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How America deploys broadband is the central infrastructure 
challenge our country faces . . . . How we get it done affects not 
only how many megabytes of information our computers can 
download, but . . . what kinds of opportunities will be available to 
those in our society who do not share fully in our general 
prosperity.1 
 
Municipal networks can play an essential role in making broadband 
access universal and affordable. We must not put up barriers to this 
possibility of municipal involvement in broadband 
deployment. . . .  Community broadband networks have the 
potential to create jobs, spur economic development, and bring a 
21st century utility to everyone.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Cheap, ubiquitous high-speed Internet access promises to 
accelerate economic growth, create new jobs and industries, advance 
education and lifelong learning, improve health care decision-
                                                          
 1. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INQUIRY CONCERNING HIGH-SPEED ACCESS TO THE 
INTERNET OVER CABLE AND OTHER FACILITIES, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4872 (2002) 
[hereinafter HIGH-SPEED ACCESS INQUIRY 2002] (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Michael J. Copps). 
 2. 151 CONG. REC. S7298 (daily ed. June 23, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Lautenberg). 
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making, and raise living standards.3  Conversely, foregone broadband 
access by poor and underserved Americans is imposing high 
economic and social costs.4  As much as $1 trillion in economic 
growth may be delayed due to structural and legal limitations on U.S. 
broadband access.5  Americans without broadband will be unlikely to 
participate in the estimated $1 trillion market for electronic 
commerce conducted over the Internet.6  Many children and young 
people in households without broadband are unnecessarily denied 
the opportunity to leverage the Internet’s rich resources for study 
and research purposes, so as to achieve their full potential.7  And 
families without broadband will struggle to become “active and 
informed participant[s] in their own health care” by finding 
potentially lifesaving treatments online.8 
Since 2004, city officials across the United States have increasingly 
endorsed the idea of providing universal broadband access to their 
                                                          
 3. FLORIDA MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION (FMEA), THE CASE FOR MUNICIPAL 
BROADBAND IN FLORIDA 2 (2005), http://www.baller.com/pdfs/fmea_white_paper. 
pdf. 
 4. See id. at 17 (asserting that towns without high-speed broadband access will 
lose jobs and people in underserved locations will not have access to important 
economic, medical, and educational opportunities). 
 5. See Charles H. Ferguson, The Broadband Problem:  Anatomy of a Market 
Failure and a Policy Dilemma 5 (2004) (“[T]he economic costs of constraints to 
broadband deployment have already been large and could amount to hundreds of 
billions of dollars over the next decade, possibly reaching $1 trillion.”); Thomas 
Bleha, Down to the Wire, Foreign Aff., May-June 2005, at 111, 121, available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050501faessay84311/thomas-bleha/down-to-the 
wire.html?mode=print (noting that the $1 trillion figure reflects only the economic 
costs of lagging broadband deployment and does not reflect costs associated with 
foregone opportunities for telecommuting or accessing medical care, education, or 
entertainment). 
 6. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 32 (adding that many leading firms from 
diverse industries now conduct much of their business over the Internet). 
 7. Cf. Lisa Guernsey, The Library as the Latest Web Venture, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 
2000, at G1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/06/circuits/ 
articles/15 book.html (describing how electronic access to information is becoming 
more common and more central to educational process); David Hoye, Use of Public 
Libraries Grows with Internet, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 19, 2002, at D1 (“Pew Internet 
and American Life survey released this week found that sevety-three percent of 
college students use the Internet more than they use the library.”). 
 8. Information Infrastructure Task Force, The National Information Infrastructure:  
Benefits and Applications (1993), http://www.ibiblio.org/nii/NII-Benefits-and-
Applications. html; April KirkHart et al., Helping Our Children Succeed: What’s 
Broadband Got to Do with It?, 3 CHILDREN’S PARTNERSHIP ISSUE BRIEF (June 2006), 
http://www.techpolicybank.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Publications_from_The
_Children_s_Partnership&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=9
418 (Internet access “can improve children’s health and their access to health care 
by improving the quality of care, helping children and parents manage chronic 
conditions more effectively from home (producing cost savings), allowing access to 
vital health information, [etc.]”). 
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citizens.9  They hope to deploy wireless fidelity (“Wi-Fi”) mesh 
networks to cast high-speed Internet signals across entire 
metropolitan areas.  San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom has 
proclaimed that he will not rest “until every San Franciscan has access 
to free wireless internet service.”10  Philadelphia is planning to 
provide Wi-Fi broadband access for a mere $10 to $20 a month 
throughout 135 square miles of the city.11  New York City has solicited 
bids on a project to build “the largest municipal wireless network ever 
established,” which would blanket Manhattan with broadband 
Internet access beamed to computers, portable digital devices, and 
emergency response personnel, even in vehicles moving at high 
speeds.12  Cities from Miami to Atlanta to Chicago to Portland have 
proposed to equalize high-speed Internet service through publicly-
funded Wi-Fi “clouds” wafting high-speed Internet signals across 
many miles.13  Finally, New Orleans has launched the nation’s first 
                                                          
 9. See Robert MacMillan, Life, Liberty and Free WiFi, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 
2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/02/ 
AR20050502 00449.html (identifying municipalities throughout the country that are 
providing or seeking to provide Wi-Fi to their citizens). 
 10. Office of the Mayor, City and County of San Francisco, Newsom Calls for 
“Revolution of Solutions” in His Annual State of the City Address (Oct. 21, 2004), 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/mayor_page.asp?id=27976. 
 11. See City of Philadelphia, Mayor Street Announces Signing of Agreements With 
Earthlink to Bring Wireless Access to Every Philadelphia Neighborhood:  Project Will Make 
Philadelphia Nation’s Largest WiFi Hotspot with No Cost to Taxpayer (Mar. 2006), 
http://ework.phila.gov/philagov/news/prelease.asp?id=233; The Wireless 
Philadelphia Executive Committee, Wireless Philadelphia Business Plan 12, 39 (Feb. 9, 
2005), http://www.phila.gov/wireless/pdfs/Wireless-Phila-Business-Plan-040305-
1245pm.pdf; Matt Richtel, Pennsylvania Limits Cities in Offering Net Access, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2004, at C6; MacMillan, supra note 9; Shane Peterson, Boiling Point, 
GOVERNMENT TECH., Nov. 2005, http://www.govtech.net/magazine/story.php?id. 
 12. The Big Apple Goes Wireless, BIZED, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 50.  This network 
appears to be for the use of city employees; plans for a network of wireless Internet 
access points in city parks and underserved neighborhoods have stalled.  See Wi-Fi and 
the Cities, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A20 (explaining how New York is “dragging” on 
providing “free or low-cost access in its densely populated, poor neighborhoods”); 
Melanie Lefkowitz, Free Wi-Fi Access Internet Connections; NYC Unplugged:  Parks Going 
Wireless, NEWSDAY (NEW YORK), July 3, 2006, at A6 (announcing that Wi-Fi in New 
York’s “large parks” is delayed for three years). 
 13. See, e.g., Miami-Dade County, Wireless Miami-Dade (2005), http://www. 
miamidade.gov/mayor/wireless.asp (“Over the next two years, we will seek to offer 
low-cost, high-speed Internet access to all.  We will work with the private sector to 
create a Miami-Dade County with its own wireless network.”); Gregory M. Lamb, Free 
Net Access from the Mayor?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 2004, at 14 (providing an 
overview of the municipal broadband movement and detailing Atlanta’s broadband 
rollout); Dan O’Shea, Muni Mess, TELEPHONY, Mar. 14, 2005, at 30 (describing 
Chicago’s efforts to construct a municipal Wi-Fi network in the face of opposition 
from the Illinois General Assembly); John Ness, Wi-Fi Clouds Arrive, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 
18, 2005, at E16-17 (describing Portland, Oregon’s plan to blanket the city with low-
cost Wi-Fi and the challenges, such as installation expenses, coverage gaps, and 
opposition from telecoms, that are likely to be faced by the city). 
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free city-owned wireless broadband network, with plans to expand 
citywide to spur economic redevelopment.14 
Citywide Wi-Fi as a public service is no longer a bureaucratic pipe 
dream, but has the backing of America’s technological titans.  Google 
and Earthlink have pledged to debut free advertiser-sponsored 
citywide Wi-Fi broadband in San Francisco if the city gives the green 
light.15  Earthlink won the Philadelphia contract to “provide 
‘reasonably priced’ access,” and hopes to provide broadband 
equipment to forty more city-supported broadband projects in the 
near future.16  Intel plans to unveil Wi-Fi across 1,500 square miles of 
Silicon Valley, and endorsed a bill in Congress that would liberate 
municipalities from anticompetitive restraints on their ability to 
contract with technology companies for city-supported Wi-Fi.17 
Although universal access to telecommunications services is at the 
core of American telecommunications law and policy, the United 
States has fallen far short of achieving this goal.  More than thirty 
percent of American homes lacked Internet access in 2003,18 often 
                                                          
 14. See Jonathan Krim, New Orleans’s New Connection; City-Owned Wi-Fi System to Be 
Announced Today, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at D01 (explaining how the city’s plan 
is part of an effort to reinvigorate the economy after Hurricane Katrina). 
 15. See Joseph Mallia, Free Wi-Fi Access Internet Connections: LI to Go Wireless--and 
Priceless?, NEWSDAY (NEW YORK), July 3, 2006, at A7 (“In San Francisco, the city and 
Google are finalizing a contract to provide free wireless access to everyone 
throughout the 50-square-mile city, in exchange for Google being allowed to show 
online advertising.”); Ryan Kim, S.F. Wi-Fi Network Bidding Heats Up; Google, Earthlink 
Team to Lead Field of Competitors, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 23, 2006, at C1 (reporting that the 
“Earthlink-Google bid includes free download speeds of about 300 Kbps that will 
include local advertising.  The premium service will feature a download speed of 1 
Mbps for about $20 a month”).   
 16. Mallia, supra note 15, at A7.  See Alex Goldman, Winning Municipal Business, 
ISP PLANET, Oct. 10, 2005, http://www.isp-planet.com/news/2005elnk_muni_ 
051010.html (noting that Earthlink is optimistic about the future of its municipal 
wireless business). 
 17. Joshua Sabatini, Vast Wi-Fi Network To Cost $250M, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. 
BUSINESS NEWS - PALO ALTO DAILY NEWS, Apr. 7, 2006 (crediting Intel Solutions 
Services with plan); Intel Corp., Intel Corporation Praises Legislative Approach on Muni 
Networks (July 15, 2005), available at http://www.freepress.net/docs/intel 
_s.1294_v1.1.pdf; see also Henry J. Gomez, Intel Imagines Wireless Cleveland, CLEVELAND 
PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 7, 2005, at A1 (noting that Intel has chosen Cleveland, Ohio as a 
“participant[] in its Digital Cities Initiative” to provide “Intel funding and 
professional support to regions looking to enhance their wireless communications”); 
Intel Corp., Intel Pledges 1500 PCs, Wireless Access Points, Technical Support for Hurricane 
Katrina Disaster Relief Efforts (Sept. 5, 2005),  http://www.intel.com/pressroom/ 
archive/releases/20050902corp.htm (discussing that Intel donated computers and 
Wi-Fi equipment to help eliminate “communication problems [that] have been a 
major challenge in coordinating disaster recovery, rescue, and care efforts”). 
 18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, A NATION ONLINE:  ENTERING THE BROADBAND AGE, fig. 
12 (Sept. 2004),  http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol2004/NationOnlineBroad 
band04.htm [hereinafter A NATION ONLINE].  Nearly thirty percent of surveyed 
Americans described themselves as non-users of the Internet as of 2006.  See Mary 
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because it was too expensive.19  Roughly two-thirds of American 
households did not have high-speed Internet access in 2005.20  One-
fifth of Americans have never used the Web at all.21 
The provision of high-speed Internet access by private industry 
alone is leaving behind most of the poor, vast numbers of racial and 
ethnic minorities, and many residents of rural and inner-city 
communities.22  Such unequal access to computers, electronic 
networks, telecommunications services, or information based on 
demographic or socio-economic factors such as income, race, gender, 
age, or location is known as a “digital divide.”23  Forbidding monthly 
fees and surcharges for broadband, at up to five times the cost of a 
dial-up Internet connection, remain the principal obstacle to 
universal broadband connectivity to the Internet.24  For tens of 
millions of families, broadband is simply too expensive; the average 
family with high-speed access boasts an annual income of $72,000,25 
                                                          
Madden, Internet Penetration and Impact 3, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 
(Apr. 2006) (“[O]ur latest survey, fielded February 15–April 6, 2006 shows that fully 
73% of respondents (about 147 million adults) are Internet users, up from 
66% . . . in our January 2005 survey.”), 
 19. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, BRIEFING MEMO:  THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 3 
(Apr. 2004), http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/acsfa/digitaldiv.doc (“In a 
2001 survey, the largest specific response to why households do not have Internet in 
their homes was ‘too expensive.’”). 
 20. Mike Dorning, Fundraising Clicks Over Internet, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 8, 2006, at 
C11; Katharine Q. Seelye, At Newspapers, Some Clipping; Jobs Are Cut as Ads and Readers 
Move Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at C1; Birgitta Forsberg, The Future is South 
Korea, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2005, at B1. 
 21. Bob Keefe, Survey Finds 1 in 5 Americans Have Never Used the Web, 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Oct. 9, 2005, at C6. 
 22. See Maggie Jackson, Nonprofit Builds A Bridge Across the Digital Divide, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 04, 2006, at G1  (“Just 23 percent of households with annual incomes of 
less than $15,000 have home Internet access . . . .”); KirkHart et al., supra note 8, at 4 
(“In 2003, only 26% of children ages 7-17 had access to broadband in their homes, 
and low-income children were one-seventh as likely to have broadband at home 
compared to children in higher income households.”); NATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FALLING THROUGH THE NET:  
DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 5-9 (1999), available at http://www.ntia.doc. 
gov/ntiahome/fttn99/FTTN.pdf (presenting demographic and geographic traits 
that are “significant determinants of a household’s likelihood of owning a computer 
or accessing the Internet from home”). 
 23. KirkHart et al., supra note 8, at 2. 
 24. See Jim Hu, Study:  Price Matters for Broadband, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 13, 
2003), http://news.com.com/2100-1034-5090434.html?part=dht&tag=ntop (“Sixty-
three percent of dial-up households said they would not upgrade to broadband 
because it’s too expensive . . . .”); Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide:  Equality in the 
Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (2002) (pointing out that “the 
expensive fees for high-speed Internet access” may preclude half of Americans from 
subscribing to it, and that  “the high cost of Internet connection remains the major 
barrier to Internet access”). 
 25. CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING, CONNECTED TO THE FUTURE:  A 
REPORT ON CHILDREN’S INTERNET USE 8 (Mar. 19, 2003), http://www.cpb.org/ 
stations/reports/ connected/connected_report.pdf. 
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two-thirds more than the $43,000 earned by the typical American 
family.26  For others, including many American households in rural or 
underserved areas, broadband access is totally unavailable.27 
The most controversial proposed solution to these gaps in 
broadband access has been for municipal governments, i.e. cities and 
counties, to offer broadband access as a public service.  Over 600 
municipalities offered such service as of 2005, a small but rapidly 
growing percentage of the over 18,000 municipalities in the United 
States.28  Currently, however, more than fourteen U.S. states prohibit 
or restrict cities and counties from ensuring universal broadband 
access.29  Despite the proliferation and growing importance of such 
state law restraints, most legal scholarship on broadband policy has 
focused on common carrier rules imposed on broadband 
infrastructure providers,30 rather than federal and state laws on 
municipal competition in broadband markets.31 
                                                          
 26. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME STABLE, POVERTY UP, NUMBERS OF AMERICANS 
WITH AND WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE RISE, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (Aug. 26, 
2004), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealt 
h/002484.html. 
 27. See A NATION ONLINE, supra note 18, at Executive Summary (reporting that 
only 24.7% of households in rural areas have broadband connections, and 22.1% of 
rural households with dial-up connections report that they do not have broadband 
because it is not available to them, while another 35% did not know whether it was 
available or not). 
 28. David Tuerck, The Competitive Effects of Municipal Provision of Wireless 
Broadband, NEW MILLENNIUM RESEARCH COUNCIL (NMRC), NOT IN THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST:  THE  MYTH OF MUNICIPAL WI-FI NETWORKS 20 (Feb. 2005),  
http://www.newmillennium research.org/archive/wifireport2305.pdf. 
 29. See Lautenberg, supra note 2 (“The ‘Community Broadband Act’ is in 
response to those efforts by States to tell local communities that they cannot establish 
networks for their citizens . . . .”).  As many as thirty-two states limited municipal 
broadband to some extent as of 2004.  CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, 
DRAFT REPORT ON BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA, Appendix B (2004), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/ COMMENT_DECISION/43588.htm. 
 30. See generally Mark Cooper, Unbundling and Open Access Policies:  Open Access to 
the Broadband Internet:  Technical and Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary 
Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2000) (making a case for open access to 
broadband networks acquired by AT&T via mergers and acquisitions); James Speta, 
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?:  A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband 
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000) (concluding that open access rules for 
broadband would not benefit the industry); Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The 
End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) (cautioning against changes imposed by broadband cable 
providers on the end-to-end architectural structure of the Internet); Tim Wu, The 
Broadband Debate:  A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004) 
(describing debates among economists and legal scholars concerning merits of open 
and closed networks); Steven Aronowitz, Brand X Internet Services v. FCC:  The Case 
of the Missing Policy Argument, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 887, 890-91 (2005) (describing 
how the shift to open access in the telecommunications industry enhanced consumer 
choice and industry competition). 
 31. Of the two major scholarly forays into the municipal broadband debate, both 
predated the Supreme Court’s 2004 holding in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 
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The primary thesis of this Article is that Congress and the states 
should encourage cities and counties to provide free and low-cost Wi-
Fi broadband to their citizens.  The American public has a 
compelling national interest in equalizing access to computers and 
the Internet across racial, economic, and geographical lines.32  
Municipal broadband projects, and particularly the provision by cities 
and counties of free or low-cost wireless broadband networks partially 
subsidized by tax revenues, hold great potential to bridge the digital 
divide.33  Existing municipal broadband efforts in the United States, 
as well as state-subsidized broadband deployment in other nations, 
have already successfully brought broadband to previously 
underserved areas.34 
Part II describes the history of the broadband market in the United 
States, and the anticompetitive implications of the market’s natural 
monopoly and network industry characteristics.  Part III contends 
that a trio of recent Supreme Court cases construing the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “1996 Act”) achieved a 
sweeping deregulation of the broadband industry.35  This has 
empowered the owners of broadband infrastructure with natural 
monopoly characteristics, such as telephone and cable networks, to 
act with near impunity to impair their smaller rivals’ ability to 
                                                          
541 U.S. 125 (2004), that Congress had not preempted anticompetitive state laws 
outlawing municipal telecommunications projects.  The first significant scholarly 
treatment of municipal broadband projects was generally supportive, see Steven 
Carlson, A Historical, Economic, and Legal Analysis of Municipal Ownership of the 
Information Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1999) (concluding that 
municipalities should take the lead in providing broadband to their citizens as a 
means to increasing accessibility to information), while the second was generally 
critical, see Kathryn Tongue, Comment, Municipal Entry Into the Broadband Cable 
Market:  Recognizing the Inequities Inherent in Allowing Publicly Owned Cable Systems to 
Compete Directly Against Private Providers, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2001) (arguing that 
allowing municipalities to compete in the broadband market would be 
anticompetitive).  Neither scholar discussed proposed federal legislation, such as the 
Preserving Innovation in Telecom Act of 2005, to ban municipalities from 
contributing to increased competition in broadband markets and more equitable 
access to high-speed Internet service.  See infra Part IV.A (describing how the law 
would outlaw municipal broadband services similar to those provided by a private 
firm in the area). 
 32. See Lautenberg, supra note 2 (stating that the Community Broadband Act of 
2005 will “promote economic development, enhance public safety, increase 
educational opportunities, and improve the lives of citizens . . . .”). 
 33. See infra Part IV.C.2 (arguing that municipal broadband projects can provide 
Internet access to underserved communities at relatively low cost per user). 
 34. See infra Part IV.C.2-3 (describing municipal broadband initiatives in rural 
Kentucky and Iowa, as well as in Canada, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden, among 
other countries). 
 35. See infra Part III (proposing that deregulation makes the role of 
municipalities in providing broadband access more vital because without regulations 
ensuring universal access many rural and underprivileged areas will continue to not 
be served). 
 8/12/2006  2:14:35 PM 
2006] WI-FI EVERYWHERE 1705 
compete.36  As a result, congressional action is necessary to 
reinvigorate competition and promote municipal participation in the 
broadband marketplace. 
Finally, Part IV endorses aspects of a bill being considered in the 
U.S. Senate, the Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunity 
Reform Act of 2006, which would remedy the growing digital divide37 
by preempting state laws that prevent municipalities from setting up 
Wi-Fi networks.38  Such a reform of the 1996 Act will best promote the 
federal policy of ensuring universal broadband service at affordable 
prices by accelerating the municipal provision of broadband to 
underserved communities.39  Permitting state regulation and 
management of municipal broadband will adequately protect the 
interests of the private broadband industry and the public in 
preserving the viability of commercial projects.40 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE BROADBAND 
INDUSTRY 
A. Broadband Access in its Historical Context 
Telecommunications services such as telephone and broadband 
Internet present a natural monopoly problem when they are 
regulated by private property rules that are not accompanied by price 
and output regulation under antitrust and/or telecommunications 
                                                          
 36. See id. (detailing how in the absence of antitrust and telecommunications 
regulation, cable and telephone companies may impair competition, inflate prices, 
reduce innovation and output, and delay universal broadband access). 
 37. See infra Part IV (reciting statistics that show that the gap between Internet 
users and non-users continues to grow across racial, educational, and socio-economic 
lines). 
 38. See id. (asserting that municipal broadband projects have prevented many 
underserved municipalities from being relegated to the wrong side of the digital 
divide). 
 39. See Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(c) (2006) (“No State or local government statute, 
regulation, or other State or local government legal requirement may prohibit or 
have the effect of prohibiting any public provider from providing, to any person or 
any public or private entity, advanced communications capability or any service that 
utilizes the advanced communications capability provided by such provider.”).  The 
Senate Commerce Committee renamed this bill the Advanced Telecommunications 
and Opportunity Reform Act of 2006 prior to referring it to the full Senate.  See Bary 
Alyssa Johnson, Senate Committee Cuts Net Neutrality Amendment, PC MAGAZINE/ABC 
NEWS.COM, June 29, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ZDM/story?id=2138. 
 40. See Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(d) (2006) (setting forth antidiscrimination 
safeguards requiring public providers to subject themselves to regulations they 
imposed, or which are imposed by state or local laws, on similarly situated privately-
owned providers, and requiring them to grant privately-owned providers open access 
to conduits, trenches, and locations used by the public provider). 
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law.41  Federal telecommunications policy developed under the 
shadow of what Congress called the “telephone monopoly” of 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (“AT&T”) and its affiliates, 
which had obtained unified national control over telephone service.42  
Prior to 1880, Alexander Graham Bell had invented and patented the 
telephone, and founded the American Bell Telephone Company.43  
AT&T built the first long-distance telephone network, and acquired 
American Bell, its former corporate parent, creating the Bell System, 
a single “‘comprehensive’ and ‘universal’ telephone network, 
‘extending from every door to every other door . . . .’”44 
AT&T’s dominance over the nation’s telecommunications 
infrastructure eventually collided with the federal antitrust laws.  In 
1913, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against AT&T for 
monopolizing and conspiring to restrain interstate trade and 
commerce in telecommunications.45  The settlement in the case 
established the ground rules for telecommunications as they would 
stand until 1934:   AT&T secured many local monopolies, but agreed 
to let independent telephone companies interconnect with its 
network, and divested its stake in the telegraph industry.46 
                                                          
 41. See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 490, 546-49 (1998) (noting that telephone network has 
been deemed a “natural monopoly” given the “cost advantage of market share in 
telephone networks,” such that that “it is most efficient for one producer to serve the 
entire market,” and that “property rights created by legal rules” restrict consumers 
from switching between competing networks); Aronowitz, supra note 30, at 891 
(“[P]arts of the telecommunications industry are natural monopolies. . . . The fixed 
costs associated with installing local wires between customers' homes and nearby 
aggregation centers make multiple competing networks, each with a last mile wire 
connection to all consumers, inefficient.”).   
 42. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 235 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 73-781, at 2 (1934)) (arguing for a flexible approach to regulating the 
telephone monopoly). 
 43. Regional Bell Operating Companies, Bell Symbol History (2005), 
http://www.bell. com/chron.htm. 
 44. Patricia Worthy, Racial Minorities and the Quest to Narrow the Digital Divide:  
Redefining the Concept of “Universal Service,” 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (2003) 
(quoting Theodore N. Vail, President of AT&T in 1907) (internal citations omitted). 
 45. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 12 (explaining that the government antitrust 
action resulted in a “negotiated agreement” that is referred to as the Kingsbury 
Commitment). 
 46. See AT&T, Milestones in AT&T History, http://www.att.com/history/ 
milestones.html (claiming that the Kingsbury Commitment “establishe[d] AT&T as a 
government sanctioned monopoly.  In return AT&T agree[d] to divest the 
controlling interest it had acquired in the Western Union telegraph company, and to 
allow non-competing independent telephone companies to interconnect with the 
AT&T long distance network.”); FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 12 (stating that pursuant 
to the 1913 settlement AT&T agreed to stop acquiring other telephone companies). 
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The Communications Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) declared a federal 
policy of universal access to communications services.47  With the 
1934 Act, Congress resolved “to make available, so far as possible, to 
all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and 
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges.”48  For most of its history, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) carried out its mission by 
regulating AT&T as the telephone monopolist, including by setting 
its prices and monitoring its progress toward achieving universal 
service.49  Unfortunately, the FCC proved to be incapable of 
effectively enforcing the 1934 Act’s mandate that AT&T act as a 
common carrier and discipline its pricing.50 
Competition in the long-distance telephone market, but not the 
local telephone markets, began to be unleashed when the courts 
rebuffed the FCC’s attempt to exclude potential competitors to 
AT&T, such as MCI and Sprint, from selling long distance.51  The 
                                                          
 47. See Mark Cooper, Universal Service:  A Historical Perspective and Policies for the 
Twenty-First Century ch. 1 (1996), available at http://www.benton.org/publibrary/ 
uniserv-prospective/prospects.html (reporting that the Act was committed to 
ensuring that not only the telephone infrastructure connect all Americans but also 
that telephone service be affordable to all Americans as well). 
 48. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 235 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151). 
 49. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 549 (explaining that the FCC “took 
its mandate to be the exclusion of competition from the telephone market, and the 
regulation of AT&T as a monopoly provider . . . .”); FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 12-13 
(noting that although the 1934 Act itself did not prevent competition, AT&T’s 
position in the telecommunications market led the FCC to regulate it as a 
monopoly). 
 50. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 168 (D.D.C. 1982) (relating the 
testimony of two former chiefs of the FCC’s Common Carrier Bureau who both 
claimed that the organization was unable to prevent AT&T from maintaining its 
monopolistic behavior). 
 51. Robert W. Crandall, The Remedy for the “Bottleneck Monopoly” in Telecom:  Isolate 
It, Share It, or Ignore It?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2005).  For example, when the FCC 
attempted to exclude MCI from the market for ordinary long distance telephone 
calls, a federal appeals court annulled the action, chiding the FCC for having 
“propagate[d] monopoly for monopoly’s sake.”  MCI v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977).  MCI fought AT&T on other fronts for the right to compete, including in 
the political sphere and by commencing antitrust litigation.  See FERGUSON, supra 
note 5, at 14 (stating that the antitrust litigation revealed much regarding AT&T’s 
anticompetitive practices).  In its antitrust case, MCI’s expert testified that AT&T 
priced its private line telephone service below the cost of providing the service, so as 
to “incur major losses in cutting its rates to stifle competition.”  MCI Commc’ns 
Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1125-27 (7th Cir. 1983).  A federal jury awarded MCI 
$1.8 billion in damages for AT&T’s violations of the antitrust laws, but the Seventh 
Circuit reversed and remanded the verdict based on its view of the inadequacy of 
MCI’s evidence and legal theories.  See id. at 1092, 1174  (“We conclude that the 
jury’s award of damages and certain jury findings on the merits lack evidentiary 
support or are otherwise improper as a matter of law, so that they must be set 
aside.”). MCI won much less, about $113 million, on remand.  See James B. Speta, 
Antitrust and Local Competition Under the Telecommunications Act, 71 ANTITRUST 99, 123 
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federal government pried the telecommunications market open still 
further when it put AT&T on trial for monopolizing the telephone 
industry, charges that AT&T agreed to settle in 1982 by divesting 
itself of its operating companies that supplied local telephone 
service.52  Two years later, AT&T completed its divestiture of the seven 
“Baby Bells,” formed by merging the regional holding companies for 
AT&T’s operating units.53  AT&T lost almost two-thirds of its 
employees and more than two-thirds of its assets.54 
The end of AT&T’s national monopoly benefited American 
telephone customers immensely.  Divestiture resulted in cost savings 
in excess of $100 billion in its first decade alone.55  Telephone 
penetration rose from 91.4% of U.S. households before divestiture to 
93.6 percent in 1991, a level where it would remain for most of the 
1990s.56  Meanwhile, long distance rates plummeted by nearly two-
thirds in the first decade after the divestiture of the Baby Bells and 
the introduction of long-distance competition.57 
                                                          
n.130 (2003) (noting that MCI received $37.8 million on remand (before trebling), 
and that this judgment was declared a victory for AT&T). 
 52. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 140-41 (describing the settlement in which AT&T 
agreed to divest itself of twenty-two local service operating companies).  The district 
court found that AT&T had “violated the antitrust laws in a number of ways over a 
lengthy period of time” thereby setting the stage for a consent decree that mandated 
divestiture of the Bell System.  United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1381 
(1981).  The court found that the government had adequately proven that AT&T 
had unreasonably and discriminatorily denied its long-distance competitors access to 
the Bell System local telephone network, among other anticompetitive acts and 
omissions.  See id. at 1352-53, 1359 (finding that regardless of AT&T’s compliance 
with the Communications Act of 1934, the company was still obligated under 
antitrust laws to allow competitors to interconnect with AT&T’s local telephone 
network).  This violated AT&T’s duty, as the owner of “a ‘strategic bottleneck’” in the 
telecommunications market, “to make access to that facility available to its 
competitors on fair and reasonable terms that do not disadvantage them.”  Id. at 
1352-53. 
 53. Crandall, supra note 51, at 3 n.4; see FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 14-15 (noting 
that the new AT&T’s businesses would be limited to competing in the long distance, 
telecommunications equipment, and electronics markets). 
 54. Clement G. Krouse et al., The Bell System Divestiture/Deregulation and the 
Efficiency of the Operating Companies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 61, 65 n.9 (1999).  For a list of the 
twenty-two operating companies and seven regional holding companies by initial size 
(measured in access lines), refer to id. at 66, tbl. 1. 
 55. Id. at 64, 81. 
 56. FALLING THROUGH THE NET, supra note 22, at 2 (chart 1-2); Eli Noam, 
Assessing the Impacts of Divestiture and Deregulation in Telecommunications, 59 S. ECON. J. 
438, 440 (1993). 
 57. See The Communications Act of 1994:  Hearings Before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 58 (Feb. 23, 
1994) (statement of Reed E. Hundt, FCC Chairman), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh402.txt (mentioning that the price of a 
ten minute phone call “from Chicago to Atlanta, expressed in 1993 dollars, was $6.28 
in 1984; today that same call costs only $2.30”). 
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Despite the breakup of AT&T’s national monopoly, its heirs, the 
Baby Bells, continued to exercise strategic bottleneck control over 
the telecommunications industry, based on their ownership of the 
Bell System of local telephone monopolies.58  Prior to the 1990s, state 
law generally granted the regional Bell system components “an 
exclusive franchise in exchange for some level of commitment to 
universal service.”59  Currently, the four large Baby Bell companies 
control almost seventy percent of the local telephone service 
market.60  The Baby Bells typically do not compete in one another’s 
markets;61 instead, they coordinate their behavior closely on erecting 
defenses against potential competitors, in venues including political 
lobbying, regulatory proceedings, antitrust and other appellate 
litigation, pricing policies, joint ventures, and subsidizing favorable 
academic and policy research and advocacy.62  For example, they have 
collaborated through the U.S. Telecom Association to advocate an 
“update” of the 1996 Act that would allow competing service 
                                                          
 58. See United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352-53 (1981) (rejecting 
defendants AT&T and subsidiaries’ motion to dismiss an antitrust suit brought by the 
U.S. government because they failed to allow competitors entry to local markets); 
Paul Joskow & Roger Noll, The Bell Doctrine:  Applications in Telecommunications, 
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1264 (1999) (explaining 
that the breakup of AT&T gave the Baby Bells a “near monopoly inside” their 
respective “Local Areas and Transmission Area[s]” and also “created a relatively 
small number of points at which long distance carriers could connect to local access 
networks”); David Gabel, Competition in a Network Industry:  The Telephone Industry, 
1894-1910, 54 J. OF ECON. HIST. 543, 568-69 (Sept. 1994) (“‘Local telephone 
exchanges are ‘bottlenecks’ under classical antitrust theory.  The control of these 
franchises provides AT&T with the incentive and opportunity to protect, maintain, 
and extend its monopoly in telecommunications services overall.’”) (quoting 
Plaintiff’s First Statement of Contentions and Proofs at 70, United States v. AT&T, 
524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981) (No. 74-1698)).  State and local law reinforced 
AT&T’s monopoly by imposing franchise requirements on independent telephone 
companies, such as maximum rates, which did not apply to AT&T.  See id. at 561-62 
(stating because these regulations were not imposed on AT&T as well, they operated 
as a barrier to entry for firms wishing to compete in the market). 
 59. Worthy, supra note 44, at 10 n.27. 
 60. See TNS Telecoms, Combined AT&T/Bellsouth Will Control 22% Consumer 
Telecom Spending, 34% Business Spending (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.tns 
telecoms.com/press-3-13-06.html (showing that Verizon accounts for twenty-five 
percent of local phone service market share, SBC twenty-three percent, BellSouth 
twelve percent, and Qwest eight percent). 
 61. See id. (indicating that eighty to ninety percent of local telephone customers 
claimed by Verizon, SBC, BellSouth, and Qwest are inside their respective service 
territories); FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 107 (noting that as of a few years ago, only 
5,000 out of seventy million SBC customers lived “outside of [SBC’s] operating 
area”); Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political Consequences of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1369 n.28 (1999) (noting that as of late 
1990s there had been “very little entry and competition in local exchange markets”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 104, 112, 116-17 (relating the large extent to 
which the Baby Bells cooperate with each other and the fact that the conflict of 
interests that seemingly arise from these activities are largely not commented upon). 
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providers to be denied access to the telephone networks, just as the 
FCC has denied competing providers access to the cable networks.63 
Prior to the 1990s, the cable industry obtained monopoly power in 
many local markets by negotiating with municipalities for exclusive 
franchise rights.64  Owners of cable networks thereby obtained a 
“bottleneck monopoly” that constitutes “a physical and economic 
barrier” to competition.65  In other words, “the physical connection 
between the television set and the cable network gives the cable 
operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of 
the [information] that is channeled into the subscriber’s home.”66 
By 2000, only a small minority of cable subscribers lived in regions 
of effective competition where they could switch providers if they so 
desired.67  Only about 3.7% of the around 34,000 “cable community 
units” in the United States had a choice between more than one 
multichannel video provider as of 2004, a condition referred to 
“effective competition” by the FCC.68  On a nationwide basis, the top 
four U.S. multichannel video companies divide the majority of the 
                                                          
 63. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, No Neutral Ground in This Internet Battle, WASH. 
POST, June 26, 2006, at D01 (describing collaboration between AT&T and BellSouth 
on print and television advertising supporting legislation permitting broadband 
providers to discriminate in pricing and service offered to different Web content 
providers); U.S. Telecom Ass’n, The Future . . . Faster, http://www.thefuturefaster. 
com/myth_everyone. aspx (last visited May 21, 2006) (“Local telecoms simply ask to 
compete according to the same rules already allowed for every last one of their cable, 
satellite and wireless competitors.”); USTA Publicity Campaign Seeks Legislative Jump 
Start, TELECOM POLICY REPORT, Feb. 2, 2005, available at http://www. 
indarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_4_3/ai_n9479829 (describing the 
telecommunications lobby’s aggressive publicity campaign geared towards prompting 
new telecommunications reforms, including “The Future . . . Faster” website). 
 64. See Br. Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and 
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law in Support of 
Respondents, at 8, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. 
Ct. 2688 (2005) (Nos. 04-277 & 04-281), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/ 
cases/aclu-brandx.pdf (“Until 1992, the law permitted localities to award exclusive 
cable franchises, and many did.  Today’s large cable companies owe their dominance 
in the market to the earlier government-granted monopoly.”) (citation omitted).  
Federal law currently defines a franchise as an authorization by a federal, state, or 
local governmental entity to construct or operate a cable system.  47 U.S.C. 
§§ 522(9), 522(10). 
 65. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
 66. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994). 
 67. See Donald L. Alexander, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, Laying Cable and 
Competition (May 15, 1999), http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=1783 
(“Nationwide, only 3% of 67 million cable subscribers can select from competing 
cable companies.”). 
 68. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING, 
ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2828 (2005) [hereinafter VIDEO 
COMPETITION REPORT]. 
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market among themselves,69 and only about fifteen percent of the 
market is not claimed by the top ten companies.70  Rates for typical 
cable television packages have risen at several times the rate of 
inflation since the passage of the 1996 Act.71 
B. From Dial-Up to Broadband Internet Access 
Through 2003, most Americans accessed the Internet using 
narrowband “dial-up” services, which send and receive data over 
telephone lines at speeds of fifty-six kilobits per second (“Kbps”) or 
less.72  The FCC defines broadband to include Internet service with a 
transmission speed of 200 Kbps in at least one direction.73  Residential 
broadband fitting this definition often operates via cable modems,74 
or by asymmetric digital subscriber line (“DSL” or “ADSL”) 
technology, which transmits data over the telephone network.75  
Broadband at 200 Kbps permits the user to stream audio or video 
content, and click through and between Web pages roughly as fast as 
                                                          
 69. See id. at 2763 (finding that “[i]n June 2003, the four largest operators served 
about 59 percent of all U.S. cable subscribers . . . in June 2004, the four largest cable 
operators served about 58 percent of . . . subscribers”). 
 70. Id. at 2872-73 tbls. B-3 & B-4.  The FCC defines “effective competition” as 
existing where consumers have a choice of more than one wireline cable television 
provider, or where direct broadcast satellite has a local penetration in excess of 
fifteen percent.  Id. at 2828. 
 71. See, e.g., Christopher Stern, Pols Threaten to Sack Cable Over Rate Hikes, VARIETY, 
Jan. 19-25, 1998, at 63-4 (reporting that cable rates had risen at four times rate of 
inflation from 1996 to 1998); Geraldine Fabrikant, Little Outcry From Viewers As Rates 
Rise For Cable, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2003, at C1 (reporting that cable rates had risen at 
slightly more than three times the rate of inflation from 1997 to 2003); Ken Belson, 
F.C.C. Sees Cable Savings in à la Carte, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at C1 (reporting that 
“American households spent an average of $57.12 a month for pay television, an 
increase of 35.7 percent from 2000 . . . .”). 
 72. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that two-thirds of homes “still 
depended upon modems,” with the result that only about “20 percent of total U.S. 
homes . . . use faster Internet service”). 
 73. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (U.S. GAO), TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
REGULATORY FACTORS AFFECTING CONSUMER CHOICE OF INTERNET PROVIDERS, 4 n.1 
(2000), available at http://www.usiia.org/news/gao.pdf.  Residential broadband 
usually does not enable symmetric high-speed access, which would be equally fast 
whether uploading or downloading, but instead connects subscribers at a maximum 
of one or two megabits per second (“Mbps”) downstream and only a tenth as fast 
upstream, less than 256 Kbps.  See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 33.  Moreover, when the 
local network neighborhood becomes crowded, cable modem broadband access can 
slow to a crawl in both directions.  See Johannes Bauer, Junghyun Kim, & Steven 
Wildman, An Integrated Framework for Assessing Broadband Policy Options, 2005 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 21, 32 tbl. 2. 
 74. See A NATION ONLINE, supra note 18, fig. 3 (showing that 56.4% of broadband 
households used cable while 41.6% used DSL in 2003); Carlson, supra note 31, at 21 
(noting that “many experts” consider “cable modem service” to be “the favored 
technology for broadband networks”). 
 75. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 3. 
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leafing through the pages of a book, on a good day.76  Unlike dial-up 
access, moreover, a broadband connection is “always on,” so a user 
does not have to waste time reconnecting whenever the urge strikes 
to surf the Web or check e-mail.77 
“True” broadband, in the minds of many commentators, would be 
Internet access at ten Mbps in both directions.78  Unlike asymmetric 
cable and DSL, which operate at average speeds of only 128 Kbps 
upstream, and less than two Mbps downstream, true broadband 
would enable creating and hosting full-featured Web sites; sending 
large e-mail attachments such as photographs, audio files, or videos; 
using peer-to-peer file sharing networks; playing advanced video 
games; utilizing Internet telephony; and engaging in 
videoconferencing.79  Most other networking technologies developed 
in competitive markets deliver symmetric connectivity, including 
modems, Wi-Fi, Ethernet-enabled local area networks, corporate 
intranets, and even DSL technologies other than the asymmetric 
version available to most homes and businesses.80  The FCC’s 
definition of broadband is insufficient for true broadband 
applications and archaic by international standards,81 and deserves to 
                                                          
 76. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INQUIRY CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF 
ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO ALL AMERICANS IN A REASONABLE AND 
TIMELY FASHION, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2406 (1999) [hereinafter HIGH-SPEED ACCESS 
INQUIRY 1999] (noting that broadband is defined as a bandwidth capable of 
supporting “a speed in excess of 200 kbps,” and that 200 Kbps was chosen because it 
allows users “to change web pages as fast as one can flip through the pages of a book 
and to transmit full motion video”). 
 77. See The Center for Democracy and Technology and the Broadband Access 
Project, The Emerging Broadband Technologies:  Overview and Background 20 (2000), 
http://www.cdt.org/digi_infra/broadband/backgrounder.pdf (explaining that, 
unlike dial-up Internet service, a broadband user does not have to “initiate each 
connection through the modem, a process that can easily take more than a minute”). 
 78. See, e.g., David Molony, Broadband:  A Problem Without a Solution?, TOTAL 
TELECOM, (Nov. 12, 2001), available at http://www.totaltele.com/interviews/ 
display.asp? InterviewID=98 (“true” broadband would provide symmetrical access at 
10 Mbps); Dan Gillmor, Former FCC Chairman’s Plan:  Broadband in Every Home, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 9, 2003, at 1C (asserting that “true broadband” would 
require more than 10 Mbps); FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 33 (finding that delivering 
high-quality digital video, advanced graphics, and multimedia applications requires 
speeds over 10 Mbps). 
 79. FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 66, 143-44. 
 80. See id. at 77 (discussing the majority of the modem industry’s choice to 
provide symmetric service and listing other, later networking technology industries 
that likewise decided to do so). 
 81. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, AVAILABILITY OF ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, FOURTH REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/broadband/706.html (follow “Availability of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability in the United States” hyperlink) [hereinafter FCC 
AVAILABILITY REPORT] (dissenting statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps) 
(comparing the speeds of broadband service in Japan and Korea at 8,000 Kbps and 
10,000 Kbps respectively with the FCC’s definition of broadband service, which 
considers speeds as low as 200 Kbps “broadband”). 
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be dropped in favor of better and more up-to-date measures of “true 
broadband” that will help policymakers gauge U.S. competitiveness.82 
From the inception of the Internet, federal telecommunications 
law forced the telephone companies to open their lines to dial-up 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).83  By the mid-1990s, providing 
home users with a connection to the Internet backbone was such an 
open and straightforward process that “technically literate 
teenager[s]” began to offer it, via Bulletin Board Systems and micro-
ISPs.84  This open system encouraged rapid adoption of the Internet 
by tens of millions of Americans subscribing to relatively low-cost 
ISPs,85 of which there were 7,000 by the end of the 1990s.86  America 
Online alone had thirty million subscribers in 2001, six times as many 
as in 1996.87  Other ISPs such as Prodigy, CompuServe, the Microsoft 
                                                          
 82. See id. (suggesting that the FCC study other countries’ successful broadband 
strategies and consider how they may be applied in the United States). 
 83. See U.S. GAO, supra note 73, at 24 (“[T]he common carrier status of 
telephone companies, which requires that they provide nondiscriminatory service at 
just and reasonable rates, worked to give ISPs easy access to consumers through the 
telephone network.”); Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
supra note 64, at 12 (“Because the FCC and state governments regulated telephone 
providers as common carriers, . . . thousands of ISPs [were] empowered to connect 
to their subscribers over regulated phone lines . . . .”); Francis Bar et al., Defending the 
Internet Revolution in the Broadband Era:  When Doing Nothing Is Doing Harm, E-conomy 
Working Paper 12 (Aug. 1999), http://e-conomy.berkeley.edu/publications/ 
wp/ewp12.html (arguing that growth of ISPs was made possible by FCC policies 
starting in the 1960s that “prevented telephone companies from dictating the 
architecture of data networks,” and “forced open access to networks whose monopoly 
owners tried to keep closed”). 
 84. Robert Crandall & Hal Singer, Are Vertically Integrated DSL Providers Squeezing 
Unaffiliated ISPs (and Should We Care)?, at 8 (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=710601 
(follow Social Science Research Network “New York, USA” hyperlink to download 
document) (noting that the process requires only some software, a telephone 
number that can be dialed from a computer and a link to the Internet); see Andrew 
Leonard, Geek Central, SALON.COM, June 15, 1998, http://archive.salon. 
com/21st/feature/1998/06/15 feature.html (recounting a college senior’s success 
in publishing and programming a website containing articles, tips and a discussion 
bulletin board). 
 85. See Telecommunications Reports International, Number of Online Users in U.S. 
Reaches 70.7 Million, But Changes Loom, TR’S ONLINE CENSUS (Aug. 8, 2001), 
http://www.tr.com/newsletters/rec/troc2q_pr.htm (measuring AOL’s subscribers in 
2001 at thirty million); Kara Swisher, Sears to Sell Its Stake in Prodigy, WASH. POST, Feb. 
22, 1996, at D11 (stating that America Online had five million subscribers in 1996, 
while CompuServe had about four million, Prodigy two million, and Microsoft 
Network one million). 
 86. See U.S. GAO, supra note 73, at 29 (citing a study that found ninety-two 
percent of American consumers had the choice of seven or more ISPs in 1998, and 
noting that about 7,000 ISPs existed in the United States in 2000). 
 87. Telecommunications Reports International, supra note 85; Swisher, supra note 
85, at D11.  Many of these ISPs had originated in the 1980s as closed-architecture 
online services operating on a mainframe model.  See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 17-
18. 
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Network, and Earthlink also had millions of subscribers.88  Driven 
primarily by dial-up access through these and other, smaller ISPs, the 
number of U.S. residential Internet users grew one hundredfold from 
1994 to 2004, from less than one million users in 1994 to over 150 
million users in 2004.89 
Despite the rapid proliferation of dial-up ISPs in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, residential customers did not have meaningful access to 
commercial broadband service until 1996.90  The local telephone 
companies created by the breakup of the Bell system had the 
capability to offer broadband Internet in the 1980s, but did not offer 
it on a widespread basis until the late 1990s.91  At a very early stage, a 
grassroots movement attempted to persuade state Public Utility 
Commissions to require the Baby Bells to offer broadband 
                                                          
 88. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, AOL 5.0 Unplugs Other Internet Providers, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 24, 1999, at E01 (stating that, in 1996, CompuServe and MSN had 4.3 million 
and 1 million subscribers respectively, while, in 1999, Prodigy was the third largest 
provider with more than 2.2 million subscribers, surpassed only by Earthlink and 
AOL); David Kalish, Two Firms Merge to Take on AOL:  EarthLink Will Rank as Second-
largest Web Access Provider, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 24, 1999, at D4 (reporting the 
merger between Earthlink and MindSpring Enterprises, Inc., which increased 
Earthlink’s subscribers to 3 million). 
 89. FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 86. 
 90. See HIGH-SPEED ACCESS INQUIRY 1999, supra note 76, at 2406 n.27 (finding that, 
although for years residential customers had the opportunity to subscribe to the 
same broadband services offered to medium and large businesses, these services were 
not designed for, marketed to or purchased by residential customers); Howard 
Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S. Telecommunications, 
2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85,  at 111 (stating that it was not until the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 opened the local telephone market to competition 
that carriers began offering DSL service as a consumer product on its own). 
 91. See Shelanski, supra note 90, at 115-16 (explaining that although DSL 
technology was available, it was not deployed until the 1990s, which could not be 
traced solely to low demand because even after demand rose, deployment lagged in 
areas covered by regional telephone monopolies); Dan Moffat, Debunking DSL Myths, 
TELEPHONY, Nov. 6, 2000 at 96, 102 (explaining that although DSL technology was 
invented around twenty years ago, it was not offered to customers because “high 
speed private line solutions” were still profitable for the “incumbent players” and 
customers had no access to alternative providers); see also Dhruv Khanna & Bruce 
Aitken, The Public’s Need for More Affordable Bandwidth:  The Case for Immediate Regulatory 
Action, 75 OR. L. REV. 347, 354-56 (1996) (arguing that local telephone service 
providers were not “meeting residential customers' significant and growing need for 
more telecommunications bandwidth at affordable rates”).  Although the Baby Bells 
could have started providing DSL to consumers in the late 1980s, they delayed doing 
so, fearing that that it would “‘negatively impact their other lines of business.’”  
DEBORAH A. LATHEN, BROADBAND TODAY 27 (Oct. 1999).  Bell Labs, which had 
invented DSL technology around 1980, had commercialized it by 1990 as the basis of 
high-speed T-1 lines.  See Moffat, supra note 91, at 102 (explaining that Bell Labs 
provided this inexpensive DSL service to business customers at high-margin prices 
for ten years).  Residential “DSL started out slowly since many [Baby Bells] were 
reluctant to cannibalize their profitable T-1 service which offered high-speed 
connections at a very expensive price [i.e. $450 to $2,000 per month].”  Reza Dibadj, 
Toward Meaningful Cable Competition:  Getting Beyond the Monopoly Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. 
LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 273 (2003). 
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connections, but failed.92  Only after the debut of cable modem 
service in their territories, starting in the mid-1990s, did the Baby 
Bells make DSL service available in communities where cable modem 
access had been offered, and at comparable prices.93 
The Baby Bells, cable companies, and a variety of commentators 
have argued that the adoption of residential broadband since 1996 
has been rapid, reflecting faster dissemination of a new 
communications technology than occurred with broadcast or cable 
television.94  Such comparisons, however, are often rigged to ignore 
the long period between the invention of broadband in the 1970s or 
1980s and its commercialization, which only picked up in the late 
1990s.95  The undue lag between the technological feasibility of 
residential broadband and its commercial availability may have 
artificially inflated the adoption rate for the technology during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.96  Moreover, the relatively low adoption 
rates for analog technologies such as television or VCRs may be an 
inappropriate comparison; a better yardstick may be the high 
adoption rates for digital technologies, such as dial-up Internet 
access, the World Wide Web, e-mail, and Wi-Fi, all of which spread 
faster than broadband.97 
C. Natural Monopoly and Network Industry Characteristics of Broadband 
The market for local access to broadband tends to be a “natural 
monopoly,” at least in its stages of “growth,” as compared to more 
                                                          
 92. See Shelanski, supra note 90, at 111.  One sign of this failure is that there were 
only a few hundred thousand DSL subscribers in the entire United States in 1999.  
LATHEN, supra note 91, at App.B, cht.2 (Oct. 1999). 
 93. See LATHEN, supra note 91, at 27 (noting that the Baby Bells only began 
offering DSL service once faced with losing potential customers to cable).  Time 
Warner Cable began cable modem trials in California in 1996.  Katie Hafner, Living 
the Broadband Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at G1. 
 94. This claim buttresses the Baby Bells’ deregulatory arguments that forcing the 
sharing of their networks with competitors, or allowing subsidies for municipal 
broadband, are unnecessary and probably harmful disruptions of a dynamic industry 
characterized by rapid growth and popularization.  See, e.g., Industrial Competition and 
Consolidation:  The Telecom Marketplace Nine Years After the Telecom Act:  Oversight Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 32 (2005) (statement of Michael 
Kellogg on behalf of U.S. Telecom Association) (arguing that U.S. broadband 
“penetration has increased at record rates” since FCC embraced deregulatory 
approach and abandoned broadband “unbundling” (or open access) policies). 
 95. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 141 (suggesting, instead, a comparison of 
adoption rates from the time of invention to the time of commercialization). 
 96. See id. (“[R]apid diffusion may be a response to pent-up demand and 
excessive delays in commercialization.”). 
 97. See id. (explaining that because analog technologies improve at a slower rate 
than digital, a comparison of the two is inappropriate). 
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“matur[e]” markets.98  In a natural monopoly, a single provider may 
satisfy consumer demand at lower average cost than two or more 
providers.99  In a more mature market, a city or neighborhood may 
support two or more methods of accessing the Internet over 
broadband, such as DSL, cable, fiber optic lines, satellite, Wi-Fi, or 
broadband over power lines.100  Nevertheless, large economies of scale 
in connecting the “last mile” of wires to subscribers favor monopolists 
over new entrants, who must incur exorbitant fixed costs in order to 
challenge incumbent providers.101  Thus, the marginal and average 
total costs of delivering broadband to the millionth user of an 
existing broadband network will tend to be much lower than to the 
tenth user to a newly constructed network.102 
Broadband is also an industry characterized by network effects, and 
is therefore frequently described as a “network industry.”103  Network 
effects characterize the broadband industry because the value of a 
broadband Internet connection increases dramatically as more 
Internet users have broadband, and as content providers make high-
                                                          
 98. Gerald Faulhaber & Christiaan Hogendorn, The Market Structure of Broadband 
Telecommunications, 48 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 305, 323 (2000). 
 99. Richard Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 
(1969); Neil Hamilton & Anne Caulfield, The Defense of Natural Monopoly in Sherman 
Act Monopolization Cases, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 465, 465 (1984); Lemley & McGowan, 
supra note  41, at 484.  Industries characterized by natural monopoly are often 
subject to economies of scale that are proportional or at least tied to the extent of 
consumer demand.  See Joskow & Noll, supra note 58, at 1251 (providing examples of 
natural monopoly industries whose economies reflect consumer demand, such as 
local distribution networks in electricity, telephone and gas service). 
 100. See HIGH-SPEED ACCESS INQUIRY 1999, supra note 76, at 2423-24; Kathleen Q. 
Abernathy, Extending Broadband to all Americans (Jan. 13, 2005), http:// 
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-256079A1.pdf (encouraging the 
deregulation and development of cable wireline networks, wireless networks and 
satellite broadband providers). 
 101. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 546-49 (finding that the telephone 
industry’s natural monopoly characteristics prevented new networks from 
competing, and regulation did little to ameliorate the situation); Aronowitz, supra 
note 30, at 890-91 (explaining that the costs associated with developing a 
telecommunications network render the creation of several competing networks 
inefficient). 
 102. See Dennis Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, 
With Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 446, 451 (1983) 
(explaining that creating a new network involves large initial costs, whereas using an 
existing network continuously decreases marginal costs); Lemley & McGowan, supra 
note 41, at 484 (finding that in a natural monopoly, the marginal and average costs 
of production decline as the demand increases in a given market). 
 103. See, e.g., Robert Crandall, Broadband Communications, 2 THE HANDBOOK OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS (Martin Cave et al. eds., 2003); CPB NETHERLANDS 
BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS, DO MARKET FAILURES HAMPER THE 
PERSPECTIVES OF BROADBAND? (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/ 
cpbreeksen/document/102/doc102.pdf. (finding that broadband shares 
characteristics typical of networks, including “network infrastructure, essential facility 
and economies of scale”). 
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bandwidth multimedia files and applications available.104  For 
broadband, as for other “markets with network effects, the 
incumbent’s large installed base makes it difficult for new entrants to 
dislodge the incumbent.”105 
Networks regulated solely by private property rights tend towards 
monopoly exploitation due to the “network effects” inherent in 
selling access to telecommunications facilities.106  Access to the 
network is valuable in proportion to the number of devices hooked 
up to it, such as telephones or Internet-ready computers, so a new 
network with few subscribers may struggle to attract the “critical 
mass” it needs to compete.107  Small upstart networks, as a 
consequence of “network externalities,” or benefits accruing to 
existing or potential subscribers from the connecting of a new 
subscriber to a network, may not always be able to challenge 
dominant networks effectively.108  Dominant firms in network 
                                                          
 104. Cf. William Kolasky, Network Effects:  A Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
577, 579 (1999) (“As defined in the economics literature, network effects exist . . . 
when a product becomes more valuable as greater numbers of customers use it. The 
most obvious examples are communications networks, where the value to each 
customer increases exponentially the more ‘friends and family’ are on the same 
network.”); A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 147, 148 (1999) (“the defining characteristic . . .  of network industries is that 
they involve products that are more valuable to purchasers or consumers to the 
extent that those products are widely used. This phenomenon is known as a ‘network 
effect’ or ‘demand-side economy of scale’”); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 
484 (“network effects are demand-side rather than supply-side effects: the shape of 
the demand curve is affected by existing demand”). 
 105. Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality 
Regulation (Sept. 20, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=812991 (follow Social Science Research Network “New York, USA” hyperlink to 
download document). 
 106. See Aronowitz, supra note 30, at 890-91 (”Creating multiple physical last mile 
connections for DSL or cable modem service would be . . . inefficient . . . .  Thus, the 
first company to install the last mile enjoys a natural monopoly over the connection 
that makes the open access question particularly pressing.”); see also Carl Shapiro, 
Antitrust In Network Industries (Jan. 25, 1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/0593.htm (”[O]nce achieved, the network effects that helped create 
dominance may make it more difficult for new entrants to dislodge the market 
leader than in other industries lacking network characteristics.”); Kolasky, supra note 
104, at 579, 583 (warning that enforcement agencies in both the United States and 
Europe have become increasingly vigilant in monitoring network effects). 
 107. Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 675 
(1999); see Aronowitz, supra note 30, at 890-91 (explaining that the costs associated 
with wiring the “last mile” discourage competing networks from entering the 
market); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 41, at 546 (noting that a network monopoly 
may be more efficient that competition due to cost advantages of dense networks, 
and bandwagon effects of compatibility and interconnection). 
 108. See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:  Connecting Internet Backbones 3, 22-
23 (Sept. 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf 
(suggesting also that dominant networks may refuse to connect their subscribers with 
those of the smaller networks, “squeeze” prices or engage in non-price 
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industries also deploy a host of predatory tactics to suppress new 
entry, such as mergers and acquisitions, refusals to provide access, 
exclusive dealing, monopoly leveraging, contrived incompatibility, 
preemptive announcements of new services or pricing, lawsuits based 
on invalid patents or trademarks, multi-product bundling, and below-
cost pricing to win standards wars.109 
Both the cable and the telephone networks are characterized by 
local monopolies, which carry over into broadband.110  The local 
telephone and residential cable networks are natural monopolies in 
the sense that competing with the dominant firms typically requires 
building additional wiring and infrastructure, which would be 
wasteful and duplicative in many, if not most, local markets.111  Fixed 
                                                          
discrimination by, for example, degrading interconnections with those other 
networks). 
 109. See Shapiro 1996, supra note 107 (stating that, although some of these tactics 
may be legitimate for firms with small shares in the market, use of same tactics by 
incumbent firms may be anticompetitive, by closing networks to upstart firms); 
Daniel Rubinfeld, Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust Enforcement In Dynamic Network 
Industries 4, 12 (Mar. 24, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/1611.htm. 
For example, the U.S. government has charged Verizon, the nation’s dominant 
Baby Bell prior to the merger of SBC and AT&T in 2006, with a variety of 
anticompetitive tactics, including merging with Bell Atlantic, GTE, and now MCI in 
order to reduce competition in local telephone and Internet service markets.  Private 
parties have complained of Verizon’s refusals to deal, contrived incompatibility with 
competing service providers, and bundling of DSL service with telephone service.  
See, e.g., United States v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1:05CV02103 (D.D.C. 
complaint filed Oct. 27, 2005) (examining Verizon’s acquisition of MCI); Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 107-08 (2d Cir. 
2002), rev’d sub nom. Verizon Commc’ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (examining refusals to deal with competing telephone 
service provider and monopoly leveraging); Twombly v. Bell Atl., 425 F.3d 99, 104 
(2d Cir. 2005) (examining refusals to deal with competing Internet service 
providers); Greco v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4434, at *3-6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) (examining bundling).  Plaintiffs have also charged Bell 
Atlantic, another large Baby Bell, with refusals to deal, contrived incompatibility, 
predatory pricing and price “squeezing,” falsely pre-announcing DSL service 
availability, and bringing bad faith patent litigation.  See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell 
Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (examining refusal to deal, price 
squeezing and patent litigation). 
 110. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 146, 59 (noting that the telephone and cable 
markets compete only in providing certain services, such as low-speed residential 
broadband and asymmetric services, and that the two industries are quite similar in 
certain aspects, including their inability to provide effective competition). 
 111. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 535 U.S. 467, 
475-76 (2002) (noting that “persistently monopolistic local [telephone] markets” 
have long been regarded as “the root of natural monopoly in the 
telecommunications industry”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 412-16 
(1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 “recognizes that actual local [telephone] 
competition might not prove practical” because such competition could result in 
“wasteful duplication of resources”); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 
537-38 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(finding that the “natural monopoly” characteristics of local telephone networks 
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costs associated with network development and installation are 
relatively high, while the marginal and average total costs reflecting 
the burden of adding more users are relatively low.112  High barriers 
to entry in the cable and telephone industries prevent potential 
competitors from undercutting high prices in many instances.113  The 
cable and telephone companies have built large networks under the 
protection of exclusive government franchises, “and therefore have 
first-mover advantages and scope economies not available to other 
new entrants . . . .”114  Other barriers to entry in the telephone 
market, which most likely affect the cable market as well, include 
                                                          
mean that duplication of them “would require an enormous and prohibitive capital 
investment”); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (finding that cable television may be a natural monopoly 
because “[t]he cost of the cable grid appears to be . . . largely invariant to the 
number of subscribers the system has,” so that “the average cost of cable television 
would be minimized by having a single company in any given geographical area”); 
James Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1063, 1089 (2004) (“Cable television service, like local telephony, has long been 
considered a natural monopoly service. Fixed costs are high; multiple wires to the 
home risks stranded investment; economies of both scale and density apply.”); Aditya 
Bamzai, Comment, The Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural Monopoly Regulation, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1525, 1530-32 (2004) (stating that a “natural” monopoly may exist 
where two providers serving same local area would require duplicative wiring, 
instruments, and billing) (citing 2 ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:  
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 123 (1971)). 
 112. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods., 694 F.2d at 126 (noting that the cost of 
installing cable grid is greater than the cost of adding more users); Bamzai, supra 
note 111, at 1528-29 (arguing that in the telecommunications industry, “large fixed 
expenses” result in “declining average costs” as number of users increases). 
 113. See, e.g., United States Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 359 F.3d 
554, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing substantial barriers to entry into local 
telephone service identified by FCC, such as sunk costs and ILEC absolute cost 
advantages); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF 
COMPETITION IN MARKETS FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING, FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034, 1043 (1998) (“Local markets for the delivery of . . . [cable 
television] programming generally remain highly concentrated and . . . characterized 
by some barriers to entry . . . .”). 
 114. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REPORT AND ORDER ON REMAND AND FURTHER NOTICE 
OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, REVIEW OF THE SECTION 251 UNBUNDLING OBLIGATIONS OF 
INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 17046 (2003) [hereinafter 
SECTION 251 ORDER] (referring to cable industry);  see id. at 17028-41 (making similar 
findings regarding barriers to entry into local telephone industry); Turner Broad. 
Sys. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 634 (1994) (The U.S. “cable industry 
is characterized by horizontal concentration, with many cable operators sharing 
common ownership,” which has “resulted in greater ‘barriers to entry for new 
programmers’”) (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992, § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460); U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 
F.3d at 572 (listing barriers to entry into local telephone industry, including “sunk 
costs,” incumbent telephone company “cost advantages,” “first-mover advantages,” 
and “operational barriers to entry” controlled by incumbent telephone companies); 
FMEA, supra note 3, at 11 (explaining that state and local governments created 
monopolies in telephone and cable television industry by granting “exclusive 
franchises . . . to serve a particular geographic area,” which protected private 
companies like BellSouth or Comcast from competition while they built “large 
networks with economies of scale and scope”). 
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“bottlenecks, entrenched customer preferences, the regulatory 
process, large capital requirements, access to technical information, 
and disparities in risk.”115 
D. The Lack of Effective Competition in Many Broadband Markets 
Consumers’ options in selecting high-speed Internet service have 
been very limited until recently.  Some commentators describe the 
broadband market as a “cable-phone duopoly.”116  By 2004, the fFCC 
reported that close to forty percent of all U.S. zip codes either had 
monopoly or duopoly broadband access, or none at all.117  “Thus, 
nearly half of all consumers lack meaningful choice in broadband 
providers.”118  For the rest, a single DSL provider is typically the only 
effective competition to the dominant local cable provider in the 
market for residential broadband access.119  These estimates actually 
overstate the extent of competition, because the FCC requires only 
that an entity has one subscriber in an entire zip code to be counted 
as a provider throughout that area.120  In fact, when consumers were 
polled in 2004 regarding the availability of broadband in their area, 
nearly a tenth reported that it was not available in their area at all, 
                                                          
 115. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1348 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 116. Rob Pegoraro, Broadband Is Too Important to Be Left to Cable-Phone Duopoly, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at F07; see also Mike Langberg, S.F. Wifi Proposal Out on a 
Tech Limb, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 19, 2005, at 1D, available at 
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/business/columnists/mike_langber
g/12425371.htm (discussing the “broadband duopoly” and various cities’ plans to 
award bidding companies the sole or shared right to build such a citywide network, 
providing Internet access to homes). 
 117. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, 
WIRELESS COMPETITION BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION RELEASES 
DATA ON HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS, tbl.12 (June 2004),  
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hsp 
d0604.pdf (finding that in 2003 14.9% of zip codes had one provider, 17.1% had two 
providers and 6.8% had none at all). 
 118. Network Neutrality:  Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006), 2006 WL 
282062 (statement of Vint Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google 
Inc.), http://commerce. senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf. 
 119. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 132, 136 (asserting that the residential 
broadband market is a duopoly between local telephone and cable monopolies); see 
also Bruce Fein, Choking Broadband Competition, BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 28, 2005, at 74 
(explaining that in many places, where cable and DSL are the only options, 
broadband access is costly and of a low quality due to the incumbents’ stronghold on 
the market). 
 120. See Michael J. Copps, Commissioner, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, RE:  Aug. 6, 
2003 Wireline Competition Bureau Report on the Growth of Subscribership to High-
Speed Service During the Last Three Years (Aug. 6, 2003), http://hraunfoss. 
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-237388A3.pdf (“Finding one high-speed 
subscriber in a zip code and counting it as service available throughout is not a 
credible way to proceed.”). 
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and one in six said that only one monopoly broadband provider 
served their area.121 
The market for local broadband service is extraordinarily 
concentrated by economic measures,122 and is in need of substantial 
reform to become fully competitive.123  In 2005, the top six providers 
claimed ninety percent of cable broadband subscribers, while the top 
four DSL providers claimed nearly ninety percent of DSL 
subscribers.124  Using the economic methodology employed by the 
U.S. Department of Justice (i.e., the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or 
“HHI”),125 the local broadband sector is “highly concentrated.”126  In 
fact, the typical local broadband market has an HHI concentration 
level of 5,000,127 three times what the Department of Justice considers 
to be highly concentrated.128  Judged by its HHI, local broadband was 
five times as concentrated in 2001 as the print media, radio and 
television broadcasting, or film production and distribution,129 and 
                                                          
 121. PEW INTERNET PROJECT, BROADBAND PENETRATION ON THE UPSWING:  55% OF 
ADULT INTERNET USERS HAVE BROADBAND AT HOME OR WORK 6 (Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://www.pewInternet.org/PPF/r/121/report_display.asp (follow “View PDF of 
Report” hyperlink). 
 122. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, PROVISION OF FIXED AND MOBILE BROADBAND 
ACCESS, EDUCATIONAL AND OTHER ADVANCED SERVICES IN THE 2150-2162 AND 2500-2690 
MHZ BANDS ET AL., 18 F.C.C.R. 6722, 6775 (2003) (asserting that, with a HHI of 
between approximately 5000 and 5400, the “typical broadband Internet market is 
very highly concentrated”). 
 123. See Pegoraro, supra note 116, at F07 (suggesting that the FCC encourage true 
competition by creating more meaningful regulations, better enforcing its current 
regulations and easing the way for progress in other forms of broadband). 
 124. Leichtmann Research Group, Over 40 Million Subscribe to Broadband Internet in 
the U.S. (Nov. 14, 2005),  http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/111405 release. 
html (reporting that Comcast, Time Warner, Cox, Charter, Adelphia, and 
Cablevision claim twenty-one out of twenty-three million cable broadband 
subscribers, while SBC, Verizon, Bell South, and Qwest claim fifteen out of seventeen 
million DSL broadband subscribers). 
 125. An industry’s HHI is derived by adding up the squares of each nontrivial 
industry participant’s market share.  U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade 
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.5 (Apr. 2, 1992), http://www.usdoj. 
gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/15.html. 
 126. The Department of Justice considers an industry with an HHI in excess of 
1,800 to be “highly concentrated.”  Id.; see also Application of Echostar 
Communications Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. 20559, 20614 (2002) (asserting that where a 
post-merger HHI exceeds 1800 and the HHI increases by more than 100 points, the 
merger will likely enhance the firm’s market power). 
 127. See Harvey Reiter, The Contrasting Policies of the FCC and FERC Regarding the 
Importance of Open Transmission Networks in Downstream Competitive Markets, 57 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 243, 291-92 (2005) (basing this analysis on a residential and small 
business market consisting of the ILEC provider, one non-ILEC provider, and one 
cable provider, the HHI is 5200). 
 128. Id. at 292. 
 129. Eli Noam, The Internet:  Still Wide Open and Competitive?, at 3-6 (Sept. 2003), 
http://tprc.org/papers/2003/200/noam_TPRC2003.pdf. 
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more than twice as concentrated as new media, such as home video 
and cable television, or the Internet industry.130 
Broadband is much less competitive than the non-broadband 
Internet sector, which many small start-up ISPs entered with relative 
ease.131  For every 100,000 users of the dial-up Internet, there were 
fewer than two broadband providers as of 2002, compared to about 
fifteen dial-up ISPs.132  Many consumers have only one broadband 
choice to make:   between a single DSL and a single cable broadband 
provider.133  Cable providers accounted for two-thirds of broadband 
households in 2001, a lead that narrowed to fifty-six percent of 
households in 2003.134 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 6.  The Internet industry is here defined to include the Internet 
backbone, Internet service providers, Web browsers and media players, and Internet 
search engines and Web portals.  See id. at 2 (listing the “infrastructure components 
underlying the Internet’s basic functioning”). 
 131. See id. at 9 (demonstrating that the top ten companies’ revenue made up 
about sixty-five percent of the Internet industry’s total revenue in 2001/2002).  Over 
ninety-two percent of Americans “had access by a short local phone call to seven or 
more ISPs by 1998.”  Shane Greenstein, Commercialization of the Internet, in 1 
INNOVATION, POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 165 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).  Even rural 
Internet users could select from among at least four to seven ISPs on average by the 
late 1990s, while urban users could select from among literally hundreds of 
providers.  See Karen Charman, Recasting the Web:  Information Commons to Cash Cow, 
EXTRA!, Aug. 26, 2002, at 22, 24, available at http://www.alternet.org/story/13929 
(quoting CEO of Earthlink) (stating that Internet users in small towns and rural 
areas can select from at least four ISPs, whereas users in cities can choose from 
hundreds); Broadband:  Competition and Consumer Choice in High Speed Internet Services 
and Technologies:  Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 31-38 (July 
14, 1999) (statement of Bill Schrader, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, PSINet 
Inc.) (“[A]pproximately [ninety-six] percent of Americans today have a choice of at 
least four ISP’s within their local calling area.”). 
 132. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE IMPORTANCE OF ISPS IN THE GROWTH 
OF THE COMMERCIAL INTERNET 28 (2002),  http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/isp 
study070102 .pdf. 
 133. S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK:  THE FCC IGNORES AMERICA’S 
DIGITAL DIVIDE 15 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/ 
sitecontent/broadband_report_optimized.pdf. 
 134. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 18, at Executive Summary; see U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 359 F.3d 554, 585 (finding, in 2004, that cable 
companies provided nearly sixty percent of all high-speed lines).  Cable has 
heretofore enjoyed several advantages over DSL in the United States, including 
coaxial cable’s superior bandwidth capacity and greater range than DSL, which is 
tied to central telephone switching office.  See Dibadj, supra note 91, at 272-74 
(explaining the technological constraints of DSL); Tongue, supra note 31, at 1104 
(noting that the performance of DSL transmissions decreases as the customer’s 
distance from the central office grows and that DSL quality varies with the condition 
of the copper wires and the quality of the other equipment).  In addition, between 
1996 and 2004, the cable industry spent about $95 billion, or $1,300 per customer, in 
rebuilding its infrastructure to provide digital channels, telephone, broadband, and 
on-demand services.  The amount spent specifically on broadband, however, is 
usually not broken out, precluding a focused examination of returns on broadband 
investments to date.  See NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMMS. ASS’N, THE VIDEO MARKET IS 
FULLY COMPETITIVE:  ALMOST 26 MILLION CONSUMERS NOW SUBSCRIBE TO CABLE’S 
COMPETITORS 5 (July 2004), http://www.heartland.org/pdf/16369.pdf; U.S. GEN. 
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Unlike other Internet and broadband providers such as AOL or 
Covad, which generally compete with one another by offering 
broadband on a national basis, the Baby Bells and the cable 
companies generally compete only in their specific local service 
areas.135  The Baby Bells typically offer broadband Internet service 
“only within their geographical monopoly telephone service areas.”136  
Cable providers resemble the Baby Bells in exercising “geographical 
monopoly control over a local distribution bottleneck,” and in 
making slow progress in offering high-speed Internet access on a 
nationwide basis or at prices most consumers can afford.137  The cable 
companies have resisted matching reduced introductory prices (i.e. 
about $15 per month) for slower broadband service offered by Baby 
Bells such as Verizon and SBC Communications (now AT&T 
again138), even though broadband is bundled with cable television 
and/or telephone service, as Verizon and SBC/AT&T have bundled 
broadband with local and long-distance telephone service.139  Now it 
appears that these same Baby Bells may recoup their foregone 
subscriber fees by charging Internet service providers such as Google 
for the privilege of being accessible to DSL subscribers, prompting 
fears of pervasive censorship and a pay-to-play Internet.140 
                                                          
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES RELATED TO COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES IN THE 
CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY 4, 25 (Oct. 2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d048.pdf (noting that programming and upgrading costs incurred by cable 
companies have increased on average by thirty-four percent, with the cable industry 
having spent over $75 billion between 1996 and 2002). 
 135. The only national residential broadband network is owned by Covad, which is 
neither a Baby Bell nor a cable company.  See Covad, Covad Public Policy (2005), 
http://www.covad.com/companyinfo/publicpolicy/index.shtml. 
 136. FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 108 (emphasis omitted). 
 137. Id. at 146. 
 138. See SBC-AT&T Merger Costs Trigger $866M Charge, SAN FRANCISCO BUSINESS 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, available at http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/ 
stories/ 2006/01/23/daily51.html (reporting the SBC-AT&T merger). 
 139. Jessica Marmor, Telecom, WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE (Feb. 28, 2006), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114107868866084626-search.html?KEYWORDS=br 
oadband&COLLECTION=wsjie/6month; Marguerite Reardon, Bells Slash Prices to 
Lure Broadband Customers, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 23, 2005, http://news. 
com.com/Bells+slash+prices+to+lure+broadband+customers/2100-1034_3-5842279. 
html (reasoning that cable companies have resisted lowering their prices, instead 
focusing on providing better speeds, usability, and reliability). 
 140. See Glenn Fleishmann, Advocates of Wi-Fi in Cities Learn Art of Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at C1 (explaining that in response to a suggested “pay-to-play” 
plan, advocates and community groups complained to state politicians); Associated 
Press, Intel Joins Group In Favor of Internet Legislation, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 26, 
2006, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/local/ 
states/california/northern_california/14435374.htm (describing Intel’s appeal to 
Congress to pass legislation that ensures that the Internet will remain “open and 
neutral”). 
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Lack of competition in the price of high-speed Internet service has 
been a significant problem.  Monthly fees averaged $50 in many areas 
on a consistent basis from 1998 to 2003 for service at one to two Mbps 
downstream and much less than that upstream.141  This price stability 
presented a stark contrast to the much more rapidly increasing 
quality and plummeting prices of computers and other digital 
technologies during the same period.142  With cable in control of 
nearly seventy percent of the broadband industry, there was “no real 
competition” in most local markets during that period, according to a 
spokesperson for a large Baby Bell, SBC.143  The bursting of the 
telecommunications bubble starting in 2000 further entrenched 
many dominant broadband providers by destroying many 
telecommunications companies, wiping out $2 trillion of stock 
market value,144 and enabling the Baby Bells to slash investment in 
infrastructure in favor of exploiting their existing networks as long as 
possible.145 
The divergence in the pace of price cuts and new innovations 
between broadband and other digital technologies may be due to 
mixed incentives facing diversified broadband providers.  Robust 
                                                          
 141. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 67-68, 141 (stating that in 1998, ADSL prices 
decreased to a range from thirty dollars per month in some regions to fifty dollars in 
the majority of areas, where they remained until 2003).  But cf. Scott J. Savage & 
Donald M. Waldman, United States Demand for Internet Access, 3 REV. OF NETWORK 
ECON. 228, 229, 236 (2004) (reporting that a nationwide survey of residences 
conducted during 2003 found mean prices for cable and DSL broadband to be 
$37.70 and $43.92, respectively).  As of 2005, the price of cable and DSL broadband 
continued to hover near $50 per month once the costs of subscribing to tied services 
such as cable television or wireline telephone service were included.  Gene 
Kimmelman, Statement on Behalf of Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation of 
America on SBC-AT&T and Verizon-MCI Mergers Remaking the Telecommunications 
Industry, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 2 & n.4 (2005) (explaining that although cable 
broadband costs about $ 45 per month, and DSL broadband about $30 per month, 
most providers also require consumers to “buy extra services--DSL tied to local phone 
service, or cable modem service tied to a cable video package. In order to get the 
benefits of this ‘bundle-only’ competition, the average household must double or 
triple its spending.”).   
 142. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 141 (comparing the pace of DSL deployment 
to the pace of deployment of other digital technologies, such as dial-up access, the 
Web, and Wi-Fi). 
 143. Tom Mainelli, DSL Service Falters as Providers Crumble, PC WORLD, Aug. 15, 
2001, available at http://pcworld.about.com/news/Aug152001id58344.htm 
(claiming that DSL providers are allies against cable). 
 144. See Michael Powell, Speech at the Goldman Sachs Communicopia XI 
Conference (Oct. 2, 2002), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-226929A1.pdf (explaining that the telecommunications industry is suffering 
from not only financial loss but also nearly 500,000 lost jobs, corporate scandals and, 
in some markets, hyper-competition). 
 145. See FMEA, supra note 3, at 8, 10 (citing BellSouth and Verizon, who both 
reduced their investment spending by thirty-nine percent, or $9.5 billion, from 2000 
to 2003); see also FERGUSON, supra note  5, at 58-59 (stating that Baby Bells “reduced 
network capital investment sharply between 2001 and 2003”). 
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competition from the Internet threatens to destroy the cable and 
telephone companies’ revenue base as Internet telephony captures 
the voice communication market, and as webcasting and digital 
delivery of entertainment content render cable television less 
necessary.146  Conscious of this threat, most Baby Bells have heretofore 
refused to sell DSL to customers who do not also purchase local 
telephone service, giving rise to allegations of anticompetitive 
product tying, in violation of antitrust law.147  Verizon’s wireless 
broadband service is only available to a third of Americans, at $60 per 
month for a two-year commitment plus a “qualifying voice plan.”148  
Moreover, Baby Bells such as SBC/AT&T have indicated that they 
may refuse to connect DSL subscribers to their choice of Internet 
telephony services.149  For their part, cable broadband providers have 
sought to shield their multichannel video businesses from Internet 
competition by prohibiting their subscribers from downloading 
excessive multimedia content or utilizing interactive video game 
servers, among other high-bandwidth activities.150 
                                                          
 146. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 27 (predicting that a competitive broadband 
industry would advance the merging of cellular, broadcasting, and data delivery 
services with Internet services). 
147. See Greco v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4434, at *12-15 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar 22, 2005) (explaining that Verizon admitted refusing to sell “stand-
alone DSL service” in most markets, offering it only as part of a limited technical trial 
in some states for a period of only eight months); Z-TEL Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC 
Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 543-48 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (denying motion to 
dismiss claim that SBC Communications unlawfully tied DSL service to local 
telephone service); Levine v. Bellsouth Corp., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 
2004) (noting that Bellsouth “has never offered” DSL “on a standalone basis”); 
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Cinergy Commc’ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 946, 
954 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (finding “substantial evidence” to support the Kentucky Public 
Service Commission’s conclusion that BellSouth had a “practice of tying its DSL 
service to its own voice service to increase its already considerable market power in 
the voice market has a chilling effect on competition and limits the prerogative of 
Kentucky customers to choose their own telecommunications carriers”); Covad 
Commc’ns Co. v. Pac. Bell, No. C 98-1887 SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21267, *12-*15 
(N.D. Cal. May 8, 2000) (reaffirming dismissal of antitrust challenge to Pacific Bell’s 
alleged practice of tying DSL data service to voice line service); Alex Salkever, Will 
Naked DSL Chill the Cable Guys?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 27, 2004, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2004/tc20040227_8296_tc0
47.htm (describing how Baby Bells have insulated their businesses from profit 
volatility by declining to offer customers DSL without bundled local telephone 
service). 
 148. Verizon Wireless BroadbandAccess Service Overview, http://www.verizon 
wireless.com/b2c/mobileoptions/broadband/serviceoverview.jsp (last visited May 
26, 2006). 
 149. See Anush Yegyazarian, A Gated Internet, THE WASH. POST Online, Feb. 3, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/02/AR2006020 
200160.html (describing how these service providers promote selected content by 
prioritizing service to preferred sites). 
 150. See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 145-46 (reviewing content providers’ 
incentives to avoid providing easy access to Internet services that would compete with 
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II. BROADBAND DEREGULATION AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRILOGY OF 2004-2005 
A. Historical Context of the Telecommunications Trilogy 
When Congress proposed in the mid-1990s to reform the nation’s 
telecommunications laws to increase competition, the Baby Bells 
opposed rules opening local telephone service to their competitors.151  
Congress planned to mandate that the Baby Bells share their 
networks and subscriber and billing information with competing 
local telephone service providers.152  The Baby Bells would have to 
offer their competitors “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” 
access to the network, by both interconnection and wholesale 
buying.153  The Baby Bells agreed to these reforms in exchange for 
significant deregulation of their operations on other fronts, including 
statutory authorization to expand into “vast new geographic and 
product markets (including long distance, equipment 
manufacturing, and cable television).”154 
Congress feared that the Baby Bells “could poison the 
compromise” by seeking “legal barriers . . . at the state level in order 
to restrain competition.”155  Recognizing the threat posed by state law 
barriers to universal service, Congress preempted such laws in 
enacting the 1996 Act.156  Section 253(a) of the 1996 Act envisioned 
uninhibited competition in telecommunications services nationwide, 
notwithstanding inconsistent state or local laws.  It stated that:   “[n]o 
                                                          
their traditional content delivery); In the Matter of Appropriate Regulatory 
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Cable Facilities, Comments of 
the High-Tech Broadband Coalition, Dkt. No. 96-45, at 11-12 (June 17, 2002), 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (search for “DiLallo” in the 
“Attorney Name” field, and specify the date of “06/17/2002”) (explaining that some 
cable ISP subscriber agreements forbade “excessive bandwidth” consumption or 
operation of interactive video game servers); Time Warner Cable, Time Warner Cable 
Residential Services Subscriber Agreement § 6(a) (2006), http://help.twcable.com/html/ 
twc_sub_agreement2.html (stating that Time Warner Cable High-Speed Data Service 
imposes “‘consumption’ limits (i.e., limits on the amount of data that [customers] 
may send or receive during the course of a month or over shorter periods) . . . as set 
forth in the price list or the Terms of Use,” which Time Warner Cable may change 
“by amending the price list or Terms of Use”). 
 151. See Carlson, supra note 31, at 46 (describing the tension between the act’s 
popularity with members of Congress and resistance by Baby Bells and lobbyists). 
 152. See id. (characterizing the compromise between lawmakers and service 
providers). 
 153. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 56, 
62-63 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)). 
 154. Carlson, supra note 31, at 46. 
 155. Id. at 47. 
 156. Id. (stating that Congress intended to carry out such preemption by 
mandating FCC enforcement). 
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State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal 
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate 
telecommunications service.”157  Congress instructed the FCC to 
preempt the enforcement of any state or local law violating that 
section to the extent necessary to correct the violation.158 
The context in which section 253(a) was enacted indicates that 
Congress intended to achieve high-quality and consumer-friendly 
universal service by the specific mechanism of preempting state law 
efforts to re-establish local telecommunications monopolies.159  Thus, 
Congress created an exception to section 253(a), which shields 
“competitively neutral” state efforts “to preserve and advance 
universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the 
continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the 
rights of consumers.”160  In section 254(b), moreover, Congress 
required the FCC to adopt policies for the advancement of universal 
service in all U.S. regions, and for access to service for consumers in 
all income groups “at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.”161 
Despite its statutory mandate to ensure universal 
telecommunications service at affordable rates, the FCC has rejected 
universal broadband access as an ideal.162  The FCC has excluded 
broadband from the “basket of services [that are] eligible for federal 
universal service support.”163  Instead, the FCC included only 
telephone services such as a voice line, long distance, operator 
services, directory assistance, and emergency services such as 911.164  
Critics of the FCC have therefore pointed out that it is failing to carry 
out its responsibility under the 1996 Act to ensure that “‘advanced 
telecommunications services’” are provided throughout the United 
States, including to “‘low-income’” consumers and those in “‘rural, 
insular, and high cost areas.’”165 
                                                          
 157. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). 
 158. 47 U.S.C. § 253(d). 
 159. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text (highlighting congressional 
concern that Baby Bells would seek legal barriers at the state level to prevent 
competition, which led to enactment of a provision in the 1996 Act to preempt such 
laws). 
 160. 47 U.S.C. § 253(b). 
 161. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b). 
 162. See Lennard G. Kruger & Angele A. Gilroy, Congressional Research Service, 
Broadband Internet Access and the Digital Divide 12 (Mar. 22, 2005),  http://www. 
usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL30719.pdf (contending that while a joint board of 
federal and state officials originally defined universal access, the FCC has since failed 
to adequately expand this definition to encompass evolving technology). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(2)-(3)). 
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B. State Law Restraints on Municipal Broadband:   Nixon v. Missouri 
Municipal League (2004) 
Soon after the 1996 Act was passed, the FCC refused to exercise its 
authority under § 253(a) to preempt anticompetitive state laws that 
impeded municipal broadband service.166  Instead, it interpreted the 
Act in discriminatory ways that benefited the broadband duopoly 
enjoyed by the cable and telephone companies, at the expense of 
municipal competition.167 
Before disputes regarding municipal provision of 
telecommunications services were brought to its attention, the FCC 
construed the telecommunications laws in such a way that 
Congressional enactments would apply equally to public and private 
telecommunications providers.  For example, in 1992, the FCC 
determined that the term “any corporation” in the 1934 Act included 
public telephone utilities.168  Similarly, in 1997, the FCC concluded 
that the term “any entity” in the 1996 Act extended to municipal 
telecommunications firms for purposes of their universal service 
obligations.169 
By contrast, when cities petitioned the FCC to carry out its statutory 
mandate under § 253(a) of the 1996 Act, the FCC construed “any 
entity” to exclude municipal entities, and thus to include only private 
entities.170  Recall that § 253(a) requires that no state action “may 
prohibit . . . any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate 
telecommunications service.”171  Taking this language at face value, 
the City of Abilene, Texas petitioned the FCC shortly after the 
passage of the 1996 Act for authorization to serve the technological 
needs of its population of more than 100,000 by rolling out “‘two-way 
audio, video and data transmission capabilities.’”172  Despite its prior 
conclusion that the phrase “any entity” included municipal 
                                                          
 166. See In re Public Util. Comm’n of Tex., 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, 3547 (1997), cited in 
City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (determining that Congress 
had not clearly signaled its intention to fully assume regulatory authority in a field 
typically monitored by the states). 
 167. See id. (allowing states to prohibit municipal market entry into telecom 
services). 
 168. See City of Abilene, 164 F.3d at 53 (citing In re IT&E Overseas, Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 
4023, 4025 (1992)) (arguing that in 1992, the FCC had construed the term “any 
corporation” in 47 U.S.C. § 153 to include Guam’s public telephone company, 
preventing the territory from usurping federal regulatory power). 
 169. See In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 9172-76 
(1997) (declining to construe the term “telecommunications services” in 1996 Act to 
mean only “for-profit” services, “when Congress could have, but did not, so state”). 
 170. See Carlson, supra note 31, at 48 (conceding that debate over the meaning of 
“any entity” is ongoing). 
 171. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). 
 172. City of Abilene, 164 F.3d at 50. 
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telecommunications providers, the FCC determined that § 253(a) did 
not preempt a Texas statute prohibiting municipalities from 
providing telecommunications services.173 
To understand how the federal courts, and the Supreme Court in 
particular, have approached the dispute between municipalities and 
the FCC over the proper construction of § 253(a), some background 
on constitutional law is necessary.  Starting in the 1980s, the Supreme 
Court, under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, orchestrated a 
“revival” of federalism, or even a “revolution” in states’ rights.174  
Specifically, the Court expanded state sovereignty at the expense of 
federal constitutional rights, the powers of the U.S. Congress, and the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.175  In a series of five-four decisions, 
the Court unshackled the states from constitutional and 
Congressional limitations, in cases frequently involving the abuse of 
individual rights by powerful state officials and private actors.176 
                                                          
 173. See id. at 50-51 (citing In re Public Util. Comm’n of Tex., 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, 
3547 (1997)) (explaining that the FCC surmised that Congress had not defined 
“entity . . . with sufficient clarity to warrant federal interference” in a field typically 
regulated by the states). 
 174. Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002). 
 175. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) 
(rendering states immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private suits 
brought by state employees pursuant to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (deciding that Congress 
lacked authority to protect women from private violence through sections of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-
92 (2000) (insisting states are immune from private suits under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 because Congress produced few factual 
findings to support the argument that the law should be construed as applying to 
state and local governments); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999) (finding 
states immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private suits for damages 
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (holding states immune 
from private suits under federal patent law because a congressional attempt to 
abrogate that immunity under Article I of Constitution and Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not identify specific factual findings to establish a need 
for the law); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (proclaiming that 
Congress lacked the necessary power under the Commerce Clause to enact a law 
mandating local governments to perform background checks on gun buyers because 
Congress cannot directly force states to act through the clause); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-36 (1997) (concluding that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded Congress’s power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600-02 (1995) 
(ruling that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to protect 
children from private violence by enacting Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990); 
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230-33 (1989) (declaring that, barring very specific 
Congressional language to the contrary, states are immune under the Eleventh 
Amendment from private suits brought pursuant to the Education of the 
Handicapped Act of 1970, as amended). 
 176. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the 
Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1045 (2005) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW 
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The line of federalism cases that has most directly affected the 
municipal broadband issue is state sovereign immunity.177  In 1985, 
the Supreme Court adopted the so-called “clear statement” rule for 
cases involving Congressional invasion of state sovereign immunity, 
holding that to abrogate a state’s immunity from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment, Congress must make “its intention 
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”178  Four years after 
that, the Court ruled that Congress had not been sufficiently clear in 
announcing its intention to subject state governments to private suits 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the “Ku Klux Klan Act.”179 
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,180 the Supreme Court utilized the “plain 
statement” rule of its Eleventh Amendment cases to resolve a 
question of statutory construction for the first time.181  The Court did 
so in order to construe the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) 
as not applying to state judges, even though Congress had expressed 
an intention that it apply to the states by passing an amendment in 
1974 that subjected states and their political subdivisions to liability 
for age discrimination in their capacity as employers.182  Justices Byron 
                                                          
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003) (observing that the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism 
revolution” was sustained by a “five-justice majority”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 8-12 (2004) (asserting that the Rehnquist 
Court’s five-four federalism and sovereign immunity decisions denied individuals the 
benefits of congressionally-recognized “rights and protections against private 
infringers of liberty,” and “ensure[d] that some individuals who have suffered 
egregious harms [at the hands of state governments] will be unable to receive redress 
for their injuries”) (citing Alden, 527 U.S. 706; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 629; Kimel, 528 
U.S. at 82; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356); Byron Dailey, The Five 
Faces of Federalism:  A State-Power Quintet Without a Theory, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1243 
(2001) (asserting that “[t]he Rehnquist Court is well known for its many five-four 
decisions in favor of enhanced state power”). 
 177. See City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invoking state 
sovereignty case law to adjudicate the issue of a state’s authority to regulate Internet 
access). 
 178. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlan, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
 179. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68-71 (1989) (concluding 
that because Congress had not engaged in an extended debate, the Court could not 
clearly discern the intentions of lawmakers).  Section 1983 “is derived from section 1 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,” known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.  David Jacks 
Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously:  Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2186 n.10 (2005) (citing Act 
of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). 
 180. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 181. See id. at 475-76 (White, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
“plain statement” rule derived from the Eleventh Amendment had previously 
governed only the question of “whether Congress intended a particular statute to 
extend to the States at all,” and not, as in the instant case, “the precise details of the 
statute’s application”). 
 182. See id. at 475 (“In 1974, Congress amended the definition of ‘employer’ in 
the ADEA to include ‘a State or political subdivision of a State.’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 630(b)(2) (2000))).  This amendment triggered a provision of the ADEA that 
outlaws discrimination by an employer against any individual on the basis of age.  See 
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White and John Paul Stevens objected that there was no “compelling 
reason” to extend the “plain statement” rule beyond the Eleventh 
Amendment context in which it arose.183  They argued that while 
there may be doubt as to whether Congress intended certain other 
statutes to apply to the states at all, rendering it more appropriate to 
require a “plain statement” of legislative intent in such instances, 
there can be no doubt that Congress intended the ADEA to apply to 
the States.184 
The “plain statement” rule proved fatal to cases brought by 
municipalities to challenge state laws prohibiting them from 
providing telecommunications services to their residents.185  In 
addressing whether section 253(a) allowed the City of Abilene to 
provide telecommunications service, the FCC and D.C. Circuit used 
the “plain statement” rule to hold that Congress was not sufficiently 
clear when it preempted state laws having the effect of prohibiting 
“any entity” from providing telecommunications services.186  In effect, 
the FCC and D.C. Circuit found that Congress meant to preempt only 
those state laws that prohibited any private entity from entering 
telecommunications markets.187  The D.C. Circuit stressed that Gregory 
requires “unmistakable clarity” from Congress before the federal 
courts will find a state’s exercise of its “‘sovereign powers’” is 
preempted.188 
When a number of municipalities and municipally owned utilities 
based in Missouri petitioned the FCC to preempt a Missouri statute 
                                                          
id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000)) (explaining Congress’s desire to extend 
the implications of the statute to states). 
 183. See id. at 476 (contending that the issue in Atascadero State Hosp. and Will was a 
narrower one of whether to apply a law to the states without express legislative 
language). 
 184. Id.  To be fair to the Gregory majority, it also drew an analogy between its 
“plain statement” rule and prior cases including Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947), which required a clear indication of congressional intent to 
preempt state agricultural regulations, and United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 
(1971), which required a clear indication of congressional intent to enact criminal 
statutes that intrude upon state criminal laws or jurisdiction.  The requirement of a 
clearly expressed congressional intention to preempt state law could not justify the 
result in Gregory, however, because Congress plainly preempted state laws or practices 
that had the effect of discriminating on the basis of age.  See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) 
(2000) (outlawing age discrimination by any “employer”); id. § 630(b)(2) (2000) 
(defining term “employer” to include “a State”). 
 185. See, e.g., City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (utilizing the 
plain statement rule to hold that Congress had not preempted a state’s authority to 
bar its municipalities from offering telecommunications services such as Internet 
access). 
 186. See id. at 52-54 (spurning a broader interpretation of statutory language in 
favor of the strict principles articulated in Gregory). 
 187. Id. at 53-54. 
 188. Id. at 52 (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460). 
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barring municipal entry into telecommunications markets, the FCC 
refused to read Congress’s protection of “any entity” from 
anticompetitive state laws as extending to municipal 
telecommunications providers.189  The FCC considered itself bound 
by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in City of Abilene v. FCC, that section 
253(a) did not satisfy the “plain statement” rule that Gregory v. Ashcroft 
had expanded to statutory construction cases.190  Nevertheless, the 
FCC endorsed municipal entry into telecommunications as a policy 
tool: 
The Commission has found that municipally-owned utilities and 
other utilities have the potential to become major competitors in 
the telecommunications industry. In particular, we believe that the 
entry of municipally-owned utilities can further the goal of the 
1996 Act to bring the benefits of competition to all Americans, 
particularly those who live in small or rural communities.191 
According to the FCC, any concerns about unfair taxpayer 
subsidies and “possible regulatory bias” could be resolved 
“successfully through measures that are much less restrictive than an 
outright ban on entry.”192 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the FCC’s refusal to 
preempt Missouri’s blanket ban on municipal telecommunications 
services.193  The court had “no doubt” that a municipality was an 
“entity” for purposes of section 253(a).194  The court reasoned that 
Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, defines an “entity” as any 
organization, “‘such as a business or a governmental unit,’” with a 
distinct legal identity.195  Congress’s insertion of the word “any” before 
“entity” removed whatever slight doubt might have remained, for the 
use of “any” prior to a noun had been repeatedly held by the 
Supreme Court to encompass all instances of the noun to which it 
                                                          
 189. In re Mo. Mun. League, 16 F.C.C.R. 1157, 1158, 1172 (2001) (citing In re Pub. 
Util. Comm’n of Tex., 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, 3546, aff’d sub nom. City of Abilene, 164 F.3d 
49). 
 190. See id. at 1164-65 (citing City of Abilene, 164 F.3d 49) (maintaining that the 
FCC was not persuaded by the municipalities’ argument that City of Abilene should 
not bind the commission’s decision). 
 191. Id. at 1162. 
 192. Id. at 1163.  The FCC had made similar findings in the previous City of Abilene 
proceeding:  “Municipal entry can bring significant benefits by making additional 
facilities available for the provision of competitive services.”  Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 
13 F.C.C.R. at 3549. 
 193. Mo. Mun. League v. FCC, 299 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Nixon v. 
Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004). 
 194. Id. at 953. 
 195. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (7th ed. 1999)). 
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refers.196  The Eighth Circuit therefore held that section 253(a) 
preempted Missouri law, insofar as the law purported to forbid 
municipalities and municipally-owned utilities from providing 
telecommunications services.197 
On petition for certiorari, Justice Antonin Scalia’s aggressive 
questioning during oral argument revealed his belief that Congress 
had already made a “plain statement” of its intent by using the phrase 
“any entity,” as the Eighth Circuit had held.198  To be any more clear, 
Congress would have had to say “any entity whatsoever,” or “any entity 
(and we really mean it).”199  Despite the clarity of the language 
adopted by Congress outlawing restraints on entry into 
telecommunications markets, the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court held that was not “‘unmistakably clear’” enough about 
embracing governmental telecom providers.200  The Court argued 
that liberating municipal telecommunications providers from state 
law bans would have “strange and indeterminate results,” specifically 
insofar as the providers would need to seek authorizing legislation 
and tax or bond funding to implement new network capacity.201  
Rather than investigating the legislative history of the 1996 Act, 
moreover, the Court speculated that “[t]here is every reason to 
expect . . . that legislative choices in this arena would reflect the 
intent behind the intense lobbying directed to those choices, 
manifestly intended to impede, not enhance, competition.”202 
But it is doubtful that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri 
Municipal League, or the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in City of Abilene, gave 
effect to the “plain” or “clear” meaning of the phrase “any entity” in 
section 253(a).203  As the City of Abilene pointed out, in construing a 
statute such as section 253(a) the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
                                                          
 196. Id. at 953-54 (citing, inter alia, Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59-60 
(1997), which held that the phrase “any business transaction” in a federal bribery 
statute applied to the defendant’s bribe of a state official, notwithstanding the “plain 
statement” rule of Gregory). 
 197. See id. at 951, 955-56 (settling on a plain-language approach to the statute, 
and remanding to the FCC for further hearings). 
 198. See Transcript of Petitioner’s Oral Arguments at 16-18, Nixon v. Mo. Mun. 
League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (Nos. 02-1238, 02-1386, 02-1405), 2004 U.S. TRANS 
LEXIS 4, *13-15 (Jan. 12, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-1238.pdf (inquiring as to whether 
Congress had in fact made a plain statement of its intent). 
 199. Id. at 17, *14. 
 200. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 141 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). 
 201. Id. at 133. 
 202. Id. at 138. 
 203. See Carlson, supra note 31, at 48-49 (noting the ongoing judicial debate over 
congressional intent, despite five reasons for a broad interpretation). 
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word “entity” typically extends to any “‘functional constituent of a 
whole’” and is “‘the broadest of all definitions which relate to bodies 
or units.’”204  Although municipalities “‘never were and never have 
been considered as sovereign entities,’” as the D.C. Circuit noted in 
City of Abilene, Congress did not preempt state suppression of the 
provision of telecommunications services by “any sovereign entity,” 
but by “any entity.”205  To contend that the phrase “any entity” applies 
only to private entities also flies in the face of the meaning of “any.”  
The ordinary usage of the word “any” by Congress (and in plain 
speech) is “‘all embracing,’” “‘most comprehensive,’” 
“‘indiscriminate[],’” “‘negatives the idea of exclusion,’” and implies 
“‘unlimited’” signification.206 
The legislative history of section 253(a) also provides no basis for 
reading its preemption of anticompetitive state telecommunications 
laws as not applying to municipal utilities.207  Section 253(a) began its 
path through Congress as section 230(a) of S. 1822, the 
Communications Act of 1994.208  Hearings held in 1994 concerning S. 
1822 apprised the Senate of the vitality of publicly funded 
telecommunications services.209  Specifically, a representative of the 
American Public Power Association (“APPA”), the lobbying arm of 
the not-for-profit electric utilities,210 testified that Congress should 
countenance no legal “obstacles in the path to public ownership of 
new telecommunications facilities or the public provision of 
telecommunications services,” because “the goals of universal service 
and vigorous competition can be enhanced if such public ownership 
                                                          
 204. Alarm Indus. Commc’ns Comm. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1066, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 
1997), cited in Brief for the Petitioner, at 29, City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1633 and No. 97-1634), available at http://www.appanet.org/ 
files/PDFs/t19980529.pdf. 
 205. City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
 206. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 204, at 30 (quoting 3A CORPUS JURIS 
SECUNDUM 903); see also id. at 30-31 (“any entity” indicates an entity “selected without 
restriction or limitation of choice, with the implication that every one is open to 
selection without exception” (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
121 (2d ed. 1957))). 
 207. See generally James W. Moeller, Electric Utilities and Telecommunications, 16 
ENERGY L.J. 95, 141-46 (1995) (reviewing committee consideration of reforms, 
including the testimony and opinions of public utility firms and trade associations on 
the expected impact of the legislation). 
 208. See Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong. § 253(a) (1994), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=103_cong_ 
bills&docid=f:s1822rs.txt.pdf (reforming the nation’s telecommunications structure 
with the stated goal of promoting the general welfare). 
 209. The Communications Act of 1994:  Hearing on S. 1822 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 354-355 (1994) 
 210. See Moeller, supra note 207, at 143 (describing the cooperation between 
industry lobbyists and lawmakers). 
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and involvement is encouraged.”211  The representative described how 
the “municipally owned electric utility” in Glasgow, Kentucky built a 
“two-way, digital, broadband communications system” that provided a 
“consumer-owned cable TV system,” “a two-way, high-speed digital 
link to every classroom in the city,” “high-speed network services for 
personal computers,” and “digital telephone service.”212 
In assessing S. 1822 in 1994, the Senate agreed with the APPA 
about the viability of public utility provision of telecommunications 
services.  The Senate Report on S. 1822 stated unambiguously that 
the legislation “allows all electric, gas, water, . . . and other utilities to 
provide telecommunications.”213  The report noted approvingly that 
“electric utilities in general have extensive experience in 
telecommunications operations. Utilities operate one of the Nation’s 
largest telecommunications systems—much of it using fiber optics.”214  
Senator Trent Lott, a cosponsor of S. 1822,215 stated that 
“municipalities” are “positioned to make a real contribution in this 
telecommunications area, and I do think it is important that we make 
sure we have got the right language to accomplish what we wish 
accomplished here.”216 
The 104th Congress that passed the 1996 Act made repeated 
expressions of a legislative intent to strike down all state bans on 
entry into telecommunications services.  At the conference 
committee stage in 1996, the conferees affirmed that the 1996 Act 
was consistent with well-regulated entry by “electric, gas, water or 
steam utilities” into the market for telecommunications services, and 
that “explicit prohibitions on entry by a utility into 
telecommunications are preempted under this section [253].”217  
Senator Bob Kerrey affirmed that:   “Congress created Section 253” to 
preempt “[a]nti-competitive laws passed by state and local 
governments . . . that prohibit[] or significantly impair[] the ability of 
publicly-owned utilities to provide telecommunications services 
themselves or to make their facilities available to other potential 
                                                          
 211. The Communications Act of 1994:  Hearing on S. 1822 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 354-355 (1994) (statement 
of William J. Ray, Manager, Glasgow Electric Plant Board, on behalf of the APPA). 
 212. Id. at 356. 
 213. S. REP. NO. 103-367, at 22 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 214. Id. at 10. 
 215. See S.1822 at § 253(a) (listing Sen. Lott as a co-sponsor). 
 216. The Communications Act of 1994:  Hearing on S. 1822 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 378 (1994). 
 217. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. REP. NO. 
104-458, at 127 (1996); see also S. Conf. Rep. 104-230, at 127 (1996) (“[E]xplicit 
prohibitions on entry by a utility into telecommunications are prohibited under 
[Section 253].”). 
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providers of telecommunications services.”218  Senator Lott, the 
Majority Leader at the time, declared that Congress intended to erect 
“a framework where everybody can compete everywhere in 
everything,” and remove “all barriers to and restrictions from 
competition.”219 
Congress also specifically considered and endorsed the idea that 
publicly-owned electric and other utilities would provide 
telecommunications services.  The 1996 Act specifically authorized 
electric utilities, many of which are publicly owned and operated, “to 
provide telecommunications services, by repealing provisions of the 
Public Utilities Holding Company Act . . . which had prohibited 
private electric companies from diversifying.”220  Senator Kerrey stated 
that in selecting the phrase “any entity” in section 253(a), “Congress 
intended to give entities of all kinds, including publicly-owned 
utilities, the opportunity to enter these markets.”221  A Senate Report 
declared that entry by utilities could “significantly promote and 
accelerate competition in telecommunications services and 
deployment of advanced networks.”222 
C. Monopolization of Telecommunications Markets:   Verizon 
Communications LLC v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko (2004) 
Congress enacted section two of the Sherman Act in 1890, 
following a long tradition of British statutory and common law, and 
American constitutional law, declaring monopolies, including merely 
local monopolies, to be unlawful and contrary to the freedom of 
trade.223  Local network-based monopolies such as the Chicago Gas 
                                                          
 218. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 204, at 17. 
 219. Id. at 1 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. at S.7906 (1995) (emphasis added)). 
 220. Carlson, supra note 31, at 48 n.249 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 79(z)-5(c)(a)(1)(A) 
(1996)). 
 221. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 204, at 17 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. at 
S.7906 (1995)). 
 222. S. REP. No. 104-23, at 4 (1995). 
 223. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. XXXIX (1776) (“[M]onopolies are odious, contrary 
to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of commerce, and ought not to 
be suffered.”); The Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. c. 3 (1624), reprinted in vol. 4 
pt. 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM at 1212 (William S. Hein & Co., 1993) (invalidating, 
with certain exceptions, all monopolies “of or for the sole buying[], selling[], 
making[], working[], or using[] of any thing[] within this Realm[]”); Darcy v. Allein 
(The Case of Monopolies), 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602) 
(invalidating national monopoly on manufacture or importation of playing cards as 
contrary to common law and several Acts of Parliament); The Cloth Workers of 
Ipswich, Godb. Rep. 252, 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B. 1615) (invalidating a local 
monopoly over the tailor’s trade within the town of Ipswich as an illegal attempt to 
“take away free trade which is the birthright of every subject”); Dier’s Case, Y.B. Mich. 
2 Henry 5, fo. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414) (invalidating an attempt to secure a local 
monopoly over cloth dyer’s trade through a promise by an apprentice not to 
 8/12/2006  2:14:35 PM 
2006] WI-FI EVERYWHERE 1737 
Trust had excited popular indignation, and state law enforcement 
action, prior to the Sherman Act being considered by Congress.224  
Through the Sherman Act, Congress aimed to reduce consumer 
prices,225 increase the quality of available products and services,226 and 
decentralize political and economic power.227 
                                                          
compete with his master for six months after completion of the apprenticeship, on 
grounds that it was against common law); Hamlyn v. More, Y.B. Hil. 11 Hen. IV, fo. 
47, pl. 21 (1410) (Hankforth, J.), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF 
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY:  PRIVATE LAW TO 1750 614 (1986) (holding that it would be 
“against reason” to recognize local monopoly in grammar school instruction); see also 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54 (1911) (“[B]y the common law 
monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon individual freedom of 
contract and their injury to the public.”); Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-
Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter House Co., 111 
U.S. 746, 761 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring) (declaring an “incontrovertible 
proposition of both English and American public law, that all mere monopolies are 
odious and against common right” (emphasis in original)); James Madison, 
Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments, in JAMES MADISON:  
WRITINGS 756, 756 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999) (cautioning that monopolies “ought to be 
granted with caution,” and therefore the U.S. Constitution has limited these grants 
to “two cases, the authors of Books, and of useful inventions”); EDWARD COKE, 
Institutes of the Laws of England vol. 3 181, 181 (facsimile ed., 1985) (1797) (“[A]ll 
grants of monopolies are again[s]t the ancient and fundamental[] laws of this 
kingdom[].”). 
 224. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 29 (1894) (noting that 
People v. Chi. Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 269, 292, 297 (1889), revoked the charter of a 
“corporation formed for the purpose of operating gas works, and . . . of furnishing 
illuminating gas to the city of Chicago and its inhabitants,” which was “designed and 
intended to . . . monopolize the gas business in Chicago” by “crushing out 
competition’”); Robert Donald, Trusts in the United States, 52 THE ECLECTIC MAGAZINE 
OF FOREIGN LITERATURE 223, 223, 225 (Aug. 1890) (“[T]he people are at last 
awakening to the dangers of Trusts. . . . Some Trusts are purely local concerns, such 
as . . . the Gas Trust in Chicago.”).  The gas trust supplied coal gas to thousands of 
consumers in Chicago via miles and miles of underground pipes and street mains.  
See People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., THE ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHICAGO (2005), 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/2987.html (summarizing the 
history of Chicago’s first gas company); Gas and Electricity, THE ELECTRONIC 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHICAGO (2005), http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/ 
pages/504.html. (detailing Chicago’s early experiences with the gas trust). 
 225. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2462 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (explaining 
that the Sherman Act intended to prohibit acts that “increase the price of articles”); 
id. at 1768 (remarks of Sen. George) (declaring that trusts have “extorted their ill-
gotten gains from the poor”); id. at 2466 (remarks of Rep. Vest) (“We know very well 
that competition always reduces prices.”). 
 226. See, e.g., id. at 4102 (remarks of Rep. Fithian) (positing that “skill is created 
and is stimulated by competition,” because with “monopoly . . . , the incentive for 
improvement and skill is deadened,” while competition produces “wares both 
skillfully and cheaply made” (quoting an unspecified political writer)); Robert H. 
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 89 (1982) (arguing that the “legislative 
history of the Sherman Act . . . recognize[d] that free competition leads to efficient 
competitors”). 
 227. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 
1945) (relating that the authors of Sherman Act intended to break up “great 
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them,” 
and promote “an organization of industry in small units”); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 
50 (stating that the Sherman Act intended to redress “the vast accumulation of 
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The price-reducing and power-limiting objectives of the Sherman 
Act are shared in large part by the 1996 Act at the core of the 
telecommunications trilogy.228  This Act aims to “promote 
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices 
and higher quality services for American telecommunications 
consumers and encourage the rapid development of new 
telecommunications technologies.”229 
Although the overlay of telecommunications regulation should 
therefore have reinforced antitrust principles, it has too often 
undermined their effect.  For example, a natural monopoly such as a 
telephone or broadband network may evade vigorous antitrust 
enforcement because federal judges and prominent commentators 
often hesitate to condemn a network industry monopolist for reaping 
what may only be a “fair” or “adequate” reward for investing in and 
controlling a network.230  Courts and commentators also frequently 
                                                          
wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals,” and multiplication and exercise 
of power of trusts “to oppress individuals and injure the public”); United States v. 
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897) (arguing that the Sherman 
Act may be offended “by driving out of business the small dealers and worthy men 
whose lives have been spent therein,” or the “the absorption of control . . . by an all-
powerful combination of capital”); 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. 
Sherman) (“The popular mind is agitated with . . . the inequality of condition, of 
wealth, and . . . the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control 
production and trade and to break down competition.”); id. at 2598 (remarks of Sen. 
George) (theorizing that “the present system of production and of exchange is . . . 
sure at some not very distant day to crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all 
small enterprises,” taking trade “away from the great mass of the people” and placing 
it into hands of those few with “large, enormous fortunes”); id. at 3146 (remarks of 
Sen. Hoar) (listing the litany of public complaints that “these great monopolies . . . 
are becoming . . . a menace to republican institutions themselves, . . . induc[ing] 
Congress to take the matter up”); id. at 3147 (remarks of Sen. George) (explaining 
that “[b]y the use of this organized force of wealth and money[,] the small men 
engaged in competition with [large trusts] are crushed out, and that is the great evil 
at which all this legislation ought to be directed”). 
 228. See Telecommc’ns Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 100 Stat. 56, 56 (1996 Act 
intended by Congress to lower telecommunications prices while enhancing service 
quality, promoting technological innovation, and breaking down the monopolies 
imposed by decades of anticompetitive regulation). 
 229. Id.; see also In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, First Report 
and Order, FCC 96-325, 8 (Aug. 8, 1996) (“Under the 1996 Act, the . . . opening of 
all telecommunications markets to all providers will . . . bring new packages of 
services, lower prices and increased innovation to American consumers.”). 
 230. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(arguing that construing 1996 Act as imposing too broad of a duty to share access to 
networks could deter investment by dominant firms in network infrastructure); 3A 
Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 771b, at 171-72 (Aspen Law 
& Business 2d ed. 2002) (claiming that forced sharing of networks may reduce 
incentives to develop infrastructure); see also Kolasky, supra note 104, at 596-97 
(“Especially in network industries where large fixed costs need to be incurred to 
build the network, the prospect of earning economic rents once the natural 
monopoly has been captured is what provides the incentive to innovate and 
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assume that any power over pricing, product or service quality in a 
natural monopoly market may have been thrust upon its beneficiary 
by economic necessity or government policy, rather than unilaterally 
seized by harmful exclusionary conduct such as refusals to deal, 
restrictive contracts, or mergers with rivals.231 
The Supreme Court’s equation of intentionally anticompetitive 
corporate lobbying for purposes of commercial advantage and 
“‘corporate aggrandizement’” with the right of natural persons to 
petition their legislators for redress of grievances has resulted in 
further difficulties in enforcing the antitrust laws in the 
telecommunications industry.232  So construed, the First Amendment 
shields cable and DSL companies from most antitrust liability for 
lobbying federal, state, or local governments for statutes or policies 
that entrench their economic positions and bar potential competitors 
from the marketplace.233  According to this line of cases, liability for 
lobbying or petitioning the executive, legislative, or judicial branches 
of government may not be imposed on a company that “genuinely 
seeks to achieve [a] governmental result, but does so through 
improper means.”234  Lobbying only triggers antitrust claims in a 
“‘sham’ situation” where a defendant’s “activities are ‘not genuinely 
                                                          
invest . . . . ‘[C]ompetition is socially undesirable in natural monopoly industries.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 231. See Verizon Commnc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407-08 (2004) (arguing that compelling firms to share networks that confer 
monopoly power by most efficiently serving consumers contradicts the purpose of 
antitrust law because it may reduce the incentive for companies to invest in such 
facilities); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(clarifying that the Act should not penalize a company as a monopoly simply because 
it was the lone survivor out of a group of competitors); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548 (9th Cir. 1991) (indicating that the antitrust laws 
tolerate both efficient monopolies and natural monopolies); Omega Satellite Prods. 
Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing the 
impracticability of applying antitrust laws to natural monopolies); Union Leader 
Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960) (stating that a 
natural monopoly market does not of itself impose restrictions on one who actively, 
but fairly, competes for it); Kolasky, supra note 104, at 596-97 (discussing this 
principle); Stephen Breyer, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 157 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1982) (explaining that antitrust laws prohibit certain forms of monopolistic conduct 
but do not affirmatively order private firms to behave in certain ways). 
 232. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127, 137-40 (1961); see also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 
(1965) (clarifying that Noerr allows firms to influence public officials without violating 
antitrust laws). 
 233. See James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and 
the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 66, 76-77 (2006) (articulating that the Noerr 
grants firms First Amendment immunity against antitrust law upon efforts to 
influence legislative, executive, administrative, and adjudicatory conduct by 
government). 
 234. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) 
(citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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aimed at procuring favorable government action’ at all.”235  The Sixth 
Circuit has held that the “Noerr-Pennington doctrine”236 and First 
Amendment preclude antitrust liability based on a monopolistic 
network operator’s petitioning of a local government to pass an 
ordinance barring another operator from obtaining a license to 
operate a competing network on more favorable terms.237  
Commentators have also suggested that the First Amendment might 
prevent antitrust liability from being imposed upon incumbent 
broadband providers that “seek anticompetitive federal and state 
laws,” or that “persuade local decisionmaking bodies to restrain entry 
by public or private competitors.”238 
Given that mere possession of a network monopoly, and even 
lobbying to preserve or expand it, do not violate the antitrust laws, 
cases against network monopolists under the Sherman Act have 
focused on the acquisition of control over network choke points, and 
the refusal to share access to them, with the purpose of making 
effective competition impossible.239  For example, the Supreme Court 
found long ago that a trade association unlawfully monopolized 
interstate commerce by the acquisition and combination into a 
system of railroad bridges, ferries, and terminals leading across the 
Mississippi River and to and from St. Louis, and the selective denial 
of access to that system of crossings to any railroad company not 
owned by a member of the association.240  The Court condemned the 
defendants’ “purpose of controlling or acquiring . . . a unified system 
of terminals” for their exclusive use as “an obstacle, a hindrance and 
a restriction upon interstate commerce, unless [the system] is the 
impartial agent of all who, owing to conditions, are under such 
compulsion, as here exists [due to the river], to use its facilities.”241 
More than thirty years later, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
scheme whereby the nation’s major newspapers combined their 
                                                          
 235. Id. 
 236. Hurwitz, supra note 233, at 66. 
 237. See Knology, Inc. v. Insight Commc’ns Co., No. 3:00 CV-723-R (W.D. Ky. 
preliminary injunction granted 2001), rev’d, 393 F.3d 656, 658-59 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the defendant company merely petitioned the local government to 
comply with its own ordinance, thus invoking Noerr’s immunity protection). 
 238. Jim Baller & Casey Lide, Curbing Anticompetitive Practices by Cable Incumbents:  If 
Not Now, When?, 11 J. OF MUN. TELECOMM. POL’Y 24, 27 (2003) (citing Knology, No. 
3:00 CV-723-R (W.D. Ky. 2001)). 
 239. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383, 395 (1912) 
(considering the intent of the defendant, the method used to consolidate control, 
and the manner in which the control was exerted). 
 240. See id. at 391-94, 410-11 (1912) (determining that the monopoly was 
administrative in nature, rather than natural, and thus unlawful). 
 241. Id. at 405. 
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resources into an “Associated Press” and shared news stories among 
its members, but excluded their local rivals from membership in a 
manner “‘plainly designed’” to harm competition.242  The Court 
declared that while one may “dispose of his property as he pleases,”243 
he may not combine with others in “concerted arrangements” that 
“pool[] their power to acquire, to purchase, and to dispose of 
[information] through the channels of commerce.”244  It also rejected 
a First Amendment defense in terms that would seem also to support 
heightened antitrust scrutiny of efforts by DSL or cable providers to 
lobby for state laws outlawing city-supported broadband: 
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against 
application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to 
the contrary . . . .  Surely a command that the government itself 
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon 
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish 
means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is 
guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep 
others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from 
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not 
sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.245 
Subsequent cases similarly found that denying customers access to 
critical inputs for their businesses, such as advertising space in a 
dominant local newspaper or licenses to play recorded music in 
conjunction with television programs, may constitute an antitrust 
violation if done with an intention to stop potential rivals from 
gaining a foothold or undercutting established prices.246 
The antitrust precedent with arguably the most direct and 
controlling application to the struggle between owners of dominant 
broadband network and their upstart municipal or private 
                                                          
 242. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 11 n.7 (1945); see also id. at 15 
(holding that such hampering of competitors was an unlawful consolidation of 
power). 
 243. Id. at 15. 
 244. Id. at 16. 
 245. Id. at 20. 
 246. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 148 (1951) (rebuking 
an attempt to monopolize by dominant local newspaper that denied advertising to 
customers, even though it was essential for the promotion of their sales, after they 
had also advertised on a local radio station that threatened to erode newspaper’s 
monopoly position); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-
25 (1979) (ruling that lower courts should assess, under antitrust “rule of reason,” 
the practice of copyright owners to refuse, for the purpose of eliminating price 
competition among themselves, to grant individual licenses to broadcast copyrighted 
music subject to blanket license arrangement that charged set fees or revenue 
percentages for licenses governing any or all songs in their catalogues). 
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independent competitors is Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States.247  In 
that case, a private electric utility had enjoyed local monopolies in 
hundreds of towns for a period in excess of two decades, which it 
preserved by obtaining local municipal franchises lasting 10-20 
years.248  Its principal competition was from municipal electric power 
systems, which bought electricity at wholesale prices from private 
electric utilities like the defendant, as well as from local cooperatives 
and the federal government.249  The defendant, however, not only 
“refus[ed] to sell power at wholesale to proposed municipal systems,” 
but even declined to transmit electric power over its wires from other 
willing providers (such as local cooperatives or the federal Bureau of 
Reclamation).250  The Supreme Court held that the defendant had 
unlawfully “used its monopoly power,” and specifically its “‘strategic 
dominance in the transmission of power in most of its service area’” 
to destroy competition, seize a competitive advantage, and “foreclose 
potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric power 
from outside sources of supply.”251  At the time, the Federal Power Act 
provided the Federal Power Commission with the authority, upon 
application of any electricity provider, to direct a public utility to sell 
or exchange energy with the provider unless the sale or exchange 
would “impair [the utility’s] ability to render adequate service to its 
customers.”252  But the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
this regulatory authority manifested an intention on the part of 
Congress “to insulate electric power companies from the operation of 
the antitrust laws.”253  Rather, the Court found that Congress had 
indicated “an overriding policy of maintaining competition to the 
maximum extent possible consistent with the public interest.” 254 
While it has yet to hear a broadband antitrust case, the Supreme 
Court recently had occasion to adopt a framework for analyzing 
telecommunications monopolization cases, which lower courts have 
applied to allegations that broadband providers have harmed 
competition.  In the same year that its ruling in Missouri Municipal 
League255 reinforced the natural monopolies enjoyed by the Baby Bells 
                                                          
 247. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 248. Id. at 368-69. 
 249. See id. at 371, 378, 388 (emphasizing that no engineering factors prevented 
the defendant from selling power at wholesale or wheeling the power from willing 
providers). 
 250. Id. at 368. 
 251. Id. at 377 (citation omitted). 
 252. Id. at 375 n.7. 
 253. Id. at 374. 
 254. Id. 
 255. 541 U.S. 125 (2004). 
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by allowing the states to prohibit municipal competition in 
telecommunications markets, the Supreme Court had a chance to 
limit the power of those monopolies in its first important antitrust 
case in nearly a decade.256  Verizon was the defendant, in a case 
implicating the critical issues of the scope of section two of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, the “essential facilities” and “monopoly 
leveraging” doctrines developed under that section, and the 
interaction of these doctrines with the anti-monopoly provisions of 
the 1996 Act.257  Previously, in Missouri Municipal League, the Baby 
Bells, led by Verizon, had pleaded with the Court to overrule the 
Eighth Circuit’s pro-competitive decision, arguing that state 
sovereignty should trump section 253(a) preemption.258  They 
complained that municipalities would, among other things, 
“maintain artificially low rates” for broadband and other 
telecommunications services.259 
The case against Verizon260 arose out of a consent decree the 
company entered into with the FCC in 2000 in which it agreed to pay 
the U.S. government $3 million and its competitors $10 million in 
compensation for its unlawful acts.261  The decree resolved charges 
that Verizon had breached its duties under the 1996 Act and a 1997 
agreement requiring it to give AT&T access to the local telephone 
network.262  In a complaint filed in federal court, Trinko, a law firm, 
sought compensation for consumers damaged in the form of 
degraded local AT&T telephone service because of Verizon’s 
“attempt to maintain its monopoly power by refusing to provide equal 
access to its local network.”263  The Trinko firm alleged, for example, 
that it had lost telephone calls because Verizon had ignored or 
delayed AT&T’s access to the call ordering system.264 
                                                          
 256. See William Kolasky, Supreme Court in Search of Limiting Principles (2004), 
http://www.wilmer.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5665%5C4619%5
Cexpertguide%20competition.pdf (commending the Supreme Court for defining 
the limits of antitrust intervention). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See Brief for U.S. Telecom Ass’n et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners 1, 3, Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (Nos. 02-
1238, 02-1386, & 02-1405), available at http://www.baller.com/pdfs/usta_verizon_ 
amicibr.pdf (claiming a state right to intervene when subdivisions undertake risky 
capital investments in competition with private entities). 
 259. Id. at 20. 
 260. The case was initially brought against Verizon’s predecessor Bell Atlantic 
prior to its merger with GTE Corporation, Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atl. 
Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 92 n.1 (2d Cir. 2002), rev’d, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 261. Id. at 95. 
 262. Id. at 94-95. 
 263. Id. at 106. 
 264. See id. at 95 (arguing that Bell Atlantic intentionally excluded competition 
and had no valid business reason for its conduct). 
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The district court dismissed the case on the basis that an allegation 
of a refusal to provide access mandated by the 1996 Act does not state 
a section two claim.265  The Second Circuit disagreed, relying on 
extensive authority to the effect that owners or operators of network-
based monopolies may not legally refuse to provide their competitors 
with access to “essential facilities” on the network that are needed to 
compete effectively.266  The court added that the complaint 
adequately alleged that Verizon was engaged in “monopoly 
leveraging” prohibited under section two, or the exercise of “a 
competitive advantage in a retail market in which 
telecommunications carriers sell local phone service to consumers” 
derived from monopoly power over the wholesale market in 
telephone network access.267 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling that the 
Trinko firm’s antitrust claim should be allowed to proceed.268  The 
Court held that the section two claim did not hold water under 
existing authorities governing a monopolist’s duty to deal with its 
competitors.269  Specifically, Verizon had not refused to deal with a 
competitor in a market that Verizon had previously entered 
voluntarily, but had instead provided AT&T with discriminatory and 
inadequate access to the ordering system that Verizon would not have 
had to open up to competitors at all if not for the 1996 Act.270  The 
Court’s previous cases had imposed liability principally for acquisition 
or maintenance of a monopoly by denying a competitor access to a 
product the monopolist already sold voluntarily (such as lift tickets or 
                                                          
 265. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that competition necessarily involves impairing the 
opportunities of rivals and does not automatically implicate antitrust laws). 
 266. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 107-08 (“[A] monopolist has a duty to provide competitors 
with reasonable access to ‘essential facilities,’ facilities under the monopolist’s 
control and without which one cannot effectively compete in a given market.” (citing 
S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Terminal 
R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. at 411))); see id. at 110 (articulating that the 1996 Act 
encourages market competition and governs interconnection relationships by 
business judgment, not regulatory coercion) (citing Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. 366)). 
 267. Id. at 108; see also id. at 108 (declaring that a monopoly leveraging claim 
requires that the “defendant ‘(1) possessed monopoly power in one market; (2) used 
that power to gain a competitive advantage . . . in another distinct market; and 
(3) caused injury by such anticompetitive conduct.’” (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways v. 
British Airways, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001))). 
 268. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
416 (2004) (arguing that the Sherman Act does not give judges unlimited power to 
intervene every time a monopoly occurs). 
 269. Id. at 410. 
 270. See id. at 409 (distinguishing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585 (1985), as anticompetitive intent in that case was inferred from the 
termination of a profitable venture to pursue an anticompetitive end). 
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the transmission of electrical power).271  The Trinko firm, by contrast, 
had alleged that Verizon had violated duties created by the 1996 Act 
to create a new market in the constituent elements of 
telecommunications networks.272  Rather than boycotting a 
competitor by denying it sales of an essential product at the going 
retail price, Verizon had simply malingered in its implementation of 
the 1996 Act’s mandate to share access to its network at a reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory wholesale price.273 
This result might have had little effect on the broadband industry, 
had the Court not expressly declined to endorse certain antitrust 
principles that are critical to resolving broadband monopolization 
cases, such as the “essential facilities” and “monopoly leveraging” 
doctrines that a number of federal appellate courts have 
recognized.274  The Court declared that it had never even recognized 
the “essential facilities” doctrine, and refused to do so in this case, 
even though it had resolved several previous cases in ways that other 
courts understood as announcing very similar principles.275  The 
Court reasoned that “essential facility claims should . . . be denied 
where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel sharing 
                                                          
 271. See id. at 409-10 (asserting that the defendants in Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail 
Power had violated previously-established duties to existing customers whereas 
Verizon withheld services that were not available to the public). 
 272. Id. at 410. 
 273. Id. at 402, 405-06. 
 274. See id. at 410-11, 415 n.4 (refraining from recognizing or repudiating the 
doctrines because neither applied to the particular case at hand).  These courts 
include, most notably, the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second, Seventh, Ninth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.  See, e.g., Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 
F.3d 1272, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Under the well-established ‘essential facilities’ 
doctrine, an inference of anticompetitive intent in violation of Section 2 arises upon 
a showing of four elements:  (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a 
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of 
providing the facility.” (citing MCI Commc’n Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983))); id. at 1284 (“Monopoly leveraging occurs when a 
firm uses its market power in one market to gain market share in another market 
other than by competitive means.” (citing Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Fla. Power & 
Light Co., 145 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979))), vacated, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 670 (2004), 
after remand, 374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004); Trinko, 305 F.3d at 108-10 (discussing 
the validity of the plaintiff’s claims under the essential facilities and monopoly 
leveraging doctrines) (citing, inter alia, Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. 366, S. Pac. 
Commnc’ns, 740 F.2d at 1009); Virgin Atl. Airways, 257 F.3d at 272 (rejecting the 
viability of the claim for monopoly leveraging because the plaintiff failed to define in 
which markets the defendant exercised monopoly power); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel 
Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rebuffing antitrust claims under 
monopoly leveraging and essential facilities theories because the plaintiff did not 
prove that the defendant had market power or a competitive relationship with the 
plaintiff). 
 275. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411. 
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and to regulate its scope and terms.”276  Considerations of judicial 
competence were prominent in the Court’s reasoning, because a 
federal agency like the FCC may be better equipped to resolve 
“highly technical” complaints about violations of the 1996 Act, and a 
more “effective day-to-day enforcer of these detailed [local network] 
sharing obligations.”277  The FCC has the power to reward those 
incumbents who obeyed the 1996 Act’s sharing obligations with the 
lucrative right to enter other telecommunications markets such as 
long-distance telephone service.278 
Paradoxically, then, the fact that Verizon had brazenly violated its 
sharing duties under the 1996 Act undermined, rather than 
supported, the Trinko firm’s case seeking compensation for those 
violations.279  This result is highly questionable given the fact that 
section 601(b)(1) of the 1996 Act provides that “nothing in this 
Act . . . shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the 
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”280  Congress specifically 
intended this clause to “prevent[] affected parties from asserting that 
the [Act] impliedly pre-empts other laws.”281  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that this savings clause meant that Verizon did not 
enjoy the type of “implied immunity” from antitrust claims that 
certain issuers and dealers in securities do under the federal 
securities laws.282  Still, the Court’s reliance on the 1996 Act’s sharing 
obligations, and the FCC’s jurisdiction to enforce them, seems to 
achieve an implied repeal of the antitrust laws in the context of 
                                                          
 276. Id. (citing 3A PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 773e, 
at 150 (2003 Supp.)). 
 277. Id. at 414-15. 
 278. See id. at 402-03, 412-13 (noting that the FCC’s oversight of Verizon’s activities 
performed many of the functions of antitrust laws, limiting the need for judicial 
interference). 
 279. Supra notes 268-273 and accompanying text. 
 280. 47 U.S.C. § 152. 
 281. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996). 
 282. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406-07.  Compare, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 729-30 (1975) (holding that federal antitrust laws must 
give way if its application would seriously compromise the authority of  regulatory 
agencies like the SEC (citing Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963))), with 
Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 802-03 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that Securities Exchange Act of 1934 impliedly repealed section one of 
Sherman Act to extent it would otherwise apply to collusive activity designed to 
stabilize securities prices and prohibit flipping), In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading 
Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 148-50 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 impliedly repealed section one of Sherman Act to extent that 
it would otherwise apply to conspiracy to restrain options trading), and Billing v. 
Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 142-44, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not impliedly repeal of section one of 
Sherman Act to extent it would otherwise apply to tying of certain securities offerings 
to purchases of other securities or payments of inflated commissions). 
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telecommunications monopolies acquired or maintained by 
violations of the 1996 Act.283  The Court may therefore have granted 
telecommunications monopolists an “implied immunity” from the 
antitrust laws by the back door, so to speak.284 
The result in Trinko seems especially perverse when it is considered 
in light of the Court’s ruling in an analogous case brought under the 
1934 Act.  Like the 1996 Act, the 1934 Act granted no antitrust 
immunity to telecommunications monopolists.285  In a case decided 
under 1934 Act, therefore, the Supreme Court held that FCC 
approval of a television industry acquisition as being “in the public 
interest” was no defense to an antitrust claim arising out of that same 
acquisition.286  The Court’s reasoning in this early case is squarely 
applicable to the Trinko case:   “a determination [by the FCC] of 
‘public interest, convenience, and necessity’ cannot either constitute 
a binding adjudication upon any antitrust issues that may be involved 
in the [FCC] proceeding or serve to exempt a licensee pro tanto from 
the antitrust laws . . . .”287  If the FCC’s issuance of an express approval 
to a business arrangement cannot be a defense to a subsequent 
antitrust claim, it is difficult to imagine why the FCC’s condemnation of 
                                                          
 283. One commentator has described the Court’s opinion in Trinko as “wistful” 
about the fact that Congress had denied it the ability to find an implied repeal of the 
Sherman Act by the 1996 Act.  Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act:  The 
Search for Standards, 93 GEO. L.J. 1623, 1638 (2005).  “Barred from simply concluding 
that the Telecommunications Act created an implied immunity,” the Court 
nevertheless used the regulatory structure erected by the 1996 Act to displace and 
undermine the antitrust case against telecommunications firms who monopolize 
“essential facilities.”  Id. at 1639.  Another commentary criticizes Trinko in even 
harsher terms, claiming that it “does not rest easily with the [1996] Act’s antitrust 
savings clause” and may in fact effectuate a “judicial nullification of the savings 
clause.”  James E. Scheuermann & William D. Semins, A New Method for Regulatory 
Antitrust Analysis?  Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 
(2005). 
 284. Indeed, the breakup of the Bell system and AT&T’s monopoly over many 
telecommunications markets may never have occurred had Trinko been decided 
prior to 1974.  See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 283, at 1639-40 (“[O]ne may wonder 
whether the 1974 complaint in the AT&T case would be sustainable under Trinko.”); 
John Thorne, A Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act:  Verizon v. 
Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 294-95 (2005) (describing Professor Kauper as 
“Former Department of Justice Antitrust Division chief . . . , who filed the 
government’s 1974 complaint that resulted in the breakup of the AT&T Bell System 
monopoly”). 
 285. See United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959) (ruling that 
the 1934 Act was not intended to prevent enforcement of antitrust laws in federal 
court). 
 286. Id.  Under the deal challenged by the government, the National Broadcasting 
Company (“NBC”) acquired a television station in Philadelphia, then the nation’s 
fourth largest television market, in exchange for the transfer of NBC’s Cleveland 
station plus $3 million to the owner of the Philadelphia station, the Westinghouse 
Broadcasting Company.  Id. at 335-36. 
 287. Id. at 353. 
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a practice as violative of the law and worthy of a substantial fine would 
be a defense. 
Congress knows how to grant express immunity to the antitrust 
laws by inserting a line or two into a statute, but declined to do so in 
enacting the 1996 Act.  For example, amendments to the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887 provided that railroads participating in a 
transaction approved or authorized by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission “shall be and they are relieved from the operation of the 
antitrust laws . . . .”288  Likewise, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 
provided that any entity affected by an order of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board was “relieved from the operations of the ‘antitrust laws,’” 
including the Sherman Act, “insofar as may be necessary to enable 
such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by 
such order.”289 
Such a clear demarcation of authority between executive branch 
oversight and enforcement on the one hand, and civil and criminal 
antitrust liability on the one hand, is strikingly absent from the 1996 
Act in light of its savings clause.290  In fact, the 1996 Act more closely 
resembles the Bank Merger Act of 1960, which provided for oversight 
and approval of bank deals by the Comptroller of the Currency, but 
                                                          
 288. An Act to Regulate Commerce, § 5 (11), 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887), as amended 
by Transportation Act of 1920, § 5 (11), ch. 91, 41 Stat. 480, recodified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 5(11) by Transportation Act of 1940, § 7, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 908-09, repealed by ICC 
Termination Act of 1995, § 102(a), Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 804, 49 U.S.C. § 701 
note; see, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 (1944) (holding 
that section 5(11) immunized consolidation of eight motor carriers from antitrust 
scrutiny, although the Interstate Commerce Commission could not “ignore” antitrust 
law entirely). 
 289. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384; see also Hughes Tool 
Co. v. TWA, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (holding that sale or lease of aircraft, approved by 
Civil Aeronautics Board, was immune from antitrust scrutiny).  Similarly, Congress 
amended the Clayton Act in 1950 to provide that the Act’s restrictions on mergers 
would not apply to “transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by 
the Secretary of Transportation, Federal Power Commission, Surface Transportation 
Board, . . . the United States Maritime Commission, or the Secretary of Agriculture 
under any statutory provision vesting such power in such Commission, Board, or 
Secretary.”  15 U.S.C. § 18 (2005).  Even this broad language does not shield all 
anticompetitive agreements or practices approved by or under the jurisdiction of 
federal regulators.  See Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 469-70 
(1960) (ruling that the Clayton Act § 18 only shields agricultural “marketing 
agreements” from antitrust actions); see also California v. Fed. Power Commc’n, 369 
U.S. 482 (1962) (holding that the Clayton Act § 18 did not necessarily legalize 
anticompetitive merger authorized by Federal Power Commission). 
 290. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 335, 377 (”Considered in this light, the most sensible reading of the 
1996 Act’s Saving Clause is that it preserves intact the system of regulatory rules 
that . . . continues to govern most regulated industries. Under these rules there is no 
blanket immunity from the antitrust laws. Further, behavior that is never disclosed to 
the agency, perhaps because it is surreptitious, is not immune.”). 
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created neither an “express immunity” from the antitrust laws nor a 
“plain repugnancy” between the antitrust and banking laws.291   
Soon after deciding Trinko, the Supreme Court remanded a case 
that had condemned a series of anticompetitive actions in violation of 
the 1996 Act committed by a large Baby Bell, Bellsouth, to the 
detriment of the independent DSL company Covad.292  Three former 
Intel executives founded Covad in order to take advantage of the 
1996 Act’s provisions for open access to telephone networks by 
deploying the Bell companies’ underutilized DSL technology to build 
a national broadband network.293  Pursuant to the 1996 Act, Bellsouth 
agreed to provide Covad with “just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory” access to its telephone network and related 
infrastructure.294  After having its access to the network routinely 
delayed and denied, Covad sued Bellsouth under section two of the 
Sherman Act for violating the 1996 Act and imposing “inordinately 
high costs” on Covad for wholesale DSL access, but “inordinately low 
costs” for retail DSL access, so that Covad was “squeezed out” of 
competing profitably in the DSL market.295 
Before Trinko was decided, the Eleventh Circuit held that Covad 
had stated valid claims under section two of the Sherman Act for 
unlawful refusals to deal, discriminatory denials of access to “essential 
facilities,” and an anticompetitive “price squeeze.”296  On remand 
after Trinko, the Eleventh Circuit held that Covad’s refusal to deal 
and “essential facilities” claims could no longer survive a motion to 
dismiss, because the FCC can force Baby Bells like Bellsouth to 
                                                          
 291. United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 331-33, 350-51 (1963). 
 292. BellSouth Corp. v. Covad Commc’ns Co., 540 U.S. 1147 (2004). 
 293. See The Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001:  
Hearings on H.R. 1542 Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th 
Cong. 71-72 (2001) (statement of Charles J. McMinn), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-24.pdf (“Two colleagues and I 
founded Covad in October of 1996, just months after [Congress] passed the 
Telecommunications Act.  We took DSL technology—which had been collecting dust 
on the shelves and in the warehouses of the Bell companies for over six years and 
quickly used it to build a broadband network that can reach nearly half of the homes 
in America.”); Todd Wallack, Covad Makes Comeback from Bankruptcy, S.F. CHRON., 
Sept. 6, 2002, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi? 
file=/chronicle/archive/2002/09/06/BU223276.DTL&type=business (“Covad, [was] 
founded in 1996 by three former Intel executives”). 
 294. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1277 n.3 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
 295. Id. at 1278. 
 296. See id. at 1288 (deciding that the plaintiff adequately alleged that the 
defendant attempted to leverage its monopoly power by giving itself preferential 
access to its essential facilities). 
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provide access to their telephone networks under the 1996 Act.297  
Only Covad’s price squeeze claim could go forward, because the 
Supreme Court had not yet “specifically barred” it in Trinko.298  
Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit found that another case brought by 
Covad against a Baby Bell had been decimated by the 1996 Act.299 
The Supreme Court in Trinko eviscerated most potential antitrust 
claims that could be brought by upstart broadband providers against 
cable and DSL monopolists and other anticompetitive actors.300  The 
case went far beyond resolving an obscure local telephone billing 
dispute, to damage if not destroy the deterrent effect of the Sherman 
Act in the context of regulated industries such as 
telecommunications.301  After Trinko, courts will dismiss many 
monopolization claims implicating broadband markets in favor of a 
vision of “idealized or imaginary” enforcement by the FCC of 
dominant firms’ regulatory obligations.302  Therefore, the nation’s 
principal hope for new entry into broadband markets will depend on 
both municipal broadband and the telecommunications laws, and 
specifically, in the latter context, how the FCC actually polices 
dominant firms’ obligations to provide just, reasonable, and 
                                                          
 297. See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (rejecting Covad’s refusal-to-deal claim because it did not allege the 
requisite unilateral termination of a voluntary course of dealing). 
 298. Id. at 1050. 
 299. See Covad Commuc’ns v. Bell Atl., 398 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(alleging that defendant breached various duties upon it by the 1996 Act and 
engaged in other anticompetitive acts). Covad had alleged that Bell Atlantic refused 
to deal with it by denying access to the wires and infrastructure used to deliver DSL, 
engaged in a “price squeeze,” disseminated false advertising about the availability of 
Bell Atlantic DSL, discriminated against customers who had ordered DSL from 
Covad, and filed a meritless patent suit against Covad in bad faith.  See id. at 670.  The 
D.C. Circuit held that only Covad’s claim for discrimination against Bell Atlantic 
subscribers who ordered DSL from Covad survived as a predatory practice actionable 
under pre-Trinko antitrust law absent a legitimate business justification.  See id. at 675-
76 (articulating that predatory pricing requires the defendant to incur short term 
losses that it should reasonably expect to regain under the benefits of the monopoly 
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 
(1986), and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
222-23 (1993))). 
 300. See Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 398 (2004) (holding that the Trinko firm’s antitrust action against Verizon, 
alleging breach of an incumbent LEC’s 1996 Act duty to share its network with 
competitors,  failed to state a claim under section two of the Sherman Act). 
 301. See Industry Competition and Consolidation:  The Telecom Marketplace Nine Years 
After the Telecom Act:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 34 
(2005) (statement of Philip L. Verveer, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP) (asserting 
that Trinko significantly weakened the Sherman Act’s authority to correct instances of 
monopolization because the decision overestimates the ability of regulatory agencies 
to adjudicate monopolization claims; emphasizes a methodology that examines parts 
of section two claims, rather than the whole claim; and is based on an idealized 
business environment, not a practical evaluation of the given facts). 
 302. Id. at 35. 
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nondiscriminatory access to their competitors.  As we shall see, the 
FCC has failed to take up the mandate of promoting 
telecommunications competition that Trinko left to its discretion, 
rendering legislative action to promote broadband competition a top 
priority.303 
D. The End of Open Access?:   National Cable and 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services (2005) 
The lack of effective competition in many American broadband 
markets may be explained in part by the absence of a vigorous 
national policy to open up broadband networks to competition via 
“open access” rules.304  In several other countries, notably France and 
Japan, the government promotes low prices and ultra-high-speed 
service by means of compulsory “unbundling” of the telephone 
network from the exclusive control of the network owner’s own DSL 
service division.305  Such nations have implemented broadband access 
at ten times the speed and half the price of typical U.S. service by 
mandating that the owners of residential telephone networks open 
them up to access by competitors at the same wholesale price.306 
In this country, the telephone networks have not been opened up 
to DSL competition to a comparable extent.307  A court ruling in 2002 
made it difficult for competing telecommunications firms to obtain 
                                                          
 303. See infra Part III.D (discussing the FCC’s inability to effectively regulate the 
Baby Bells’ networks so as to allow greater network access for telecommunications 
competitors, and outlining the necessity of congressional efforts to remedy the high 
entry barriers to the cable and DSL broadband markets faced by developing 
telecommunications companies). 
 304. Cf. Jesse Drucker, For U.S. Consumers, Broadband Service Is Slow and Expensive, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at B1 (arguing that France’s national policy of ensuring 
equal broadband accessibility for all telecommunication providers has encouraged a 
more competitive broadband market). 
 305. See Hidenori Fuke, The Spectacular Growth of DSL in Japan and Its Implications, 
52 COMM. & STRATEGIES 175, 179-88 (2003) (finding that Japan became one of the 
world’s most advanced countries with respect to the deployment of broadband 
access, by means of forced sharing of metallic and fiber networks used to deliver DSL 
service); Drucker, supra note 304, at B1 (proffering that France’s low priced and high 
quality broadband, relative to the United States, is a result of its policies mandating 
that “big carriers” share networks with competitors). 
 306. See Robert McChesney & John Podesta, Let There Be Wi-Fi, WASH. MONTHLY, 
Jan./Feb. 2006 at 14 (“The Japanese built their world-class system by ensuring ‘open 
access’ to residential telephone lines, meaning competitors paid the same wholesale 
price to use the wires.”); see also Drucker, supra note 304, at B1 (lauding the successes 
derived from France’s “unbundling” rules). 
 307. See McChesney & Podesta, supra note 304, at 14 (“Instead of encouraging 
competition, the FCC has allowed DSL providers and cable companies to shut out 
competitors by denying access to their lines.”); Drucker, supra note 304, at B1 
(noting that “unbundling,” responsible for higher quality broadband service in 
France, is a “dead” issue in the United States because of successful lobbying efforts by 
telephone companies). 
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access on commercially viable terms to DSL-capable networks 
controlled by the Baby Bells.308  The court’s opinion ignored the 
language of the 1996 Act in a manner that would be repeated in 
Missouri Municipal League.309  The clear language of the 1996 Act 
mandated the FCC to implement regulations requiring the Baby Bells 
to “provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier . . . , 
nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled 
basis” and “on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory.”310  Congress specifically directed the FCC to 
consider, in adopting such regulations, whether “the failure to 
provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of 
the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services 
that it seeks to offer.”311  The FCC found that competing 
telecommunications companies would indeed find their ability to 
provide services impaired by a failure to force the Baby Bells to share 
access to their local telephone network monopolies, which would 
require new entrants to duplicate the network unnecessarily, causing 
delays, higher costs, and less frequent entry.312  The D.C. Circuit held 
that the FCC had unlawfully failed to consider, before imposing 
forced sharing of telephone lines capable of delivering DSL 
broadband, whether there was adequate alternative broadband 
infrastructure for independent DSL ISPs to use, in the form of the 
cable networks.313  As the FCC predicted, independent DSL 
                                                          
 308. See U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. F.C.C., 290 F.3d 415, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the FCC should not have adopted a uniform national unbundling rule 
without first considering the relevance of competition in broadband services coming 
from cable and satellite providers in any particular market); Drucker, supra note 304, 
at B1 (noting that recent court decisions unfavorable to ISPs have encouraged other 
ISPs to offer wireless broadband alternatives). 
 309. See U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n, 290 F.3d at 429 (rejecting FCC’s reliance on “the 
letter of the [1996 Act],” because letter of statute did not adequately reflect court’s 
view of need to limit unbundling rules to avoid creating “disincentives to research 
and development” by network owners, “the tangled management inherent in shared 
use of a common resource”). 
 310. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000); see id. § 251(d)(1) (mandating that the FCC 
implement regulations granting competing telecommunications providers 
nondiscriminatory access to the networks of incumbent providers). 
 311. Id. § 251(d)(2)(B). 
 312. In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996:  Interconnection between Local Exchange 
Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Report and Order, 11 
F.C.C.R. 15499, 15642 (1996). 
 313. See U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n, 290 F.3d at 429 (supporting its conclusion that the 
FCC had exceeded its authority, the D.C. Circuit relied upon the holding of the 
Supreme Court in a previous case that the FCC’s mandate to open up the Baby Bell’s 
telephone networks to competitors must be subject to “some limiting standard, 
rationally related to the goals of the [1996] Act.” (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. 
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999))); id. (noting that the Supreme Court had indicated 
that the FCC could not lawfully “blind itself” to the availability of network 
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companies have faced high barriers to entry in the broadband 
market, because the telephone companies have reinforced their 
locally dominant positions.314 
The FCC has also liberated the Baby Bells from the constraints 
imposed by “common carrier regulation” under the 1996 Act.315  Such 
regulation has a long history under U.S. law, dating to the imposition 
of heightened common-law standards of care and related duties of 
nondiscrimination and reasonable pricing on inns, railroads, ferries, 
and other common callings or carriers, due to public policy 
concerns.316  Courts expanded common carrier rules to telephone 
and telegraph companies in the 1800s, finding them to be “charged 
with a duty which concerns the public interest.”317  In 1894, the 
Supreme Court held that telegraph companies were “common 
carriers” that, like the railroads, were “bound to serve all customers 
                                                          
infrastructure, other than that owned by the Baby Bells, which independent 
telecommunications firms could use (quoting Iowa Util. Board, 525 U.S. at 389)). 
 314. See Aaron M. Wigod, Comment, The AOL-Time Warner Merger:  An Analysis of 
the Broadband Internet Access Market, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 349, 383 (2002) 
(arguing that because telephone networks resist “open access” to DSL capacity by 
competing broadband providers, these providers find it difficult to compete); Andy 
Dornan, DSL:  Deregulated to Death, IT ARCHITECT, Sept. 1, 2005, at 20 (describing how 
it is “already impossible for independent DSL providers to compete on price in most 
areas” where Baby Bells are dominant). 
 315. See Rob Frieden, The FCC’s Name Game:  How Shifting Regulatory Classifications 
Affect Competition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1275, 1276-77 (2004) (discussing the FCC’s 
policy shift from classifying telephone company provided broadband access as a 
regulated “telecommunications service,” to reclassifying these companies as 
“information service” providers, thereby freeing such companies of traditional 
regulations). 
 316. See An Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 Stat. 379-80 (1887) (providing that all 
charges for transportation of passengers or by railroad “shall be reasonable and just,” 
and prohibiting any “undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any 
particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular 
description of traffic”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) (“[I]t has been 
customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first 
colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, . . . wharfingers, innkeepers, & c., 
and in so doing to fix a maximum charge to be made . . . .”); R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 
84 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1873) (noting that railroads are common carriers whose 
operations have public interest implications); James B. Speta, A Common Carrier 
Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 253-64 (2002) (tracing 
history of common carrier regulation to English common law). 
 317. See Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 18 (1894) (holding that 
telegraphs, like railroads, owe a duty of nondiscrimination in service due to public 
policy implications of common carrier status); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call 
Publ’g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1901) (finding that telegraphs, as common carriers, 
“are performing a public service,” so that “all individuals have equal rights both in 
respect to service and charges”); Hockett v. State, 5 N.E. 178, 182 (Ind. 1886) 
(holding that because telephone service is “a matter of public convenience and of 
public necessity, . . . [a]ll the instruments and appliances used by a telephone 
company in the prosecution of its business are consequently, in legal contemplation, 
devoted to a public use”); Speta, supra note 316, at 261-62 (describing development 
of case law treating telegraph providers as common carriers). 
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alike, without discrimination.”318  Congress extended common carrier 
regulation to the telephone companies in 1910, with the Mann-Elkins 
Act, and reaffirmed common carrier regulation of 
telecommunications by wire, radio, or energy in the 1934 Act.319 
The 1996 Act, in turn, imposed common carrier regulation on 
providers of “telecommunications” services, but not on providers of 
“information” services, such as electronic publishing.320  Congress 
defined a “telecommunications service” as the “offering of 
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, . . . regardless of 
the facilities used.”321  In contrast, it defined an “information service” 
as “electronic publishing” or other offerings of “information via 
telecommunications,” but specifically excluded “any use of any such 
capability for the . . . operation of a telecommunications system or 
the management of a telecommunications service.”322  “Electronic 
publishing” is a very distinctive category from telecommunications, 
for it “includes disseminating news articles, offering literary material, 
and providing services similar to the Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw 
databases.”323 
                                                          
 318. Primrose, 154 U.S. at 14. 
 319. See An Act to Provide for the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign 
Communication by Wire or Radio, and for other Purposes, § 3(h), 48 Stat. 1064, 
1066 (1934) (defining “common carrier” as “any person engaged as a common 
carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate 
or foreign radio transmission of energy”); id. § 201(a), 48 Stat. at 1070 (imposing 
“duty” on “every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by 
wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request 
therefore”); id. § 202(a), 48 Stat. at 1070 (making it “unlawful for any common 
carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, . . . or 
services . . . , or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage 
to any particular person . . . .”); id. § 203, 48 Stat. at 1070-71 (imposing price 
regulation scheme on common carriers); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 
U.S. 218, 220, 234 (1994) (finding that the 1934 Act authorized the FCC “to regulate 
the rates charged for communication services to ensure that they were reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory,” creating a “rate-regulation, filed-tariff system for common-
carrier communications”); Speta, supra note 316, at 262 (“The Mann-Elkins 
Act . . . declared telephone and telegraph companies to be common carriers and 
subjected those companies to the Act’s just and reasonable rates and 
nondiscrimination requirements . . . .”); Antonia M. Apps & Thomas M. Dailey, Non-
Regulation of Advanced Internet Services, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 681, 684 n.12 (2000) 
(explaining that the Interstate Commerce Commission, initially created to regulate 
railroads to ensure “just and reasonable” rates, regulated AT&T and the telephone 
industry after 1910). 
 320. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 
2696-97, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820, 834-35 (2005) (discussing the differing regulatory 
schemes that the 1996 Act imposes upon telecommunications carriers and 
information-service providers). 
 321. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). 
 322. Id. § 153(20) (2000). 
 323. BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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To exempt the Baby Bells from “common carrier” regulation of 
their DSL networks, the FCC had to find that broadband service 
delivered over the telephone lines constitutes “information” rather 
than “telecommunications.”324  This finding rested on a line of 
reasoning that led to surprising conclusions.  First, the FCC stressed 
that “an entity provides telecommunications only when it both 
provides a transparent transmission path and it does not change the 
form or content of the information.”325  This premise is based on the 
1996 Act’s definition of the term “telecommunications” so as to 
exclude services such as electronic publishing, which involve the 
“transmission” of “information” along with a “change in the form or 
content of the information as sent and received.”326  Second, the FCC 
claimed that DSL broadband permits users to change the form or 
content of the information they transmit over the Internet, such as 
“‘home pages’ on the World Wide Web.”327  Third, the FCC decided 
not to categorize DSL broadband as a telecommunications service to 
the extent that it transmits data unaltered, but as an information 
service to the extent that it facilitates changes in the content of 
data.328  The FCC maintained one of its previous rulings establishing 
the principle that telecommunications and information services are 
“mutually exclusive” and cannot coexist.329  This prior ruling drew 
support from legislative history declaring that telecommunications 
services do not include information services and vice versa.330 
Finally, the FCC reached the paradoxical conclusion that DSL 
broadband involves “telecommunications,” i.e. the 
“transmission . . . of . . . wireline Internet access service,” but is not a 
                                                          
 324. See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2711, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 851 (The FCC “has tentatively 
concluded that DSL service provided by facilities-based telephone companies should 
also be classified solely as an information service”). 
 325. In the Matter of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireline Facilities:  Universal Service Obligations of Broadband 
Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3030 (2002) 
[hereinafter Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access]. 
 326. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000)). 
 327. Id. at 3031. 
 328. See id. (concluding that Congress intended to define “information service” so 
as to include the capability of transferring data that is altered in form or content, 
such as that which is provided by broadband Internet access services). 
 329. Id.; see also id. at 3027-28 (citing In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on 
Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501 (1998)) (reiterating the FCC’s conclusions from 
its 1998 Report to Congress on universal service). 
 330. See In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 
F.C.C.R. 11501, 11523 (1998) (“The Senate Report stated in unambiguous terms that 
its definition of telecommunications ‘excludes those services . . . that are defined as 
information services.’ Information service providers, the Report explained, ‘do not 
“provide” telecommunications services; they are users of telecommunications 
services.’” (citing S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 18, 28 (1995))) (footnotes omitted).  
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“‘telecommunications service.’”331  In other words, DSL “does not 
offer ‘telecommunications’ to anyone, it merely uses 
telecommunications to provide end-users with wireline broadband 
Internet access . . . .”332  Thus, the FCC elected to treat DSL 
broadband providers like electronic publishers or authors of Web 
pages, which for the most part they are not, rather than like owners 
of a telecommunications network used to transmit Internet data over 
wires, which they are. 
The cable broadband market joined the DSL market on the path 
to deregulation in 2002, when the FCC decided that cable modem 
service is an “information service” and not a “telecommunications 
service.”333  The FCC’s reasoning here was nearly identical to its 
reasoning in the DSL context in that the crux of the matter is that a 
cable broadband provider “is not offering telecommunications 
service to the end user, but rather is merely using 
telecommunications to provide end users with cable modem 
service.”334  The FCC also relied upon the fact that cable broadband 
providers sometimes offer “computer interactivity” services that go 
beyond the mere “transmission of data,” such as e-mail, newsgroups, 
Web hosting, and the domain name system, even though not all 
“subscribers use . . . e-mail or web-hosting,” and even though not 
“every cable modem service provider offers” them at all.335  The 
classification of cable broadband as an “information service” meant 
that cable broadband providers would not be regulated as common 
carriers or cable service providers.336  Instead, they would be regulated 
with a very light touch “under the less stringent provisions” governing 
Web sites and other “information service[s].”337 
The FCC’s decision to deregulate the cable broadband industry, 
based on a determination that cable modems did not deliver a 
telecommunications service but rather merely “information,” 
naturally surprised many courts, legislators, regulators, market 
                                                          
 331. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access, supra note 325, at 3033. 
 332. Id. 
 333. HIGH-SPEED ACCESS INQUIRY 2002, supra note 1, at 4802. 
 334. Id. at 4824; see also Amy Schatz, Jesse Drucker & Dionne Searcey, High Court to 
Old Media:  You Win, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2005, at B1 (predicting that the FCC’s 
“hands off” approach will result in less choice and increased cost for consumers of 
high-speed Internet services). 
 335. HIGH-SPEED ACCESS INQUIRY 2002, supra note 1, at 4822-23. 
 336. See 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000) (outlining cable service provider regulatory 
scheme); id. § 201 (outlining common carrier regulatory scheme). 
 337. Brand X Internet Serv. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 47 
U.S.C. § 151 (2000)), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). 
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participants, and commentators.338  Because the words “broadband” 
and “Internet” did not appear anywhere in the 1996 Act’s definitions, 
it seemed clear that Congress had intended the term 
“telecommunications service” to encompass new technologies for 
communications at a distance, of which cable broadband 
unquestionably is one.339  Based on the 1996 Act’s definitions of 
“information” and “telecommunications,” the Ninth Circuit held in 
2000 that cable modem service is a “telecommunications service” 
because it “controls all of the transmission facilities between its 
subscribers and the Internet.”340 
A broad coalition of public and private entities brought several 
challenges to the FCC’s decision to deregulate cable broadband, 
which were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit by judicial lottery.341  
Leading the charge were independent broadband ISPs Brand X 
                                                          
 338. See, e.g., HIGH-SPEED ACCESS INQUIRY 2002, supra note 1, at 4872 (dissenting 
statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps) (“Today we take a gigantic leap down 
the road of removing core communications services from the statutory frameworks 
established by Congress, substituting our own judgment for that of Congress and 
playing a game of regulatory musical chairs by moving technologies and services 
from one statutory definition to another.”); Christopher Stern, FCC Gives Cable Firms 
Net Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at E01 (reporting that Representative Edward 
Markey, key framer of 1996 Act, characterized FCC’s decision as “extraordinary 
regulatory activism as the FCC rewrites the words of Congress to return to pre-1996 
regulatory classifications”). 
 339. The cable companies and Baby Bells themselves made clear to Congress and 
the FCC that cable was a technology for providing data “communications” services 
over a wire.  See, e.g., Telecommunications Policy Reform:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement of Decker Anstrom, 
President, National Cable Television Association) (“Already several leading cable 
companies are building state-of-the-art communications facilities that deliver voice, 
video and data over the same wire.”), quoted in Brief for Respondents Earthlink, Inc., 
Brand X Internet Serv., and Center for Digital Democracy at 34 n.10, Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005) 
(Nos. 04-277 & 04-281); Comments of Verizon Commun., FCC GN Docket No. 00-
185, at 10-11 (Dec. 1, 2000) (footnotes omitted) (“Cable operators are . . . offering 
for a fee to the public a service that transmits ‘information of the user’s choosing, 
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received’ 
‘between or among points specified by the user’—in other words, a 
telecommunications service.  This conclusion is the only one that can be squared 
with the Act and the Commission’s precedents.”), quoted in Brief for Respondents 
Earthlink, Inc., Brand X Internet Serv., and Ctr. for Digital Democracy at 19-20, Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 
820 (2005) (Nos. 04-277 & 04-281). 
 340. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2000); accord 
MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“[A]lthough MediaOne maintains a ‘cable system,’ its facilities can be properly 
classified as telecommunications facilities when they provide a transmission path to 
the Internet.”). 
 341. See Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1127 (noting that seven different petitions for review 
of the FCC’s ruling, filed in three different federal circuits, were consolidated by the 
Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation on Apr. 1, 2002); Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2698, 
162 L. Ed. 2d at 836-37. 
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Internet Services and Earthlink; joining them were the State of 
California, the Consumer Federation of America, the National 
League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National 
Association of Counties, among other associations representing 
primarily local governments.342  By the time the case got to the 
Supreme Court, MCI, the State of New Jersey, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Brennan Center for Justice, and the American 
Association of Retired Persons had lined up on the side of the 
challenge.343 
The Ninth Circuit held that the FCC’s determination that cable 
broadband is an “information service” was erroneous.344  The court 
pointed out that cable broadband providers are the 
telecommunications “‘pipeline,” which “controls all of the 
transmission facilities between its subscribers and the Internet.”345  A 
dial-up ISP such as America Online, by contrast, permits users to 
connect over telephone lines owned by entities other than the ISP, 
which entities are properly considered telecommunications 
services.346 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, and held that cable 
broadband is an information service.347  The Court reasoned that 
                                                          
 342. Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1127 & nn.10, 12. 
 343. See Brief for MCI, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nat’l Cable 
& Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005) 
(Nos. 04-277 & 04-281), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/ 
briefs/pdfs_04-05/04-277&04-281MCIResp.pdf (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision should be affirmed because the Commission’s interpretation of 
“telecommunications service” and “information service” is inconsistent with 
Congressional requirements set forth in the 1996 amendments to the 
Communications Act); Brief for the State of New Jersey, Board of Pub. Util. Comm’n 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Brand X, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 
820 (2005) (Nos. 04-277 & 04-281), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ 
about/cases/NJ%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
should be affirmed because that decision was based on a proper reading of the 
Communications Act and upon precedent); Brief of the ACLU and Brennan Ctr. for 
Justice, supra note 64 (arguing that the FCC’s classification of cable broadband as 
purely an “information service” violated its legal mandate); Brief of AARP, Free Press 
and Nat’l Internet Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Brand X, 125 S. 
Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005) (Nos. 04-277 & 04-281), available at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/BrandX%201.pdf (arguing that the 
FCC’s categorization of cable broadband as purely an “information service” threatens 
competition within the Internet service provider industry and reduces choice among 
ISP consumers). 
 344. See Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1132 (finding that broadband service is part 
“telecommunications service”). 
 345. Id. at 1129 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. City of 
Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 346. Id. at 1128-29. 
 347. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2710-
12, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820, 850-52 (2005) (concluding that the FCC’s construction of 
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consumers use cable broadband to transmit data over the wires only 
in connection with “the information-processing capabilities provided 
by Internet access, and because the transmission is a necessary 
component of Internet access.”348  Surfing the Web over a cable 
modem, the Court declared, requires the cable company to grant the 
surfer access to the domain name system, which fits the statutory 
definition of an “information service” as a “‘capability for . . . 
acquiring . . . retrieving, utilizing, or making available’ Web site 
addresses.”349  The Court added that because Congress intended to 
exempt electronic publishers such as LexisNexis and Dow Jones News 
from common carrier regulation, it could also have intended to 
exempt cable broadband providers even though they “use 
telecommunications as an input to provide information service to the 
public.”350 
Soon after Brand X was decided, the Chairman of the FCC declared 
that it set forth a “‘framework for broadband that can be applied to 
all providers,’” including DSL delivered by the Baby Bells.351  The FCC 
would “‘move quickly to establish regulatory parity between 
telephone companies and cable companies that are providing a 
broadband service,’” the Chairman promised.352  In August 2005, the 
FCC issued a ruling that categorized DSL broadband as an 
information service.353 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Brand X places the impetus on 
Congress to clarify and rationalize the 1996 Act’s framework for 
telecommunications competition.354  Specifically, Congress should 
clearly demarcate between the provision of the “pipeline” or 
“facilities” used to connect subscribers’ homes to the Internet, and 
the provision of data storage and generation capacity such as Web 
                                                          
cable broadband as an “information service” was a reasonable statutory 
interpretation). 
 348. Id. at 2703, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 842. 
 349. Id. at 2709-10, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 849 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000)). 
 350. Id. at 2707, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 846. 
 351. Jon Van, Web Service Price War Seen Despite Ruling, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 2005, at 
C1. 
 352. Amy Schatz, FCC to Seek Parity After Net Ruling; Push to Let Phone Firms Keep 
Exclusive Line Access Planned After Cable Decision, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at B9. 
 353. See In the Matter of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) (summarizing the conclusions of § IV of the 
FCC’s Aug. 5, 2005 Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). 
 354. See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2690-91, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 820-22 (affirming the 
lawfulness of the FCC’s interpretation, under the 1996 Act, that broadband cable 
modem service is an “information service,” not a “telecommunications service”; and 
emphasizing the deference that the federal courts owe to the FCC’s interpretation of 
ambiguous statutes). 
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hosting and e-mail server space.355  The former is a 
telecommunications service which must be governed by common 
carrier regulation to prevent monopolistic and oligopolistic 
exploitation to the detriment of consumers.356  The latter is an 
information service more akin to electronic publishing, for which 
monopolistic control over a network bottleneck is not an urgent 
concern.357  The domain name system, which is necessary to route 
Web surfers to the correct destination, presents something of a 
middle ground between these two categories.  It provides no basis for 
characterizing cable broadband service, as a whole, as merely an 
information service, however, when it is principally used for the 
“‘management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system 
or the management of a telecommunications service.’”358  From the 
consumer’s perspective (which Congress intended to address in 
enacting the 1996 Act, as its preamble indicates),359 cable broadband 
service is just as much a purchase of a “physical transmission pathway 
to the Internet” as is dial-up access or broadband DSL.360 
The weakening of private competition based on open access rules 
makes municipal broadband an even more important counterweight 
to broadband monopolies and duopolies, and makes state action to 
impede municipal entry that much more anticompetitive.361  The 
                                                          
 355. See id. at 2715, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 855 (Scalia, J., joined by Souter, J., and 
Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the case of Internet access, the end user utilizes two 
different and distinct services. One is the transmission pathway, a 
telecommunications service that the end user purchases from the telephone 
company . . . . [This] is a regulated telecommunications service . . . .”) (citation 
omitted). 
 356. As Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, it is absurd to 
recognize that cable broadband provides high-speed Internet access over cable wires, 
but then deny that “cable companies ‘offer’ high-speed access to the Internet,” as the 
FCC and majority did in Brand X.  Id. at 2713, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 853. 
 357. See id. at 2703, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 841 (stating that the Communications Act 
defines “information service” as the offering of information storage or generation 
capability; and acknowledging that the issue of storage and generation is not 
challenged in this action). 
 358. Id. at 2717 n.6, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 858 n.6 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) 
(2000)); see also In the Matter of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011, 24,030-31 
(1998) (stating that a provider of DSL broadband offers a telecommunications 
service even when it also offers information services as well). 
 359. See Preamble, Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 153 (outlining the 
Act’s goal of promoting lower prices and better services for the American consumer). 
 360. See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2714-15, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 855 (Scalia, J., joined by 
Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (declaring that the telecommunications 
aspect of cable broadband service is sufficiently independent to justify its 
characterization as an offer of an independent service, not a combination of 
services). 
 361. Catherine Yang, Good for Cable, Bad for America, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, June 28, 
2005, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2005/tc200506289131 
tc120.htm (“Instead of fostering stiff competition that leads to the low prices and 
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power vested by the FCC in the cable and telephone companies to 
exclude upstart competitors could frustrate universal broadband 
access by raising prices and decreasing innovation and output.362  If 
independent broadband providers are precluded from effectively 
challenging the broadband duopoly enjoyed by the cable and DSL 
providers, the price of broadband will increase, or decrease at a 
slower rate, and fewer Americans will subscribe as a result.363  And if 
consumers can be restrained from leaving a broadband ISP that 
restricts their freedom of Internet choice, content diversity and 
technological innovation will suffer.364 
With the sweeping deregulation of the private broadband industry 
wrought by Trinko and Brand X, the role of municipal governments 
and utilities in making high-speed Internet access a service that most 
Americans use becomes critical.365  Congress had intended the “open 
access requirements” of the 1996 Act to “ensure that all competitors 
will have a way to deliver goods and services to anyone anywhere on 
the information superhighway.”366  The 1996 Act reflected Congress’ 
belief that “universal service will be achieved by nondiscriminatory 
access to telecommunications services.”367  Without the open access 
regulations intended to achieve universal service, the risk is that some 
                                                          
innovation that lure consumers, the U.S. is allowing the huge cable and phone 
companies to shut out competitors that provide services—Internet, phone, or TV—
delivered via those broadband networks.”). 
 362. See Dornan, supra note 314, at 20 (arguing that the FCC’s policies towards 
large telecommunications companies are reinforcing their power and will very likely 
lead to increases in prices and a reduction in choices for the American broadband 
consumer). 
 363. See Schatz, Drucker & Searney, supra note 334, at B1 (contending that the 
Supreme Court’s Brand X decision will have an adverse impact on 
telecommunication competition, which will precipitate an increase in prices and a 
limitation of options for broadband consumers). 
 364. Yang, supra note 361; Ben Scott, Network Neutrality & The Communications, 
Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, Prepared Statement of 
Free Press, Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America before the United 
States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (May 25, 2006), 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/scott052506.pdf (“College kids created 
Google. A hobbyist conceived the idea for eBay. A teenager wrote the code for 
Instant Messaging. Some of the most popular sites on the Internet today—MySpace, 
FaceBook, and YouTube—did not exist three years ago. This technological 
revolution keeps turning because the Internet is an unrestricted free marketplace of 
ideas where innovators rise and fall on their merits. The laws that protect this free 
market are network neutrality rules. Without the rules, innovators are at the mercy of 
the network owners to say who can and cannot succeed.”). 
 365. See Yang, supra note 361 (opining that due to Supreme Court’s repeal of 
broadband open access rules under 1996 Act, “U.S. consumers may end up with only 
the menus [of Web access, phone, and TV services] offered by their local phone and 
cable companies.”). 
 366. 141 CONG. REC. S7907 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Lott). 
 367. Brief for the Resp’ts States and Consumer Groups at 28-29, Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomm. Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005) (Nos. 04-277 & 04-281). 
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Americans may not “benefit[] from the power of the Information 
Age.”368  Even if Congress refuses to revive open access rules, however, 
municipal broadband networks can help consumers escape 
broadband monopolies or duopolies that charge exorbitant prices 
and suppress Internet innovation.     
III. ALL LEGAL PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL BROADBAND          
SHOULD BE LIFTED 
A. Proposed Federal Legislation on Municipal Broadband 
Federal and state laws outlawing municipal entry present a stark 
conflict with the policy of universal access to broadband that the 
federal government and the federal telecommunications laws have 
adopted.369  While private telecommunications companies have a 
legitimate interest in fair competition with municipal broadband 
projects, and in recovering their investment in broadband 
infrastructure along with a reasonable profit, this interest is 
overprotected by outlawing municipal broadband.370  Congress can 
assure adequate protection of private property and investments by 
permitting states to enact legislation that requires municipal 
telecommunications providers to obey all applicable laws governing 
delivery of broadband services, and prohibits the use of eminent 
domain to seize private telecommunications infrastructure for 
conversion to municipal networks. 
In May 2005, a Texas congressman introduced the Preserving 
Innovation in Telecom Act of 2005, federal legislation that “imposes a 
nationwide prohibition on municipally-sponsored networks.”371  
                                                          
 368. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 133 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 369. See Preamble, Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 153 (declaring its 
objectives of promoting competition and reducing federal regulation so as to foster 
rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies for consumers). 
 370. Cf. Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg (D-N.J.), Open the Doors to Broadband Access; Don’t 
Slam Them Shut, THE HILL, July 13, 2005, at 30 (arguing for legislation restricting 
states from outlawing municipal broadband, but stipulating that “when a 
municipality does become a provider it can’t abuse its authority to discriminate 
against private competitors”); In re Mo. Mun. League, 16 F.C.C.R. 1157, 1163 (2001) 
(recognizing that concerns about “possible regulatory bias” by municipalities 
entering telecommunications markets could be resolved “successfully” by various 
ways short of “an outright ban on entry”). 
 371. Texas Congressman Seeks Ban on Municipal Wi-Fi Networks, EE TIMES, June 3, 
2005, http://www.eet.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=164300255.  A 
Baby Bell formerly employed the congressman who introduced the legislation and 
gave him more than $10,000 in campaign contributions during the 2003/2004 
election cycle.  See id. (reporting that Rep. Pete Sessions (R-TX), who introduced the 
Preserving Innovation in Telecom Act of 2005, was previously employed by 
Southwestern Bell); Dwight Silverman, SW Bell’s Internet Link Debuts, HOUSTON 
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Specifically, the bill purports to “prohibit municipal governments 
from offering telecommunications, information, or cable services 
except to remedy market failures by private enterprise to provide 
such services.”372  The law would ban any state or local government, or 
affiliated private entity, from offering telecommunications or 
information services substantially similar to those being provided by a 
corporation or other private entity in the same “geographic area.”373  
An exception to this ban would exist for any state or local 
government providing such service prior to the date of enactment of 
the Act.374 
In response to the proposed federal ban on municipal broadband, 
Senator John McCain introduced the Community Broadband Act of 
2005 (“CBA”), which would guarantee greater competition in 
broadband markets by facilitating municipal entry.375  The CBA, 
which was incorporated into the Advanced Telecommunications and 
Opportunity Reform Act of 2006, provides that states shall not 
prohibit any public provider from offering broadband or other 
advanced telecommunications capabilities.376 
                                                          
CHRON., Oct. 1, 1996, http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/business/96/10/ 
02/swbell.html (describing debut of Southwestern Bell Internet Services as subsidiary 
of Southwestern Bell, a Baby Bell); The Center for Responsive Politics, 2003-04 
Congressional PAC Contributions Sessions, Pete (R-TX) (May 16, 2005), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/memberprofile.asp?cid=N00005681&cycle=2004&
expand=B08 (noting that the Federal Election Commission records show that in the 
2003/2004 election cycle, Rep. Sessions received $10,000 in contributions to his 
Political Action Committee from SBC Communications as well as $9,000 from 
Verizon Communications). 
 372. H.R. 2726, 109th Cong. Preamble (2005). 
 373. Id. § 2(g)(1).   
 374. Id. § 2(g)(2). 
 375. See 151 CONG. REC. S7298-99 (daily ed. June 23, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
McCain) (stating the CBA gives incumbent providers an incentive to enter new rural 
areas, and contains no limits on their ability to compete with municipalities offering 
high-speed Internet access to their citizens). 
 376. Compare Community Broadband Act, S. 1294, 109th Cong. § 2(1)(c)(1) 
(2005) (“No State statute, regulation, or other State legal requirement may prohibit 
or have the effect of prohibiting any public provider from providing, to any person 
or any public or private entity, advanced telecommunications capability or any 
service that utilizes the advanced telecommunications capability provided by such 
provider.”), with Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment 
Act of 2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(c) (2006) (“No State or local government 
statute, regulation, or other State or local government legal requirement may 
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting any public provider from providing, to any 
person or any public or private entity, advanced communications capability or any 
service that utilizes the advanced communications capability provided by such 
provider.”).  The CBA was folded into a much larger telecommunications reform 
bill.  See Communications, Consumer's Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. (2006), http://www.govtrack. us/congress/bill.xpd? 
bill=s109-2686 (indicating that Community Broadband Act of 2005 was folded into 
broader legislation); Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status for the 109th Congress 
S. 2686 (2006), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN 02686:@@@T 
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Rather than passing federal legislation restricting municipal 
broadband, such as the Preserving Innovation in Telecom Act of 
2005, Congress should enact the CBA or a similar provision, and 
embrace a level playing field for municipal broadband as a 
competitor in markets currently dominated by local monopolies and 
duopolies.  While preempting state law bans on municipal broadband 
and Wi-Fi service, a law like the CBA would permit state law 
regulation of public broadband providers on terms generally 
applicable to all other providers of broadband service, and prohibit 
discriminatory regulation of private providers on terms not 
applicable to public ones.377  As Intel, a prominent Wi-Fi equipment 
provider, argues, the CBA “strikes an appropriate balance between 
preempting state prohibitions on the municipalities that provide 
broadband service and requiring municipalities to operate in a 
competitively neutral manner under open, transparent processes.”378 
                                                          
(similar).  The broader bill, which was renamed the Advanced Telecommunications 
and Opportunity Reform Act of 2006, see infra note 39, imposes additional 
provisions granting a right of first refusal to any private provider able and willing to 
establish an “equivalent advanced communications capability of the same scope for 
the same or lower cost to consumers,” and requires both open bidding processes for 
all public-private partnerships, and a notice and thirty-day opportunity for 
commercial enterprises to bid for the rights to provide services in the same coverage 
area at identical service tiers and pricing.  Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and 
Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(e)-(f) (2006).  The 
House of Representatives has already passed a similar bill, which omits the right of 
first refusal and prevention of unfair public competition provisions of the Senate bill.  
The House bill, however is somewhat more restrictive of municipal broadband in 
that it goes beyond prohibiting discrimination or closed access to municipal 
broadband facilities, see id. § 502(d), to also impose a requirement that states and 
municipalities do not “grant any preference or advantage to any [broadband] 
provider” that they own or control.  Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and 
Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong., § 401(b) (2006).   
 377. See Community Broadband Act, S. 1294, 109th Cong. § 2(1)(c)(2)-(3) (2005) 
(forbidding regulations enacted by public providers from discriminating in favor of 
themselves or any providers they own).  The Communications, Consumer’s Choice, 
and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006 imposes a similar antidiscrimination 
requirement, which extends to all “laws and regulations,” “ordinances[,] . . . rules 
and policies, including those relating to the use of public rights-of-way, permitting, 
performance bonding and reporting,” and supplements it with an open access 
provision mandating that to the extent consistent with public safety, private providers 
be allowed to “place similar facilities in the same conduit, trenches, and locations as 
the public provider for concurrent or future use under the same conditions as the 
public provider.”  Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband 
Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(d)(1)-(3) (2006).  The House 
of Representatives has passed a bill that would not only prohibit discrimination or 
noncompliance by public providers with generally applicable law and regulations, 
but also requires that states and municipalities do not “grant any preference or 
advantage to any [broadband] provider” that they own or control.  Communications 
Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong., 
§ 401(b)-(c) (2006). 
 378. Intel Corp., supra note 17. 
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B. State Law Restraints on Municipal Broadband and Wi-Fi Projects 
By 2004, about ten states had passed statutes that impeded 
municipal entry into broadband markets.379  Since then, state 
legislators have proposed action to prohibit or restrict municipal 
broadband in at least fifteen states.380  Legislation intended to block 
or delay many citywide broadband and Wi-Fi projects passed in 2005 
in at least seven states:   Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Nebraska, and Tennessee.381  With Florida and Michigan’s 
action, four of the ten most populous U.S. states now significantly 
restrict municipal broadband networks.382  The measures either 
languished in committee or expired without action in at least seven 
more states, including:   Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, 
and West Virginia.383 
Seven states currently have outright prohibitions on all or many 
municipalities providing high-speed Internet access to their residents.  
With certain exceptions, the law in Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, 
and Texas forbids most or all municipalities from providing 
telecommunications services.384  Nevada law bars cities with 
                                                          
 379. See Stephen Ursery, Bans on Local Telecom Service Are Upheld, AMERICAN CITY & 
COUNTY, May 1, 2004, at 16, 18, available at http://americancityandcounty.com 
(follow “May 1, 2004” drop down hyperlink; then follow “Bans on local telecom 
service are upheld” hyperlink) (discussing the impact of statutes enacted by several 
states). 
 380. See Baller Herbst Law Group, Proposed State Barriers to Public Entry (Jan. 24, 
2006), http://www.baller.com/pdfs/baller_proposed_state_barriers.pdf (listing 
fourteen states that have proposed restrictive legislation); Neal Peirce, City-Sponsored 
Wi-Fi’s Wild Ride, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, available at http://seattletimes. 
nwsource.com/html/opinion/2002446112_peirce21.html (referring to the 
introduction of bills blocking municipal Wi-Fi access in fourteen states); John 
Tanner, The Great Municipal Wi-Fi Freakout:  Will Proposed City Systems Help or Hinder the 
Private Sector?, AMERICA’S NETWORK, Apr. 1, 2005, http://electronic.americasnetwork. 
com/040105/Page_19.asp (claiming restrictive legislation was pending in seventeen 
states); Carol Wilson, Municipal Networks Gaining Ground, TELEPHONY, Apr. 25, 2005, 
at 6, available at http://telephonyonline.com/mag/ (follow “telecom_municipal_ 
networks_gain” hyperlink) (noting restrictions were proposed or passed in 
Pennsylvania, Florida, and Texas). 
 381. Baller Herbst Law Group, supra note 380, at 1-3, 5-7. 
 382. See id. at 3-4, 6, 8 (detailing enactments in Florida, Michigan, and Texas); 
Peirce, supra note 380 (describing restrictions imposed by the Pennsylvania 
Legislature). 
 383. See Baller Herbst Law Group, supra note 380 (outlining specific difficulties 
various legislatures encountered while attempting to enact barriers to public 
broadband entry). 
 384. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 392.410(7) (West 1994 & Supp. 2006) (excepting 
telecommunications for governmental functions such as emergency, medical, or 
educational services, as well as “Internet-type services”); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-593-86-
596 (2005) (barring municipalities and public power suppliers from offering retail or 
wholesale broadband or telecommunications services, excepting only certain services 
provided with authorization prior to 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-574 (2004) 
(defining dark fiber as “unused fiber optic cable through which no light is 
transmitted or any installed fiber optic cable not carrying a signal”); NEB. REV. STAT. 
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populations of 25,000 or more, and counties with populations of 
50,000 or more, from selling telecommunications access to members 
of the public.385  Virginia law prohibits municipal broadband projects 
except in those cities that operated electric utilities in 2002,386 and 
outlaws subsidizing broadband in those cities with tax revenues and 
in many (perhaps most) circumstances other revenues.387  
Washington state law prohibits public utility districts from providing 
broadband Internet access to end users.388 
Several other states may forbid municipalities from providing 
broadband Internet access as a public service simply by failing 
explicitly to authorize them to do so.  In these states, which have 
adopted “Dillon’s Rule,” state constitutional, statutory, or common 
law provides that municipalities have only those powers expressly 
conveyed to them by the state government, or that are really 
necessary to carry out those express powers.389  Dillon’s Rule could 
                                                          
§ 86-575 (2004) (excepting services provided over dark fiber); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-
52-601-7-52-604 (2005) (establishing that no municipal broadband services may be 
offered except where the municipality also operates an electric plant pursuant to 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-401 and a referendum is held on the matter pursuant to 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-602 (2005)); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 54.201-54.202 
(Vernon 2005) (originally codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c-0, 
§ 3.251(d) (1995)) (stating that a “municipality or municipal electric system may not 
offer for sale to the public” various regulated telecommunications services, including 
“a service offered either directly or indirectly through a telecommunications 
provider”); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 54.2025 (Vernon 2005) (excepting dark fiber). 
 385. NEV. REV. STAT. § 268.086.1(a) (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 710.147.1(a) (2003); 
Carlson, supra note 31, at 52 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 268.086.1(a) (2004) (originally 
enacted 1997)). 
 386. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2160(A) (Matthew Bender 2006) (establishing that 
any locality operating an electrical system prior to Mar. 1, 2002, may provide 
telecommunications and broadband services within any such locality). 
 387. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2160(D) (Matthew Bender 2006) (forbidding 
localities from cross-subsidizing broadband services with revenues from other 
sources, except in areas where no for-profit broadband or offer to provide it exists). 
 388. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 54.16.330 (West 2006) (authorizing public utility 
districts to provide wholesale broadband access to private broadband providers, but 
expressly prohibiting the public utility districts from selling to end users). 
 389. See Carlson, supra note 31, at 53-55 (citing Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 
163, 170 (1868), and expounding that Dillon’s Rule is a fundamental attribute of 
state sovereignty and can be applied by direct legislative action or indirect judicial 
fiat).  Dillon’s Rule is named after John Forest Dillon, a justice of the Iowa Supreme 
Court who invented it.  See Merriam, 25 Iowa at 170-76; see also Manuela Albuquerque, 
California and Dillon:  The Times They Are A-Changing, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 
190 (1998) (describing John Dillon as “a judge and writer of a municipal law treatise 
who formulated the doctrine embodied in the rule”).  Fifty years earlier, Chief 
Justice Marshall noted that local governments were “instruments” of state 
governments, “created” and “controllable” by state legislatures for their purposes.  
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 4 L. ed. 629, 659 (1819).  Dillon’s Rule went 
“dramatically” beyond this recognition of state governments’ utilization of local 
governmental entities, and even “thwarted” it, by precluding local governments from 
acting in ways perhaps not unanticipated, but not specifically commanded, by the 
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potentially give rise to legal challenges to municipal broadband in 
several large states.  Illinois, Florida, and Texas are Dillon’s Rule 
jurisdictions, although Florida courts are divided on the issue and 
Illinois courts exempt a small minority of “home rule” cities and 
counties.390  The New York courts have adopted Dillon’s Rule, except 
as modified by the state’s “Bill of rights for local governments.”391  
California is also a Dillon’s Rule state, at least as to counties and 
“general law cities.”392  In one case, a county that asserted the 
                                                          
state.  David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City:  Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 
U. PA. L. REV. 487, 508 (1999). 
 390. See Barry v. Garcia, 573 So. 2d 932, 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reaffirming 
that Dillon’s Rule governs statutory interpretation (citing Tampa v. Easton, 198 So. 
753 (Fla. 1940))); Vill. of Wauconda v. Hutton, 684 N.E.2d 1364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) 
(striking down a local ordinance as inconsistent with legislative intent, but upholding 
the home rule principle that local ordinances may impose more rigorous restrictions 
than state regulations so long as they do not conflict); N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. 
City of St. Charles, 697 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (allowing City of St. Charles to 
pass utility ordinances as implicitly granted by legislature); Tex. River Barges v. City 
of San Antonio, 21 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App. 2000) (upholding City of San Antonio’s 
right to regulate navigable waterways under home rule as granted by legislative 
charter); see also Jesse J. Richardson et al., Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the 
Influence of Dillon’s Rule on Growth Management, BROOKINGS.COM, Jan. 2003, at 41-45, 
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/dillonsrule.pdf (summarizing 
the application of Dillon’s Rule to local authority in the states).  But see City of Boca 
Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1992) (holding Dillon’s Rule abrogated in Florida 
by Article VIII, section 2(b) of state constitution); County of Wabash v. Partee, 608 
N.E.2d 674 (Ill. App. 1993) (finding Dillon’s Rule abrogated in very limited 
circumstances by § 10 of art. VII of state constitution). 
 391. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (enumerating rights, powers, privileges, and 
immunities of local governments).  The “Bill of rights for local governments” 
provides that local powers shall be liberally construed, not strictly construed as under 
Dillon’s Rule. See also Richardson et al., supra note 390, at 44 (interpreting N.Y. 
Const. art. IX, § 3(c) as an express repudiation of Dillon’s Rule as applied to powers 
granted to local governments under the same article).  Compare N.Y. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 3(c) (expressing legislative desire for the courts to construe art. IX liberally), with 
Merriam, 25 Iowa at 170 (“any fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by 
the courts against the [municipality]--against the existence of the power”), and 
Pesticide Pub. Policy Found. v. Wauconda, 1510 N.E.2d 858, 860-62 (Ill. 1987) 
(noting that under Dillon’s Rule, powers of municipality are strictly construed). 
 392. See Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 415 P.2d 769, 773 (Cal. 1966) 
(reiterating general law that cities only have those powers expressly conferred upon 
it by the state legislature or necessarily incident to the declared object of the 
municipal corporation); County of Marin v. Super. Ct. of Marin County, 349 P.2d 
526, 530 (Cal. 1960) (characterizing counties as mere political agents of the state, 
authorized only to exercise powers granted by the state); County of Modoc v. 
Spencer & Raker, 37 P. 483, 483 (Cal. 1894) (denying Modoc County the authority to 
employ outside counsel to assist in criminal prosecutions without express consent of 
the state legislature); G.L. Mezzetta, Inc. v. City of Am. Canyon, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 
295 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (limiting powers of general law cities only to those which 
the legislature expressly confer upon it, or are essential to the object or purpose of 
the municipal corporation); Albuquerque, supra note 389, at 190 (explaining the 
constitutional powers of California cities to override general state laws that conflict 
with municipal affairs); Richardson et al., supra note 390, at 41 (differentiating 
charter cities which enjoy broad home rule powers from counties and general law 
cities which are subject to Dillon’s Rule). 
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authority to rebroadcast television signals as a “public service” was 
rebuffed by a state appellate court, which held that the California 
Constitution grants a county only such powers as are expressly 
granted by the state constitution or statutes, or that arise by necessary 
implication from such powers.393 
The cable companies and Baby Bells have used Dillon’s Rule to 
attempt to block municipal telecommunications entry as exceeding 
local governmental authority.  For example, in Warner Cable Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Schuylkill Haven,394 the court held that a borough should be 
enjoined from building and operating a cable television system, 
because in Pennsylvania, a Dillon’s Rule state, the legislature had 
been silent on a borough’s power to do so, except as to those systems 
operating by July 1979.395  By contrast, the court in Bellsouth 
Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg,396 held that a city was authorized 
to make the Internet available over its fiber-optic network under a 
statute which allowed cities to provide “cable television services,” 
defined to include any wire or cable system transmitting television or 
electronic signals.397  The court found that Dillon’s Rule, which 
mandates a strict construction of city powers, had been replaced in 
more recent cases by a “plain meaning” rule in determining whether 
“public enterprise” is “unauthorized” under state law.398 
Other states have regulatory regimes intended to ban most 
broadband subsidies.  Alabama, Florida, Iowa, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin outlaw most broadband subsidies, 
and have adopted a number of provisions intended to increase the 
cost of city-supported telecommunications services.399  For example, 
                                                          
 393. See Byers v. Bd. of Supervisors of San Bernardino County, 68 Cal. Rptr. 549, 
556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (dismissing the county’s attempt to classify television 
rebroadcasts as a public service implicit in several statutory provisions, and instead 
proclaiming such powers to be retained by the state until expressly granted to 
counties). 
 394. 784 F. Supp. 203, 211-12, 214-15 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
 395. Id.  For a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court embracing Dillon’s 
Rule, see Guthrie v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 499 A.2d 570, 599-600 (Pa. 1985) (“A 
political subdivision has only those powers expressly given it by the legislature.”). 
 396. 606 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 397. See id. at 723-28 (interpreting state statutes broadly in order to grant cities any 
additional and supplementary powers reasonably necessary to carry the statutes into 
effect). 
 398. See id. at 724-26 (relying on recent North Carolina Supreme Court decisions 
that used the plain meaning rule without reference to Dillon’s Rule). 
 399. See ALA. CODE § 11-50B-3 (LexisNexis 2005) (adopting regulations requiring 
public providers to allow nondiscriminatory access to any of its telecommunications 
equipment not needed for public purposes); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.81(2)(f) (West 
Supp. 2006) (banning cross-subsidization of telecommunications from utility or any 
other revenues); IOWA CODE ANN. § 388.10(1)(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (preventing 
use of general funds to support or subsidize telecommunications); S.C. CODE ANN. 
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Iowa law provides that municipalities may not spend any “general 
fund moneys for the ongoing support or subsidy of a 
telecommunications system,”400 thereby prohibiting cities and 
counties from competing with private industry under most 
circumstances.401  Cities in Iowa also may not direct revenue from 
municipal electric, gas, water, sewage, or garbage services for the 
“ongoing support” of a telecommunications system.402  They are 
prohibited from offering telecommunications services for free as a 
public service, but must charge the full cost.403 
Incumbent veto provisions are powerful mechanisms by which 
states may hinder municipalities from offering broadband or Wi-Fi 
Internet as a public service to their residents.404  Congress and some 
states have considered or passed legislation requiring municipalities 
to grant a right of first refusal to incumbent broadband providers.405  
In arguably the most onerous such law, Pennsylvania mandates that 
municipalities outside of Philadelphia give incumbent providers two 
                                                          
§ 58-9-2620 (Supp. 2005) (excluding public providers from receiving any financial 
benefit not afforded to nongovernment-owned telecommunications providers and 
from subsidizing services from any other source of revenue); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-
402 (2005) (barring subsidies for telecommunications equipment or services, but 
allowing the dedication of a reasonable portion of the electric plant to the provision 
of such services); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-18-303(3)-(5) (2003) (prohibiting cross-
subsidization through the use of tax, utility, below-market loan, or any other type of 
revenue, as well as any preferential or advantageous grant to itself or any other 
private provider of public telecommunications services); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 196.204(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2005) (limiting subsidization to retained earnings or 
revenues derived from the sale of directory advertising). 
 400. IOWA CODE ANN. § 388.10(1)(a)(1). 
 401. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 23A.2 (West Supp. 2005) (banning agencies and 
political subdivisions from private competitive markets unless authorized under state 
regulation or permitted by rule to promote services related to public education); 
Iowa Tel. Ass’n v. City of Hawarden, 589 N.W.2d 245, 252 (Iowa 1999) (holding that 
federal law “does not prevent the State of Iowa from prohibiting the offering of local 
[telecommunications] service by its political subdivisions”); Petitioner’s Reply Brief 
at 13, Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (No. 02-1238), available 
at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-1238/02-1238.mer.pet. 
rep.pdf (arguing constitutionality of congressional action preempting restrictions on 
private enterprise ventures into areas of commercial service). 
 402. IOWA CODE ANN. § 388.10(1)(a)(4) (West Supp. 2005). 
 403. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 388.10(1)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring city to 
charge itself, at a reasonable rate, for facilities or equipment used to provide 
telecommunications services); IOWA CODE Ann. § 388.10(2)(b) (West Supp. 2005) 
(defining telecommunications services as any retail provision of telephone, Internet, 
or cable television services). 
 404. See Baller Herbst Law Group, supra note 380, at 2-3 (discussing legislative 
efforts to prevent municipalities from providing broadband services with greater data 
capacity than incumbent providers). 
 405. See Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(f)(3) (2006); Shane Peterson, Boiling Point, GOV’T 
TECH., Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.govtech.net/magazine/story.php? 
id=97156 (criticizing Pennsylvania legislation granting right of first refusal to 
incumbent providers). 
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months to agree to establish, and over a year to actually establish, 
broadband service at the data speed requested by a municipality.406  
What gives this provision a potentially obstructionist character is that 
the price and quality of service may not be relevant to the right of 
first refusal, so that providers could block municipal action simply by 
offering high-cost broadband access such as a T-1 line.407  Congress 
and the state of Florida have adopted a better approach, the former 
requiring that a private firm provide equivalent broadband service 
with the same coverage at equal or lower cost, and the latter 
providing that municipalities need only consider whether 
comparable broadband service will be generally available throughout 
the area.408  This more flexible approach would expedite municipal 
broadband projects and create fewer opportunities for 
gamesmanship than the Pennsylvania law.409 
Requirements that municipal broadband projects show a profit, or 
conduct expensive referenda that are ripe for abuse via corporate 
advertising,410 will tend to make the United States lag even further 
                                                          
 406. See Peterson, supra note 405 (explaining that prior to municipalities 
constructing their own networks, incumbent providers must first be given fourteen 
months to provide the updated services). 
 407. See Wilson, supra note 380, at 6-7 (quoting James Baller of The Baller-Herbst 
Group criticizing the measure for its lack of specificity regarding quality, and 
commenting that a “service provider could, cynically, claim its T-1 service meets the 
[new] data speed requirements”). 
 408. Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(f)(3) (2006) (“The public provider may proceed 
with the project only if, during the 30-day period, no private sector entity submits a 
bid to provide equivalent advanced communications capability of the same scope for 
the same or lower cost to consumers, as determined by a neutral third party, and 
demonstrates the requisite technical and financial ability to provide that capability.”); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.81(2)(b)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 2006) (municipality must 
consider whether private service of “same or a similar” character is “generally 
available throughout the community”).  Florida law allows a municipality to operate 
telecommunications services only if they obtain and hold a certificate from the 
Florida Public Service Commission, which the Commission may grant or deny 
according to its determination of the public interest.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 364.335(3) (West Supp. 2006). 
 409. See generally Wilson, supra note 380, at 6-7 (highlighting competitive 
differences between Florida and Pennsylvania telecommunication laws). 
 410. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:844.50(A) (Supp. 2006) (requiring local 
authorities to obtain a majority vote by referendum prior to providing 
telecommunication services).  The executive director of the Florida Municipal 
Electric Association has complained that incumbents are “consistently saying things 
that are untrue” and simply “making stuff up” to make municipal broadband look 
risky.  Wilson, supra note 380, at 7.  When supporters of municipal broadband for the 
Tri-Cities of St. Charles, Batavia and Geneva, Illinois lost a voter initiative to 
authorize funding, for example, Comcast and Southwestern Bell allegedly 
“bombarded the area with inaccurate information to persuade voters to reject a 
public fiber network.”  Baller & Lide, supra note 238, at 26 n.18.  Likewise, providers 
of wireless networking technology that municipalities could use to deploy Wi-Fi have 
alleged that incumbent broadband and wireless corporations have engaged in an 
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behind nations that heavily subsidize broadband to make their 
workers and students more competitive.411  A recently passed Florida 
law requires municipalities to hold referenda before financing such 
projects over periods in excess of fifteen years.412  Similarly, Minnesota 
requires a super-majority vote before a municipality can offer 
broadband,413 while Louisiana and Colorado require special elections 
to approve municipal broadband projects.414 
C. Lifting All Legal Prohibitions on Municipal Broadband Will Accelerate 
the Advent of Universal Broadband Access 
There are three principal reasons why all municipal broadband 
restrictions should be eliminated, preferably through federal 
legislation such as the CBA.  First, municipal broadband is closing the 
digital divide along racial, economic, educational, and geographic 
lines.415  Second, government subsidies in general and municipal 
broadband in particular have proven to be effective tools for 
promoting universal broadband access in other nations.416  Third, 
broadband and Wi-Fi networks operated by cities and counties can be 
financially viable and are likely to encourage greater private 
broadband investment.417 
                                                          
“‘organized campaign of disinformation’” against municipal Wi-Fi.  Mike Angell, 
Cities Face Backlash as They Plan Municipal Wireless Services, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 
3, 2005, at A05 (quoting Ron Sege, chief executive of wireless gear firm Tropos 
Networks). 
 411. See Peirce, supra note 380 (citing a survey by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development ranking United States twelfth globally in broadband 
expenditures per capita). 
 412. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.81(2)(f) (West Supp. 2006) (creating the necessity 
for public referendum before issuing bonds intended to finance communications 
projects if those bonds mature after more than fifteen years). 
 413. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.19 (West 2003) (prohibiting municipal ownership 
of telephone exchanges without the approval of a majority of electors, and 
mandating municipal construction of telephone exchanges only upon successful 
referendum garnering sixty-five percent of the votes cast). 
 414. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-27-201(1)-202 (2005) (exempting projects from 
election requirement when no private broadband providers will offer service in the 
area to be covered); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:844.50(A) (Supp. 2006) (requiring local 
authorities to obtain a majority vote by referendum prior to providing 
telecommunication services). 
 415. See 151 CONG. REC. S7298 (daily ed. June 23, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Lautenberg) (contending that the digital divide can be overcome by creating greater 
access to Internet services and allowing municipals to lower prices in underserved 
urban areas). 
 416. See 151 CONG. REC. S7299 (statement of Sen. McCain) (arguing that countries 
such as Canada, Japan, and Korea are outpacing the United States in high-speed 
Internet penetration due to cooperative systems that combine municipal and private 
networks). 
 417. See id. (maintaining that CBA would not limit competition, but prevent 
regulatory or competitive discrimination and encourage cooperation among 
providers). 
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1. Barriers to universal broadband access:   The digital divide along racial,     
economic, educational, and geographic lines 
Assuming that equitable access to Internet technology across racial 
and socioeconomic lines is a valued outcome, trusting the private 
market to roll out access on its own timetable is unlikely to achieve it.  
Racially discriminatory access to property and positions of value has 
persisted for decades in diverse sectors of the American economy.418  
African-Americans and Latino/Latinas are much less likely to 
accumulate wealth,419 own a home420 or business,421 or receive needed 
medical care as non-Hispanic whites.422  These racial disparities in 
ownership of, and access to, valuable property and services, inevitably 
carry over into access to information and telecommunications.423 
For nearly a century, the information media and 
telecommunications industries in the United States remained 
                                                          
 418. See, e.g., University of Southern California (“USC”), Lusk Center for Real 
Estate, USC Lusk Center for Real Estate Study Shows Sizeable and Persistent Racial 
Homeownership Gaps (Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/lusk/press/ 
item.php?id=546 (uncovering persistent racial disparity in homeownership rates 
between non-Hispanic whites and minorities). 
 419. See RAKESH KOCHHAR, THE WEALTH OF HISPANIC HOUSEHOLDS:  1996 TO 2002 2 
(Pew Research Center 2004), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/34.pdf (showing 
African-American and Hispanic families have a net financial worth equal to 
approximately one-tenth of non-Hispanic white families). 
 420. See id. (asserting that minorities face greater barriers to homeownership and 
have limited access to financial markets); USC, supra note 418 (revealing that non-
Hispanic whites are currently nearly fifty percent more likely to own their own homes 
than minorities). 
 421. See Leonard M. Baynes & C. Anthony Bush, The Other Digital Divide:  Disparity 
in the Auction of Wireless Telecommunications, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 351, 372-73 (2003) 
(asserting that business ownership among minorities may largely be the product of 
disparate treatment by lending institutions and inadequate access to investors); 
KOCHHAR, supra note 419, at 15 (declaring business ownership rates among Latinos 
are slightly more than half that of non-Hispanic whites, with the rate of non-Hispanic 
blacks around one third that of non-Hispanic whites). 
 422. See COMMISSION ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., UNEQUAL 
TREATMENT:  CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 5, 426-40 
(The National Academies Press 2003), http://darwin.nap.edu/books/030908265X/ 
html/R1.html (finding minorities dying at higher rates, as they are less likely to 
receive proper health care for illnesses such as cancer, HIV, heart disease, and 
stroke); Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering:  An Approach to Addressing 
Inequalities in Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color and Immigrant Communities, 8 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 40-41 (2004-2005) (claiming subtle forms of discrimination 
have persisted in the U.S. healthcare system, and that such discrimination causes 
minorities to receive inferior care). 
 423. See ROBERT W. FAIRLIE, IS THERE A DIGITAL DIVIDE?  ETHNIC AND RACIAL 
DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, 23 (Univ. of 
California, Latino Policy Institute and California Policy Research Center 2003), 
http://cjtc.ucsc.edu/docs/r_techreport5.pdf (proposing income as one of the two 
main causes of disparities in access to technology for minority groups). 
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profoundly oligopolistic in their structure,424 and almost entirely 
excluded women and members of minority ethnic groups.425  For 
decades, policies and practices of the U.S. government and the 
American film and broadcast industries contributed to denying 
African Americans, Native Americans, Latinos/Latinas, and Asian 
Americans effective access to telecommunications media.426  History 
has shown that the federal government has repeatedly given away 
radio and TV licenses to too few people, almost all of whom are non-
Hispanic whites.427  Until the late 1940s, the federal government 
denied people of color licenses to operate radio stations, and until 
the late 1960s, few members of minority ethnic or racial groups were 
hired to work as journalists in radio or television.428  There were no 
                                                          
 424. As of July 2001, 98.5% of American cities were reported to have only one 
local newspaper to read.  Media Ownership:  Hearings Before the Commerce Comm. 
of the U.S. Senate, 107th Cong. 4 (July 17, 2001) (testimony of Eli M. Noam, 
Professor of Finance and Economics, Columbia University, Director, Columbia 
Institute for Tele-Information), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/071701 
Noam.pdf.  Likewise, the percentage of U.S. newspapers that had a local competitor 
declined from over sixty percent in the nineteenth century to less than two percent 
by 1986, leaving only twenty-eight cities with two or more newspapers competing for 
the attention of the public.  See C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2115-16 (1992) (faulting increased reliance on advertising 
revenue for the decline of competitive dailies within the same city).  Similarly, most 
of the American book publishing business is controlled by between five and twelve 
large companies, depending on the source, and six or seven major studios have 
claimed over eighty percent of the domestic box office intake in 2004.  See C. Edwin 
Baker, Media Concentration:  Giving up on Democracy, 54 U. FLA. L. REV. 839, 880 & 
n.193 (2002) (summarizing data regarding number of companies that dominate 
book publishing); Box Office Mojo, Studio Market Share:  2004, http://www.boxoffice 
mojo.com/studio (follow “2004” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 17, 2005) (charting 
breakdown of market share and revenue among top twelve film distributors in 2004). 
 425. See Eric Boehlert, The Forbidden Truth About Jayson Blair, SALON, May 15, 2003, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2003/05/15/nytimes (noting that the New 
York Times had not hired a black columnist prior to the early 1990s); New York 
Times Co., New York Times Timeline 1851-1880 (2005), http://www.nytco.com/ 
company-timeline-1851.html (admitting to not hiring an African-American reporter 
until 1945, and not hiring a female reporter, except to cover First Ladies, until 
1961); Press Release, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Pioneering 
New York Times Journalist Dies (Nov. 5, 2001), http://www.rcfp.org/news/ 
2001/1105shanah.html (commemorating Eileen Shanahan as the first woman 
journalist hired in 1961 by the New York Times for assignments other than covering 
First Ladies). 
 426. See Juan González & Joseph Torres, How Long Must We Wait?  The Fight for 
Racial and Ethnic Equality in the American News Media 8 (2004), http://images. 
democracynow.org/howlong.pdf (blaming the FCC for not intervening in the face of 
blatant racist practices among broadcast companies). 
 427. See Baynes & Bush, supra note 421, at 378-79, 385 (arguing that when FCC 
grants spectrum licenses for wireless telephone and other telecommunications 
services, members of minority groups are much less likely to be awarded the most 
valuable ones). 
 428. See González & Torres, supra note 426, at 8 (summarizing broadcasting’s long 
history of racial discrimination). 
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African-American owned radio stations until 1949, and no such 
television stations until 1969.429 
With the benefit of federal licenses to operate without competition 
on their assigned frequencies, the owners of telecommunications 
firms have imposed an extraordinary degree of concentration on 
American media industries.430  Through the early 1980s, there were 
only three major television companies (NBC, ABC, CBS).431  In 2004, 
the four largest television stations claimed seventy-three percent of 
the average local market.432  Despite many more channels, the 
ownership of major media outlets may be more concentrated than at 
any time since the early 1960s.433 
Even after ownership of media outlets was opened up to minorities 
on a wider scale, the radio, television, and motion picture industries 
continued to exhibit minimal representation of racial or ethnic 
minorities in positions of ownership or control.434  Minority 
ownership of commercial radio and television stations remains 
minimal.435  For many years, very few minorities held executive 
positions in film studios and television networks.436 
Tracking inequalities in access to broadcast technologies, huge 
gaps in access to computers and the Internet sprang up in the 1990s, 
as non-Hispanic white, high-income, and well-educated Americans 
                                                          
 429. Id. at 10.  The first radio station owned by a Hispanic debuted in 1945, and 
the first Native American-owned radio station was licensed in 1970.  Id. at 8-10. 
 430. See Eric Boehlert, Pay for Play, SALON, Mar. 14, 2001, http://dir.salon. 
com/ent/feature/2001/03/14/payola/index.html (observing that in recent years, 
three companies have controlled sixty percent of the radio stations in the top 100 
U.S. markets); Alexandra Marks, Media Future:  Risk of Monopoly, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 19, 2002, at 3 (declaring that four companies have determined what 
two-thirds of listeners to radio news get to hear). 
 431. Noam, supra note 424, at 2-3. 
 432. Media Ownership:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, 108th Cong. (Oct. 2, 2003) (testimony of Eli M. Noam, Director 
and Professor of Finance and Economics, Columbia Institute for Tele-Information), 
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=950&wit_id=2681. 
 433. See Ted Turner, My Beef with Big Media, WASH. MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2004, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0407.turner.html (attributing 
the concentration of media ownership to the loosening of ownership regulations by 
federal legislators and the pro-consolidation regulations put forth by the FCC). 
 434. See González & Torres, supra note 426, at 10-11 (chronicling the continued 
racism underlying FCC regulations that stymied minority representation in broadcast 
media prior to the civil rights movement). 
 435. See id. at 14 (proclaiming that by 2000, racial and ethnic minorities still 
owned only three percent of commercial television stations, three percent of 
commercial FM radio stations, and about five percent of commercial AM stations). 
 436. See Edward Guthmann, Jackson Aims at Wrong Target; Black Showing Not Oscar’s 
Fault, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 27, 1996, at E3 (detailing allegations of racial under 
representation and “cultural lockout” in Hollywood); Report Says Blacks Are Underhired 
in Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at C13 (reporting that “only a handful of 
blacks hold executive positions with film studios and television networks”). 
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went online at rates far surpassing those at which African-American 
or Hispanic, low-income, or less-educated Americans did.437  Starting 
about 1995, concerns began to mount that unequal access across 
neighborhoods to advanced telecommunications services in general, 
and high-speed Internet access in particular, revealed racial 
discrimination in the form of “electronic redlining.”438  Despite 
grassroots campaigns to outlaw electronic redlining in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the final legislation did not include 
such a prohibition.439  The 1996 Act included an aspiration to 
universal service without discrimination on account of race or other 
factors, but did not require equitable deployment on a statistical 
basis, or forbid electronic redlining.440 
The Clinton administration believed in ensuring widespread and 
inexpensive access to computer-based information by all U.S. citizens, 
arguing that as a “matter of fundamental fairness, this nation cannot 
accept a division of our people among . . . information ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots.’”441  Accordingly, it carefully tracked the digital divide in a 
series of groundbreaking studies.  In the first such report, released in 
1995, the Administration discovered that a principal digital divide was 
based on race and national origin:   non-Hispanic white Americans 
had computers at double to quadruple the rates of Hispanics and 
African-Americans.442  Native Americans fared little better than 
                                                          
 437. See Suneel Ratan, A New Divide Between Haves and Have-Nots?, TIME, Spring 
1995, at 25, 26 (raising concerns over the digital divide, and the enormity of the 
possible impact to minority employment and education); see also Howard Bryant, Will 
There Be Redlining in Cyberspace?, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July, 1995, at 47 (contending that 
major carriers are selecting the most affluent areas for new telecommunications 
services, which in turn disadvantages minorities); Reginald Stuart, High-Tech 
Redlining:  Are African-Americans Being Frozen Out of the New Communications Network?, 
UTNE READER, Mar. 1995, at 72-73 (citing U.S. Census Bureau study finding nearly 
thirty million whites and only one and one-half million blacks used computers at 
home in 1989); Robert Wright, Low Fiber, NEW REPUBLIC, June 27, 1994, at 4 
(evaluating the intentionality of “redlining” and its impact on poor neighborhoods). 
 438. See Allen S. Hammond, IV, Universal Service in the Digital Age:  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996:  Codifying the Digital Divide, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 179, 206 
(1997) (illuminating Congress’s failure to include express language forbidding 
redlining of poor and minority communities in the 1996 Act, but instead 
incorporating analogous language into an amendment to the Communications Act 
of 1934). 
 439. See id. at 206-08 (arguing that so long as the guidelines allow providers to 
develop areas based on wealth, underprivileged communities will receive little more 
than basic services). 
 440. Id. at 202, 206. 
 441. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK 
FORCE, THE NII:  AGENDA FOR ACTION (1993), http://www.ibiblio.org/nii/NII-
Agenda-for-Action.html. 
 442. See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET:  A SURVEY OF THE “HAVE NOTS” IN RURAL AND URBAN 
AMERICA tbl.5 (1995), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/tables.htm [hereinafter 
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Hispanics, while non-Hispanic minorities (other than Asian-
Americans and Pacific Islanders) fared worse.443  Other divides, the 
report found, were based on income and education:   Americans with 
household incomes over $50,000 had computers at up to twenty times 
the rate of those with incomes of less than $25,000, while college 
graduates had computers at up to fifty times the rate of those with 
high school educations or less.444 
The Commerce Department released its first report on racial and 
other disparities in Internet access in 1997.445  The report showed that 
three times as many non-Hispanic whites as African-Americans or 
Hispanics had Internet access.446  Income and education gaps also 
remained stark.447  Generally poor infrastructure in rural or central 
city areas where more minority, poor, and less educated people often 
live could not explain these gaps, because they persisted among 
racial, income, and educational groups residing in areas of similar 
density.448  Thus, the geographic digital divide, while very real, seems 
more likely to be caused by poverty and demographics rather than 
the other way around.449 
                                                          
FALLING THROUGH THE NET I] (showing, for example, that almost one-third of urban 
and central city non-Hispanic whites had computers, compared to only about one-
tenth of urban and central city African-Americans or Hispanics, while almost one-
fourth of rural non-Hispanic whites had computers, compared to only one in sixteen 
rural African-Americans and one in eight rural Hispanics). 
 443. See id. (demonstrating that only about fifteen percent of non-Hispanic Native 
Americans had computers, compared to a third or more of Asian-Americans and 
Pacific Islanders, but less than twelve percent of other non-Hispanic minorities). 
 444. Id. at tbls.2 & 11. 
 445. See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET II:  NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, Highlights (1998), 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/net2/falling.html [hereinafter FALLING THROUGH 
THE NET II] (reporting on computer usage statistics along lines of geography, income, 
race, age, education and household type). 
 446. Id. chart 2, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/net2/charts.html. 
 447. See id. charts 11 & 17 (providing, for example, that 75.9% of households 
earning over $75,000 per year had computers, while only 23% of those earning 
between $20,000 and $24,999 per year had computers; and that while 25.7% of those 
who had a high school diploma had a computer, 63.2% of those with a college 
degree had a computer). 
 448. See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET I, supra note 442, tbls.2, 5 & 11 (indicating large variances 
between homes with computers according to income, race, and educational 
attainment, and smaller variances between rural, urban, and central city areas); 
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FALLING THROUGH 
THE NET II, supra note 445, tbls. 11 & 17 (updating the data for 1997 on households 
with computers according to income and education). 
 449. See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET I, supra note 442, at tbls. 2, 5 & 11 (providing data showing 
race, income, and education correspond with larger divides than geographic 
comparisons). 
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The digital divide worsened during President Clinton’s second 
term on a percentage basis, with the gap between access by African-
Americans and non-Hispanic whites widening by roughly forty 
percent, from about 13.5 percentage points in 1997 to 18.6 points in 
1998, and the gap between access by Hispanics and non-Hispanic 
whites widening by a comparable amount.450  The gap in home 
Internet access between non-Hispanic white and African-
American/Hispanic households widened from 1997 to 1998.451  Only 
forty percent as many African-Americans or Hispanics as non-
Hispanic whites had home Internet access in 1998.452  The percentage 
gap in Internet access between non-Hispanic white and African-
American or Hispanic households yawned even further between 1998 
and 2000, reaching an eighteen-point divide.453  Asian-American 
households also lagged slightly behind non-Hispanic white 
households in home Internet access by the late 1990s.454 
The digital divide continued to grow under the Bush 
administration, as the racial gap in online access by African-American 
and non-Hispanic white households hit twenty points in 2001 and 
2003, and twenty-eight points between Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
                                                          
 450. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FALLING 
THROUGH THE NET:  DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1999), chart I-23, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/FTTN_I/Chart-I-23.html; see also 
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FACT SHEET:  
HISPANICS FALLING BACK IN INFORMATION AGE (1999), http://www.ntia.doc. 
gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/factsheets/hispanics.htm (providing statistics showing 
that while Hispanics’ access to computers and the Internet is increasing, the gap 
between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites continued to grow between 1997 and 
1998); NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FACT 
SHEET:  IN INFORMATION EXPANSION, BLACKS LAG BEHIND (1999), http://www.ntia. 
doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/factsheets/african-americans.htm (showing that 
while the telephone gap is narrowing, and the overall number of African-Americans 
with computers is increasing, the computer and Internet usage gap between African-
Americans and non-Hispanic whites is increasing). 
 451. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FACT 
SHEET:  IN INFORMATION EXPANSION, BLACKS LAG BEHIND (1999), http://www.ntia.doc. 
gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/factsheets/african-americans.htm; NATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FACT SHEET:  HISPANICS 
FALLING BACK IN INFORMATION AGE (1999), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ 
digitaldivide/factsheets/ hispanics.htm (citing the fact that the computer ownership 
gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites also widened by about forty percent 
from 1994 to 1998). 
 452. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FACT 
SHEET:  RACIAL DIVIDE CONTINUES TO GROW (1999), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
ntiahome/digitaldivide/factsheets/racial-divide.htm. 
 453. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FALLING 
THROUGH THE NET:  TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION, Executive Summary (2000), 
http://www. ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/execsumfttn00.htm. 
 454. See CISCO SYSTEMS INC., THE ETHNIC DIVIDE (2005), http://www.cisco.com/ 
web/learning/netacad/digital_divide/issues/DigitalEthnic.html (reporting that 
Asian-American households had a 1.8% gap in home Internet use compared to non-
Hispanic white households). 
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white households in those years.455  Measured by adult home Internet 
users, a third fewer African-Americans had broadband access as non-
Hispanic whites, as well as twenty percent fewer Hispanics as non-
Hispanic whites.456  By 2001, Asian-Americans appeared to have 
surpassed non-Hispanic white Americans in both Internet access 
generally speaking, and subscriptions to broadband in particular.457  
Asian-Americans of Middle Eastern descent, however, may continue 
to be less wired than the general population.458 
In recent years, income, educational attainment, and geography 
have continued to be strongly associated with the percentage of 
households enjoying Internet access.  In 2003, Americans with a high 
school education or less were one-half to one-seventh as likely to have 
Internet access as those with a bachelor’s degree or more.459  The 
income gap was just as wide, for Americans with incomes of $25,000 
or less were almost one-half as likely to have Internet access as those 
with incomes of $75,000 or more.460  This income divide continued to 
develop until in 2005, fifty percent of households earning less than 
$30,000 per year had no Internet access at all, while fifty percent of 
households earning more than $75,000 had high-speed broadband 
access.461  According to a 2005 study, the majority of Americans with 
broadband “are affluent and well-educated,” in that two-thirds of 
                                                          
 455. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 18, at app. tbl. 1. 
 456. See FCC AVAILABILITY REPORT, supra note 81, at 36-37 (finding thirty percent 
of non-Hispanic white home Internet users had broadband in 2004 versus twenty 
percent of African-American users and twenty-four percent of Hispanic users).  The 
percentage figure for African-American home adult Internet users with broadband 
grew more quickly from 2001-2003, more than doubling from nine percent to twenty 
percent, but a greater percentage of non-Hispanic white adult home Internet users 
without broadband in 2001 had acquired it by 2003, with an additional fifteen 
percent of the total population of non-Hispanic white Internet users acquiring 
broadband between 2001 and 2003, versus another eleven percent for African-
Americans and only another four percent for Hispanics.  Id.  Thus, while “[t]here 
has been considerable growth in advanced [broadband] services usage by minority 
populations,” it is not clear that racial and ethnic disparities in broadband access 
have declined.  Id. at 36. 
 457. See CISCO SYSTEMS INC., supra note 454 (stating that the Asian-American 
Internet usage rate was at 60.4% compared with 59.9% for non-Hispanic whites). 
 458. See, e.g., WAYNE BAKER ET AL., PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE DETROIT ARAB 
AMERICAN STUDY (2004), http://www.isr.umich.edu/news/arab-amer/final-
report.pdf (“The digital divide is wider among Arabs and Chaldeans [living in the 
Detroit area] than in the general population . . . . [S]eventy-five percent of the 
general population uses a computer, compared to 55 percent of Arabs and 
Chaldeans.”). 
 459. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 18, at app. tbl.1. 
 460. Id. 
 461. See Bill Newton, Bring Internet Law Up to Speed, SOUTH FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 
20, 2004, at 25A, available at http://www.freepress.net/news/article.php?id=5942. 
(arguing that by adopting more competitive measures in its “overhaul” of the 
Telecom Act of 1996, Congress can make Internet access more affordable). 
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households earning at least $75,000 per year had broadband at 
home, compared to only one-fifth of those earning less than 
$30,000.462 
Finally, people living in rural or central city areas are less likely to 
have broadband access than those living in suburban areas.463  Less 
than ten percent of rural homes had broadband access by 2005.464  
Thirty percent of sparsely populated zip codes had not one 
broadband subscriber in the entire zip code as of 2004.465  About forty 
percent of zip codes where the median income was $21,644 or less in 
2003 had no broadband subscribers at all.466  Many very low income 
zip codes are in major cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Los 
Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Philadelphia.467   
While documenting the exclusion of millions of Americans from 
the opportunities made available by the Internet, the Bush 
administration has downplayed the importance of the digital divide 
as a concept.  The Commerce Department stopped using the term 
entirely in its reports on Internet access rates,468 and failed to update 
the Clinton administration’s annual reports on the digital divide 
called “Falling Through the Net.”469  New FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell called the “digital divide” “a dangerous phrase” that could 
lead to “government entitlement programs that guaranteed poor 
                                                          
 462. Keefe, supra note 21. 
 463. See A NATION ONLINE, supra note 18, at app. tbl.1 (displaying rates of Internet 
use at 54.1% for rural, 50.3% for central city, and 58.8% for “urban not central city” 
dwellers in 2003). 
 464. See Amit R. Paley, Broadband Crawling Its Way to Exurbs:  Communities Create 
Long-Sought Access, WASH. POST, May 23, 2005, at B01 (citing the National Rural 
Telecommunications Cooperative regarding community initiatives to expand rural 
access to broadband technology). 
 465. See FCC AVAILABILITY REPORT, supra note 81, at 6 (noting progress from two 
years prior when sixty percent of rural zip codes did not have any broadband 
subscribers). 
 466. See id. at 35 (referring to a 2001 report also showing that ninety-six percent of 
zip codes earning above $53,494 had broadband subscribers). 
 467. See RHETT A. BUTLER, 100 LOWEST INCOME ZIP CODES IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2004), http://wealth.mongabay.com/tables/100_lowest_income-5000.html (listing 
the 100 poorest zip codes where more than 5,000 tax returns were filed, which range 
from an average of $10,471 to $17,500 per return). 
 468. Compare, e.g., A NATION ONLINE, supra note 18 (continuing to show racial 
divide in its data, but neglecting to mention the divide in its analysis), with NATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FACT SHEET:  RACIAL DIVIDE 
CONTINUES TO GROW (1999), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/ 
factsheets/racial-divide.htm (addressing explicitly the problem of racial divide in 
computer and Internet access). 
 469. See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET:  TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION (2000), http://search.ntia. 
doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf (providing the last of the “Falling Through the Net” series 
on the NTIA’s website). 
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people cheaper access to new technology, like . . . computers.”470  He 
dismissively equated the divide in access to the Internet with the gap 
in ownership of Mercedes-Benz luxury cars.471 
2. Citywide Wi-Fi bridges the digital divide and benefits consumers 
Municipalities and public utilities are well-equipped to be the 
“default provider[s] of critical services for the public good and fill the 
gap when the private sector fails.”472  By 2000, a “large percentage of 
municipal utilities” were studying ways to offer telecommunications 
services in conjunction with private firms.473  In areas where strong 
telecommunications monopolies and duopolies “may continue to 
dominate in the short term, public enterprise solutions may be a 
necessary alternative.”474 
Municipal broadband has rescued many small communities from 
being relegated to the wrong side of the suburban-rural digital divide.  
Broadband Internet service was “frequently limited or lacking in rural 
areas” for years after its debut in urban areas.475  For this reason, small 
cities and towns in more rural parts of America have taken the lead in 
providing fiber optic-based broadband to their residents.  Starting in 
1989, the public electric utility in Glasgow, Kentucky launched a 
cable arm that by the mid-1990s provided the local population with 
the first municipal broadband network in the United States, if not the 
world.476  Cedar Falls, Iowa offered true broadband throughout the 
city, at ten Mbps, starting in 1997; eventually more than 5,500 Cedar 
Falls residents used the network.477  In 2004, leaders of eighty 
                                                          
 470. Stephen Labaton, New FCC Chief Would Curb Agency Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
2001, at C1. 
 471. Christopher Stern, New FCC Chairman Favors a Non-Activist Approach, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 7, 2001, at E1. 
 472. Montgomery Van Wart, Dianne Rahm, & Scott Sanders, Economic Development 
and Public Enterprise:  The Case of Rural Iowa’s Telecommunication Utilities, 14 ECON. 
DEVEL. Q. 131, 142 (2000). 
 473. JOHN M. EGER & ARTHUR M. BECKER, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MUNICIPALITIES UTILITIES:  COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 
IN THE NEW ECONOMY 37 (2000), http://www.smartcommunities.org/APPA_special_ 
report.pdf. 
 474. Van Wart, Rahm, & Sanders, supra note 472, at 142. 
 475. Id. 
 476. See Communications Act of 1994:  Hearings on S.1822 Before the Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 103d Cong. 351-53  (1994) (statement of William J. Ray 
on behalf of the APPA) (testifying that Glasgow “see[s] telecommunications services 
as just an extension of other utility services” such as electricity, water, and sewer). 
 477. See DORIS J. KELLEY, A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY BENEFITS OF 
CEDAR FALLS, IOWA’S MUNICIPAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK 3, 5 (Oct. 2, 2003), 
http://www.opportunityiowa.org/_docs/Doris%20Kelley_White%20Paper.pdf 
(cataloguing the benefits of a municipality-sponsored fiber optic network in terms of 
job growth, education, and healthcare, by comparing data from Cedar Falls with a 
similar town with solely private telecommunications access). 
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municipalities in Iowa forged an alliance to demand local referenda 
to create public telecommunications utilities; they aimed to build 
local fiber-optic networks capable of offering broadband at speeds of 
up to 100 Mbps.478 
The next major wave of municipal innovation involved Wi-Fi.  Wi-Fi 
is an open standard for the wireless networking of personal 
computers at true broadband speeds of up to ten Mbps.479  In 1999, 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) 
promulgated the Wi-Fi standard as IEEE standard 802.11.480  Wi-Fi 
access points utilize unregulated spectrum to blanket areas of dozens 
to hundreds of feet in diameter with broadband (or dial-up) Internet 
signals.481  When they are staggered throughout an area in Wi-Fi 
“‘mesh’ networks,” these access points can operate at surprisingly low 
cost per user.482  A Wi-Fi network requires only a computer with a Wi-
Fi radio card and an access point to rebroadcast an Internet signal 
“over a free slice of the radio spectrum reserved for consumer use.”483  
By 2004, a large American city could have dozens of Wi-Fi “hotspots,” 
although with most providers charging high fees of up to $6 per 
hour, access remained prohibitively expensive for many persons and 
situations.484  By the end of 2006, experts anticipated that 16.2 million 
American households would have home-based wireless routers or 
                                                          
 478. See Catherine Yang & Ira Sager, Hometown Broadband Heroes, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 
22, 2004, at 14, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
04_47/c3909013_mz003.htm (stating that if the initiative is successful, “everyone—
not just the top half—will get those byways”); Press Release, OpportunityIowa (Nov. 
11, 2004), http://www.opportunityiowa.org/_news/OI%20Press%20Release.pdf 
(announcing the initiative to place issue of establishing local telecommunications 
utility on local ballots). 
 479. See FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 49 (forecasting that WiFi networks with 
broadband speeds of 10 Mbps will be available in the majority of urban areas by the 
year 2010). 
 480. IEEE, Wireless LAN Medium Access Control and Physical Layer Specifications 
(1999), http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf. 
 481. See Bauer, Kim, & Wildman, supra note 73, at 32 (comparing Wi-Fi service to 
other forms of broadband and highlighting its coverage of up to 300 feet). 
 482. David P. McClure, The Myths of Municipal Wireless Networks, in NMRC, supra 
note 28, at 1. 
 483. Rebecca Perry, Wireless Fidelity, TECH. REVIEW, Sept. 2003, at 81, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=13295&ch=infotech. 
 484. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: 
STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2005, at 5 tbl. 1 (Apr. 2006), available at http://hraunfoss. 
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-264744A1.pdf (reporting that only about 
2% of high-speed Internet connections in the United States. as of June 2005, or 
970,133 out of 42,866,469, utilized wireless or satellite technology rather than DSL, 
cable, fiber, or power lines); Steven Titch, in NMRC, supra note 28, at 7 (noting that 
San Francisco had 396 hotspot locations, Atlanta 243, and Philadelphia 93); T-
Mobile USA, Inc., Services (2006), http://hotspot.t-mobile.com/services_plans.htm 
(last visited May 20, 2006) (listing “$6.00 for the first 60 minutes” as “Pay As You Go” 
rate for Wi-Fi hotspot service). 
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other equipment to access the Internet wirelessly by plugging in to 
their wire-based Internet connection.485 
“At current growth rates, many urban centers could have complete 
Wi-Fi coverage within a few years.”486  As President Bush 
acknowledged in an important policy speech, mid-sized cities such as 
Spokane, Washington have established “hot zones” that provide 
entire neighborhoods with wireless broadband.487  For example, ten 
small and mid-sized cities in Florida offered Wi-Fi Internet access in 
designated areas by 2005.488  A small city in Minnesota became “one of 
the first municipalities in the U.S. to install, own and operate its own 
broadband network” by building a Wi-Fi network after being 
underserved by the local cable and DSL providers.489  A public utility 
in Owensboro, Kentucky has offered Wi-Fi at low rates since 2001.490 
Wealthier suburbs and mid-sized cities where media and high-tech 
professionals congregate have also launched municipal Wi-Fi 
networks.  On the west side of Los Angeles, the mixed-income 
community of Culver City has implemented Wi-Fi throughout several 
square miles.491  The entertainment hub of Burbank, CA has launched 
one of the “first municipal broadband wireless hotspot[s]” in the L.A. 
area492 as a free network covering a thirty-four-block area where up to 
29,000 “entertainment-related employees” work.493  Tempe, Arizona is 
on its way to becoming one of the first mid-sized cities to provide Wi-
Fi broadband to its residents without distinction, all 150,000.494 
                                                          
 485. See Michel Marriott, Hey Neighbor, Stop Piggybacking on My Wireless, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2006, at A-1, 22. 
 486. FERGUSON, supra note 5, at 50. 
 487. See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the U.S. Department of Commerce, High 
Tech Improving Economy, Healthcare, Education (June 24, 2004), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040624-7.html (lauding Spokane’s efforts to 
establish Wi-Fi hot zones as “a great opportunity” because it encourages citizen 
productivity). 
 488. See Opinion, Give Cities Wi-fi Option, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 28, 2005, 
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/blogs/content/sharedblogs/palmbeach/editorial/
entries/ 2005/03/ (arguing for municipalities’ right to provide Wi-Fi access without 
interference from state governments’ efforts to favor private providers). 
 489. Patricia Fusco, Support Your Local Sheriff, ISP PLANET, Dec. 6, 2001, http://isp-
planet.com/fixed_wireless/business/2001/wisp_municipalities.html. 
 490. See Angell, supra note 410 (reporting that home broadband rates start at $25 
per month and business rates at $50 per month). 
 491. Culver City, CA, Modern Technology Brings Free Broadband Outdoors to Downtown 
Culver City (Sept. 7, 2004), http://www.terabeam.com/news/pressreleases/pr-
20040907_culver.php. 
 492. Burbank.com, Burbank Hotspot:  Free Internet Access (May 2005), http:// 
www.burbank.com/hotspot.shtml. 
 493. Id. 
 494. See Associated Press, Company Hired to Build Tempe’s Citywide Wifi Being 
Investigated, KVOA TUSCON, May 26, 2005, http://kvoa.com/Global/story.asp?S=339 
5962&nav=J7NoaKaX (reporting that investigations into whether the company hired 
to provide the service was properly registered may cause delay in rollout). 
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It is in the largest cities, the last and in some ways the most difficult 
frontier of the municipal broadband revolution, that the potential of 
Wi-Fi to bridge racial and socioeconomic digital divides is making 
itself felt most strongly.495  Most U.S. cities will either have Wi-Fi access 
or be in the process of rolling it out in about five years’ time, 
according to California-based consulting firm MobileTrax.496  Over 
200 cities were planning or constructing municipal broadband 
networks as of early 2005,497 and nearly 200 cities are currently 
deliberating about whether and how to implement citywide wireless 
broadband access.498  Cities may spend up to $700 million through 
2008 in setting up Wi-Fi and wire-based high-speed networks.499 
City officials in Philadelphia have argued that only a public-private 
partnership will bring broadband Internet access to the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods at prices of $20 per month or less.500  Officials argue 
that without public participation, the goal of basic Web connectivity 
for all residents of Philadelphia will go unmet.501  Citywide Wi-Fi will 
provide a much cheaper option for the city’s poorer residents than 
the virtual duopoly of Comcast and Verizon, which charges residents 
$50 to $200 monthly.502 
Other major cities, inspired by Philadelphia’s example, have 
explored citywide Wi-Fi.  Chicago tried in 2005 to “rush a plan 
through its city council” to authorize the building of a municipal Wi-
Fi network, fearing preemptive action from the Illinois General 
                                                          
 495. See infra notes 496-526 and accompanying text. 
 496. See Wi-Fi Goes to Town, TECH. REV., July-Aug. 2004, at 23 (noting the trend in 
municipally-provided Wi-Fi services becoming an expected service). 
 497. David McClure, The Myths of Municipal Wireless Networks, in NMRC, supra note 
28, at 1. 
 498. See Carmen Nobel, Municipal Wi-Fi Catches On in U.S. Cities, EWEEK, Feb. 1, 
2006, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1917896,00.asp (explaining that 
defensiveness of large Internet providers and state governments has only hastened 
cities’ push for municipal Wi-Fi). 
 499. See Michael Grebb, Cities Unleash Free Wi-Fi, WIRED, Oct. 19, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/wireless_special/0,2914,68999,00.html 
(noting that San Francisco, Chicago, Denver, Miami Beach and Portland are all 
planning to create municipal Wi-Fi networks and the forecast for spending on 
municipal wireless networks for U.S. cities and counties is $700 million over the next 
three years). 
 500. Lee Gomes, Despite Opposition, Might the Web Need a New Government Jolt, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2005, at B1. 
 501. See id. (arguing that the current private Internet providers will not serve poor 
communities with broadband access, or at least not at their target price of $20 per 
month); The Wireless Philadelphia Executive Committee, supra note 11, at 9, 38 
(noting that privately operated Wi-Fi hotspots in Philadelphia, such as those of T-
Mobile or various hotels, provide only “patchwork” coverage, and at the high cost of 
$10-15 per day). 
 502. See Andy Serwer, Wi-Fi Mania:  When Whole Cities Are Public Hot Spots, FORTUNE, 
Oct. 31, 2005, at 53 (noting that where Verizon and Comcast had failed to deliver 
services, Philadelphia is stepping in to satisfy the market for affordable service). 
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Assembly.503  Similarly, Cleveland’s mayor consulted with Intel about 
building a “‘wireless cloud’ that eventually could hover over all of 
Northeast Ohio.”504  Boston and Minneapolis, among other cities, also 
debated citywide Wi-Fi in 2005.505 
Over the summer of 2005, the Democratic candidate for the 
second highest public office in New York City campaigned vigorously 
for universal broadband Wi-Fi access, to bring the South Bronx’s 
Internet access up to the level of South Korea’s.506  Estimates of the 
cost of this project ranged from $80 million, or $10 per New Yorker, 
to $1 billion, or $125 per New Yorker, the latter being the equivalent 
of only two to three months of broadband access at the prevailing 
rates of Time Warner Cable or Verizon.507  By the fall of 2005, the 
Technology in Government Committee of the New York City Council 
                                                          
 503. See O’Shea, supra note 13 (noting that the Illinois General Assembly was 
considering a bill similar to Pennsylvania’s, prohibiting cities from building their 
own municipal networks). 
 504. Gomez, supra note 17. 
 505. See Robert Preer, First to Go WiFi, and It Used to Be So Square, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 29, 2005, at 3-CI(City Weekly) (reporting that Boston has begun a 
“neighborhood WiFi Internet-access experiment”); Tom Scheck, Minneapolis 
Considers Citywide WiFi Alternatives, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, http://news. 
minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/12/08_scheckt_wifi/ (noting that the city 
is currently in the process of negotiating city-wide Wi-Fi with two private companies). 
 506. See Wayne Hanson, Rasiej Plan Forwards Technology for New York City, 
GOVERNMENT TECH., Aug. 18, 2005, http://www.govtech.net/magazine/channel_ 
story. php/96307 (reporting on candidate Andrew Rasiej’s proposal to create 
citywide WiFi service and to make subways cell-phone compatible); Tim McDevitt, 
New York Gets Wired, EPOCH TIMES, June 24, 2005, http://www.theepochtimes. 
com/news/5-6-24/29791.html (covering a speech by Andrew Rasiej, candidate for 
office of Public Advocate in New York City, in which he asserts that most public 
school students only have access to computers for one hour per week). 
 507. See Bruce Fein, Letter to the Editor, High Cost of Wi-Fi, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2005, at 4-11 (estimating cost at about $1 billion); McDevitt, supra note 506 
(providing a proponent’s estimate of $80 million); The Big Apple Goes Wireless, supra 
note 12, at 50 (estimating the cost of “mesh” coverage for Manhattan at $500 million 
to $1 billion). These estimates are probably inflated by several times if not a factor of 
100.  See Ron Sege, President and CEO, Tropos Networks, Summary of Statement Before 
the New York City Council, Committee on Technology in Government Oversight:  Is Brooklyn 
Business Suffering from a Broadband Gap? (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.tropos. 
com/company/2005_01_10.html (summarizing the speech of the CEO of a company 
with substantial experience in building citywide Wi-Fi networks, estimating that the 
cost of a Wi-Fi network across New York City could be as little as $30,000 per square 
mile, for an installation cost of less than $10 million to cover the city’s 320 square 
miles); see also NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, History of Fire Service (2005), 
http://ci.nyc.ny.us/html/fdny/html/history/fire_service.shtml (stating that the area 
of New York City covers 320 square miles).  Philadelphia has reported the cost of its 
wireless broadband network as $70,000 to $100,000 per square mile, which would 
make the cost of covering New York City’s 320 square miles with wireless connectivity 
as little as $24 million.  See Christopher T. Heun, Government Bridging The Digital 
Divide, INTERNET WEEK, Aug. 12, 2005, http://www.Internetweek com/168601371 
(reporting cost estimate of Philadelphia’s Wi-Fi network by its Chief Information 
Officer, though also including another estimate of $150,000 per square mile 
provided by a private research company). 
 8/12/2006  2:14:35 PM 
2006] WI-FI EVERYWHERE 1785 
was debating ways to increase broadband penetration in the city to 
over half of residents, with an ultimate goal of “affordable broadband 
Internet access to every city resident, business and non-profit 
organization.”508  Citywide universal broadband could improve the 
education of the city’s children and facilitate emergency response 
and other city services, one councilmember argued.509  In December 
2005, the City Council authorized a commission to study city-funded 
broadband for three years, a disappointing do-nothing result.510  
Three-fifths of New Yorkers must carry on with no Internet or with 
slow dial-up, it seems.511 
Most recently, San Francisco city officials have unveiled plans for a 
citywide Wi-Fi network that will permit “anyone with a Wi-Fi-enabled 
computer to go online whether at home, in a park or in a cafe.”512  
San Francisco’s Mayor, Gavin Newsom, has pledged that the Wi-Fi 
network “will help keep San Francisco a technology leader and help 
bridge the digital divide of Internet haves and have-nots.”513  Mayor 
Newsom argues that providing universal broadband guarantees the 
“fundamental right” of access to information.514  Even more 
practically, the network would be a backup communications system in 
the event of a crippling natural disaster such as an earthquake.515 
Additionally, a public-private partnership in Silicon Valley is 
planning the first major regional governmental-supported Wi-Fi 
                                                          
 508. Marcus A. Banks, Universal Internet Access—Not Just A Campaign Theme, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE, Oct. 2005, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/tech/ 
20051019/19/1617. 
 509. See id. (arguing that the benefits outweigh privacy concerns created by 
privately provided municipal broadband supported by advertising). 
 510. See New York City Establishes Broadband Advisory Committee, GOVERNMENT TECH. 
(Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.govtech.net/magazine/channel_story.php/97698 
(noting that the legislation requires the committee to meet in public hearings only 
two times in three years, and issue yearly reports to the Mayor and City Council).  As 
a prominent technology Web site pointed out:  “While cities like Philadelphia, New 
Orleans and San Francisco are moving full steam ahead on their projects, New York 
is still just trying to get a commission together to look at the issue.”  Marguerite 
Reardon, Can Wi-Fi Make It in Manhattan?, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2005), 
http://news.com.com/Can+Wi-Fi+make+it+in+Manhattan/2100-7351_3-5992316. 
html. 
 511. See Reardon, supra note 10 (noting that only forty percent of New Yorkers 
had broadband by December 2005). 
 512. Verne Kopytoff, City Wi-Fi Chills Telecoms; Cheaper, Even Free, Online Access 
Would Hit SBC, Comcast, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 5, 2005, at C1, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/10/05/BUG3AF2GIU1.DT. 
 513. Id. 
 514. Eric Auchard, S.F. Mayor Sees Wireless Service As Basic Right, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 
2005, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1004-09.htm. 
 515. Id. 
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network, spanning four counties and thirty-six cities.516  The Silicon 
Valley cities of Santa Clara and Cupertino already waft free Wi-Fi 
broadband across entire zip codes spanning key neighborhoods.517  
The regional Silicon Valley initiative intends to deploy a new wireless 
technology called WiMax, which promises to greatly enhance the 
speed, power, range, and usability of wireless broadband.518  WiMax 
can provide wireless high-speed Internet access at speeds far 
exceeding those available over cable or DSL broadband 
connections.519  “A single Wi-Max transmitter will send broadband 
Internet signals up to 30 miles and penetrate buildings . . . .”520  For 
these reasons, experts anticipate that WiMax “will quickly dominate 
the fixed broadband wireless market.”521 
Even if municipal services fall short of assuring universal 
broadband access in their own right, municipal entry into the 
broadband industry promises to bridge the digital divide in American 
society by spurring the cable companies and Baby Bells to reduce the 
price, and improve the availability and quality, of the broadband 
service available in rural, inner-city, and minority-group 
communities.522  Rather than “crowding out” private broadband 
providers, municipal broadband tends to increase the number of 
private broadband providers.523  Municipal service provision tends to 
                                                          
 516. See Ryan Kim, Silicon Valley Wi-Fi network sought Wireless coverage from Daly City to 
Santa Cruz, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29, 2006 (relating that the plan will cover 2.4 million 
people). 
 517. See Nobel, supra note 498 (stating that the service is being provided for free 
from a small service provider called Metrofi). 
 518. See Ryan Kim, supra note 516 (reporting that the plan calls for low cost or free 
service at 256 Kbps with capability to expand to paid service at 1 Mbps); David Strom, 
Finding New Connections When Wi-Fi Is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at G5 
(showing WiMax has a range of thirty miles and higher speeds than Wi-Fi); Titch, in 
NMRC, supra note 28, at 6-7 (noting that the average distance for WiMax would be 
three to five miles at 75 Mbps). 
 519. See Steve Rosenbush, Why WiMax Could Hit the Hotspot, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 5, 
2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2005/ 
tc2005105_ 6161_tc024.htm (reporting that WiMax is twenty to thirty times faster 
than household broadband). 
 520. Tuerck, in NMRC, supra note 28, at 21; see also Charlie Lanter, Houston Could 
Be First Wireless County in U.S., MACON (GEORGIA) TELEGRAPH, Nov. 20, 2003, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050316175604/http://www.macon.com/mld/maco
n/2003/11/30/news/7378346.htm (reporting that WiMax service will soon be 
available in Houston for a cost of $15 to $30 per month). 
 521. Senza Fili Consulting, WiMAX Will Dominate Fixed Broadband Wireless Market but 
Mobile Services Using the Technology Will Be Slower to Take Off (Feb. 7, 2006), 
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release_html_b1?release_id=108691. 
 522. See infra notes 523-526 and accompanying text. 
 523. See FMEA, supra note 3, at 4, 10 (“While critics charge that municipalities 
‘crowd out’ private investment, the reality in Florida shows that where municipalities 
invest in broadband, there are more private providers of broadband services . . . . A 
recent analysis by Applied Economic Studies, Inc., shows that . . . where 
municipalities have invested in broadband infrastructure, local telecommunications 
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“significantly” improve the quality and reduce the price of the 
services available in a locality.524  In telecommunications, price wars 
with municipal providers can drive down subscriber rates by twenty-
two percent, the FCC has found.525  As the pioneer of airline 
deregulation has pointed out, competition between public and 
private service providers “‘is highly conducive to improved [industry] 
performance.’”526 
3. Subsidies promote universal broadband access in Canada, Europe and 
Asia 
City-supported broadband and Wi-Fi projects may also help the 
United States catch up to its trading partners and commercial rivals 
in achieving universal broadband access.527  Many nations with higher 
broadband penetration rates than the United States, including 
Canada, Japan, and South Korea, “have used municipal systems and 
governmentally-provided infrastructure as important components of 
their broadband strategy.”528 
Relative to other nations’ broadband networks, broadband in the 
U.S. resembles less an information superhighway than a “bumpy, two-
lane country road.”529  The federal government “has failed to create a 
modern, competitive, open architecture local broadband industry” as 
“broadband services are [held] hostage to the self-interest and 
                                                          
competition is more robust and vibrant,” and that “municipal construction of 
communications networks expands the number of private firms serving the same 
market by more than 60%.”). 
 524. Reiter, supra note 127, at 298. 
 525. See id. (noting also that even “serious consideration” of introducing 
municipal service tends to drive down private service rates). 
 526. Harvey L. Reiter & Stephen P. Chinn, Municipal Entry into Telecommunications 
and Cable Services:  Benefits and Barriers, 44 MUN. LAW. 14, 15-16 n.37 (2003) (quoting 2 
KAHN, supra note 111, at 104). 
 527. See FMEA, supra note 3, at 9-10 (arguing that privately owned 
telecommunications companies are obligated to maximize shareholder profits and 
therefore “lack the motivation to deploy broadband with the breadth and speed that 
the public interest requires,” whereas local governments instead owe a duty to 
maximize economic development and therefore may better promote the public 
interest in achieving modern broadband technologies); Harold Feld et al., Connecting 
the Public:  The Truth About Municipal Broadband, at 11 (Apr. 2005), http://www. 
mediaaccess.org/MunicipalBroadband_WhitePaper.pdf (concluding that as public 
sector players enter the market, competition and the number of broadband 
consumers will increase). 
 528. FMEA, supra note 3, at 9. 
 529. Forsberg, supra note 20 (quoting TechNet, a lobbying group that promotes 
the growth of technology, as it compares U.S. broadband development to that of 
other countries).  Technet’s membership includes Intel, Microsoft, Verisign, 
NASDAQ, Amazon.com, Apple Computer, and J.P. Morgan.  Technet, Who We Are 
(2004), http://www.technet.org/who2/memberListName. 
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inefficiency of powerful incumbent firms.”530  Antitrust enforcers and 
broadband regulators in the United States, including the Department 
of Justice and FCC, have allowed broadband competition to 
atrophy.531  This lack of competition suppresses broadband 
penetration, as a study of thirteen European nations concluded that 
broadband penetration is closely correlated with the competitiveness 
of local broadband markets.532 
By comparison, Canada ranks in the top five nations in the world in 
broadband connectivity, although European nations are giving it a 
run for its money.533  Canada has “successfully combined municipal 
systems with privately deployed networks” to wire its vast expanses 
with broadband connectivity.534  For example, the Canadian cities of 
Calgary and Fredericton have blanketed portions of their downtown 
areas with free wireless broadband access, and other Canadian cities 
and provinces are expected to follow suit.535  The Canadian 
Government, reportedly the first country in the world to connect all 
                                                          
 530. Broadband Policy and the Future of American Information Technology:  Hearings 
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (statement of Charles Ferguson, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, The 
Brookings Institution), available at http://www.brookings.org/views/testimony/ 
20040428.htm. 
 531. See Bleha, supra note 5, at 117 (stating that in 2003 the FCC ruled that 
telephone companies need not share ultra-high-speed fiber networks with 
competitors and access to telephone lines would be terminated in 2006 for firms 
wishing to compete in DSL markets, while the Bush administration failed to appeal a 
court ruling that telephone companies had no obligation to ensure competition in 
provision of DSL service over telephone lines). 
 532. See Richard Cadman & Chris Dineen, Broadband and i2010:  The Importance of 
Dynamic Competition to Market Growth (Feb. 21, 2005), http://www.spcnetwork. 
co.uk/uploads/20050221_broadband_analysis.pdf (finding a forty percent 
correlation between the level of broadband take-up and competition between access 
modes in European countries and a seventy-two percent correlation between rate of 
change in levels of market concentration and rate of broadband take-up such that 
for every one percent decrease in market concentration there is a three percent 
increase in broadband take-up); see also Feld et al., supra note 527, at 11 (asserting 
that currently the broadband market remains an ILEC/cable duopoly but as 
competition increases, prices will decrease, quality of service will increase, and the 
market will experience an increase in broadband consumers). 
 533. See Michael Geist, Canadian Copyright Bill:  A Missed Opportunity for Education, 
OTTAWA CITIZEN (CANADA), June 29, 2005, at F1 (noting that Canada spent billions 
constructing world-class Internet infrastructure spanning the entire country). 
 534. Robert MacMillan, Congress Tunes in to WiFi, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 27, 
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/27/AR2 
05062700482.html (quoting Senator John McCain). 
 535. See Michael Geist, Let Towns, Cities Provide Cheap, Everywhere Broadband, 
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 28, 2005, at D2 (stating that municipally-supported broadband 
may be the only realistic means of bringing connectivity to smaller Canadian cities to 
bridge the digital divide between urban and rural communities, where in 2003 
eighty-six percent of Canadians had access to broadband services but only twenty-
eight percent of Canadian communities had access). 
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of its classrooms to the Internet,536 is committed to “providing high-
capacity Internet access to all Canadian communities.”537  It is 
spending $155 million to bring subsidized satellite broadband to over 
fifty-two remote communities, many of whose residents are members 
of Aboriginal communities.538 
Northern European nations, such as Sweden, have led the world in 
access to the Internet, broadband, and wireless telephony.539  Under 
the rubric of a European broadband policy, which aims for “an 
information society for all,” Swedish statistics on computer 
ownership, Internet access, and broadband penetration as a 
percentage of inhabitants or households compare favorably to those 
for the United States or Canada.540  Approximately seventy-four 
percent of Swedes had Internet access in 2005, compared to sixty-
nine percent of Americans.541  In terms of broadband penetration 
rates, Sweden also led the United States by 2003, with over thirty 
percent of households with broadband.542 
                                                          
 536. Geist, Canadian Copyright Bill, supra note 533, at F1.  
 537. Government of Canada, Lucienne Robillard Announces $35 Million to Bring 
Broadband to Aboriginal Communities (May 20, 2004), http://www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/ 
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hyperlink). 
 538. See id. (adding that forty-one of the fifty-two communities in British 
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec are Aboriginal communities, all of which 
were selected based on financial capability, demonstrated community support and 
readiness to deploy and use satellite capacity). 
 539. See Global Broadband Subscribers to Near 440m by 2010—Report, TOTAL TELECOM, 
Aug. 10, 2005 (“In terms of geographical regions, Japan, South Korea, Sweden and 
Finland will have the highest rates of broadband penetration at over 30%.”); 
Economist Intelligence Unit, The 2005 E-Readiness Rankings (Apr. 30, 2005), http:// 
www.ebusinessforum.com/index.asp?layout=rich_story&doc_id=6427 (reporting that 
the Nordic nations of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway “remain best in class 
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European Commission, European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 
2005 (11th Report), COM (2006) 68 final, at 6 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/implementation_enf
orcement/annualreports/11threport/com_2006_68_en.pdf (demonstrating that 
broadband penetration is substantially higher in the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden and Belgium than in the United States or Japan); Research and Markets:  How 
Did France Go from Internet Laggard to Broadband Leader?, BUS. WIRE, June 27, 2005, 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2005_June_27/ai_n14698127  
(“[C]ountries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden 
all recorded broadband penetration rates equal or higher than the US at the end of 
2004.”). 
 540. See Helena Lindskog & Magnus Johansson, Broadband—A Municipal 
Information Platform:  Swedish Experience, 31 INT’L J. OF TECH. MGMT. 47, 47 (2005). 
 541. See European Travel Commission, New Media Review (Aug. 25, 2005), 
http://www.etcnewmedia.com/review/default.asp?SectionID=10 (ranking Sweden as 
having the third highest level of Internet usage compared to the United States, which 
ranked sixth, also behind New Zealand, Iceland, Denmark and Hong Kong). 
 542. See Broadband Subscribers and Penetration Rate in Various Countries, 2003, EUR. 
TELECOM, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1. 
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Although Sweden and other northern European nations have 
deregulated their telephone networks and broken up their state-
owned information monopolies, they have clung to a universal service 
model for ensuring broadband Internet access for all citizens.543  
Sweden has successfully deployed municipal broadband networks to 
bridge the digital divide between adequately served wealthier urban 
areas and underserved poorer rural areas.544 
In Sweden today, the national broadband policy is to a large extent 
being effected by municipalities building so called urban or 
municipal area networks (“stadsnät”). Apart from national 
subsidies for building the national optical fiber network trunk 
net . . . and enabling all 289 Swedish municipalities to connect to 
this national grid, there are also subsidies for municipalities 
building networks within the community . . . .  For many Swedish 
municipalities the build-up of urban networks was initiated in the 
early 1990s, and today some 90% of Sweden’s municipalities have 
some kind of urban network.545 
As of 2005, about ninety percent of Swedish municipalities had 
deployed urban broadband networks, while thirty percent of 
municipalities with over 200 inhabitants had “area networks.”546 
Likewise, East Asian countries have propelled themselves to the 
forefront of the broadband race by using massive subsidies to 
universalize access.547  The high levels of East Asian broadband 
connectivity may give Asian industries a decisive advantage in fields 
ranging from telemedicine to distance education and Internet-based 
games.548 
With a GDP per capita less than a third as much as the United 
States enjoys, South Korea has Internet connections over five times as 
fast as U.S. connections, over which consumers can watch television 
of excellent quality.549  The South Korean government seized on 
                                                          
 543. See Lindskog & Johansson, supra note 540. 
 544. See id.  
 545. Id.  
 546. Id.  
 547. See Dan Mitchell, Broadband Beat Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at C5 
(noting that Japan surpassed the U.S. in development and expansion of broadband 
by instituting an “industrial policy” providing incentives that resulted in a higher 
percentage of homes with broadband, as well as cheaper and faster connections). 
 548. See id. (stating that Japan, South Korea, and other Asian countries are “poised 
to leap ahead of the United States” in numerous areas while the U.S. economy is at 
risk of losing up to $1 trillion due to constraints on broadband deployment). 
 549. See Forsberg, supra note 20 (reporting that the United States ranks thirteenth 
in rollout of broadband where GDP per capita in 2004 was $40,000 and consumers 
experience broadband speeds up to four Mbps, whereas South Korea is the leader in 
rollout of broadband where GDP per capita in 2003 was $12,600 and consumers 
currently enjoy speeds up to 20 Mbps). 
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universal broadband access as a job-creating infrastructure project, 
and invested billions of dollars in subsidized computers for poorer 
citizens and subsidies for DSL and fiber-optic networks.550  The South 
Korean government spent $9.2 billion on broadband infrastructure 
from 1999-2003, and planned to invest an additional $11 billion by 
2005 in providing ninety percent of the nation’s households with 
service at 20 Mbps.551  Buoyed by this generous support, South Korean 
consumers pay about one-tenth as much for broadband as American 
consumers.552  South Koreans obtain access at 10 Mbps for the same 
price U.S. consumers pay for 1.5 Mbps DSL or cable modem access.553 
The Japanese also surpassed the United States by 2003 in 
broadband penetration as a percentage of households, with 
consumers in Japan paying much less for broadband at much higher 
speeds.554  By the end of 2005, “‘ultra-high-speed’ broadband, which 
runs through fiber-optic cable,” will be available throughout Japan,555 
with eight Mbps for as little as $10.556  These fiber-optic broadband 
connections empower consumers to utilize video telephones, 
                                                          
 550. See id. (after South Korea experienced a financial crisis in 1997-98, the 
government invested in the high-tech industry, creating jobs and a demand for 
modems, routers, servers, computers, resulting in the growth of a new infrastructure 
and ultimately a successful economy); Rob Frieden, Best Practices in Broadband:  
Lessons from Canada, Japan, Korea and the United States 14 (July 2004), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567802 (follow Social Science 
Research Network “New York, USA” hyperlink to download document) (describing 
Cyber Korea 21, a government plan articulated in 1997 to provide every citizen with 
access to a personal computer as well as financial support for construction of 
broadband networks). 
 551. Irene K. Kunii & Moon Ihlwan, Where Broadband is Really Booming, BUS. WK., 
May 5, 2003, at 88. 
 552. See Mark Cooper, Expanding the Digital Divide & Falling Behind on Broadband:  
Why a Telecommunications Policy of Neglect is Not Benign, at 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/ddnewbook.pdf (noting that in three years 
the price gap between what American consumers and South Korean consumers pay 
for broadband on a Mbps basis has doubled); Sherille Ismail & Irene Wu, Broadband 
Internet Access in OECD Countries:  A Comparative Analysis, Office of Strategic Planning and 
Policy Analysis and International Bureau, at 6-7 & fig. 3 (2003), http://hraunfoss.fcc. 
gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-239660A2.pdf (“price per [M]bps can be very 
low” in Japan and South Korea, as low as $3.88 per Mbps, compared to $29.44 per 
Mbps charged by Comcast). 
 553. FCC Availability Report, supra note 81, at 5 (Commissioner Michael J. Copps, 
dissenting). 
 554. See McChesney & Podesta, supra note 306, at 14 (asserting that American 
residents and businesses currently pay “two to three times as much for slower and 
poorer quality service” as Japanese consumers); Mitchell, supra note 547 (describing 
Japanese broadband as half the price and sixteen times the speed of American 
broadband); see also Cooper, Expanding the Digital Divide, supra note 552, at 1 (stating 
that Americans pay ten to twenty times as much for broadband, on a Mbps basis, as 
consumers in Japan). 
 555. Bleha, supra note 5, at 115. 
 556. FCC Availability Report, supra note 81, at 5 (Commissioner Michael J. Copps, 
dissenting). 
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telecommuting, speedy movie downloads, digital high-definition 
television, and multiplayer online gaming.557  Among other policy 
decisions promoting broadband competition, “the Japanese 
government . . . encouraged municipalities to build their own 
networks, especially in rural areas.”558  Additionally, Japan’s antitrust 
regulators pried open the nation’s telephone infrastructure to new 
ventures such as Yahoo! broadband, which rolled out much faster 
broadband as early as 2002.559  The implementation of government 
subsidies, loan guarantees, and tax breaks also helped high-speed 
Internet access become much more affordable than in the United 
States.560 
Perhaps the most surprising broadband success story in the world is 
mainland China.  By 2006 or 2007, China may surpass the United 
States in the total number of broadband subscribers, despite average 
incomes less than a fifth as much per person.561  In 2005, China had 
the most Internet users in the world for a single nation outside the 
United States, although as a percentage of its enormous population, 
                                                          
 557. See Bleha, supra note 5, at 114 (noting that data could not be transmitted at 
ultra-high speeds through pre-existing Japanese phone lines). 
 558. McChesney & Podesta, supra note 306, at 15. 
 559. See Bleha, supra note 5, at 113 (explaining that after the Japanese government 
instituted one of the most competitive regimes in world, compelling telephone 
companies to grant competitors access to phone lines, Yahoo! broadband was 
created, which offered high-speed service five times faster than the typical U.S. 
broadband connection). 
 560. See id. at 114-15 (describing how incentives led to “rapid deployment of fiber 
networks” and competition which decreased price of high-speed Internet 
connections in Japan to as low as $22 a month); McChesney & Podesta, supra note 
306, at 14 (arguing that broadband in the U.S. is the most expensive in the 
developed world such that sixty percent of U.S. households do not subscribe because 
of availability or expense, whereas most Japanese citizens can access broadband for 
just $22 a month). 
 561. See Peter Sayer, China Could Overtake US in Broadband Access This Year, 
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.thestandard.com/movabletype/ 
datadigest archives/003211.php (noting that although the United States had 8.1 
million more broadband subscribers than China at end of 2004, the growth rate in 
China during July-December 2004 was larger than in the United States); Marguerite 
Reardon, China to Trump U.S. in Broadband Subscribers, CNET NEWS.COM, May 4, 2005, 
http://news.com.com/China+to+trump+U.S.+in+broadband+subscribers/2100-1034 
_3-5695591.html (asserting that China will have fifty-seven million broadband 
subscribers and the United States will have fifty-four million by the end of 2007 
according to market research firm iSuppli); Web Site Optimization, January 2006 
Internet Bandwidth Report:  China Will Pass US in Broadband Lines by Late 2006, Jan. 24, 
2006, http://www.prleap.com/pr/24601 (arguing that although the United States 
currently has the highest number of broadband subscribers, China should overtake 
the United States by end of 2006 as its current yearly growth rate exceeds 90% 
compared to 29.08% in the United States).  For average incomes, see CIA, World 
Factbook:  GDP Per Capita (2004), http://www.cia.gov/ia/publications/factbook/ 
rankorder/2004rank.html. 
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Chinese Internet access lagged behind most developed nations and 
even Brazil and Croatia.562 
The Chinese government has implemented policies to bridge the 
staggering digital divide between the urban east and more rural west 
of China, where urban households own sixteen times as many 
personal computers and enjoy Internet access more than 140 times as 
often.563  China’s tenth “five-year plan” for economic development 
since the communist revolution planned “greater efforts to develop 
broadband information networks across the country,”564 and set a 
target whereby twenty million of China Telecom’s 100 million 
Internet users would have broadband access by 2005.565  The 
government also broke up China Telecom into northern and 
southern divisions as a pro-competitive move.566  Although it is 
difficult to estimate what might have happened absent the breakup, 
the less concentrated post-breakup market structure has contributed 
to rapid Chinese take-up of broadband, with subscribership doubling 
annually for both new companies.567 
                                                          
 562. See European Travel Commission, supra note 541 (stating that China had the 
second largest number of Internet users at the end of 2005 with 119.5 million, 
compared with 197.8 million users in the United States). 
 563. Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, Universal Service Policy in China:  Building Digital Bridge 
for Rural Community, at 6 tbl.2 (Aug. 31, 2005), http://web.si.umich.edu/ 
tprc/archive-search.cfm (search for papers from 2005 under “TPRC papers archive;” 
then follow PDF hyperlink for article). 
 564. Chinese Pin High Hopes on Booming IT Industry, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 13, 2001, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/9059.htm. 
 565. Telecommunications Industry Association, Five-Year Plan Set for China’s Three 
Large Operators, PULSE ONLINE (May 2001), http://pulse.tiaonline.org/article. 
cfm?id=466.  In what may be a related effort to fulfill goals articulated in China’s 
tenth “five-year plan,” the Ministry of Information Industry launched the Village 
Access Project in 2004 which divided the responsibility of providing improved 
telecommunications service to 40,000 rural villages among China Telecom and five 
other carriers, based on their share of local revenue.  See Xia & Lu, supra note 563, at 
9 (explaining that rural Chinese villages are underserved and the government took 
responsibility for improving rural communications rather than leaving it to market 
forces).  Previously, China Telecom enjoyed a telephone service monopoly in many 
areas, and used cross-subsidization to expand the number of rural telephone 
connections rapidly, at a rate of about ten percent per year before 1999.  See id. at 7 
(also describing how competition and governmental reform ended cross-
subsidization trend, prompting China Telecom to decrease investment in rural 
networks, which led rate of growth of rural connections to plummet to two percent 
after 1999). 
 566. See Xia & Lu, supra note 563, at 4 (stating that although China’s 
telecommunications industry is now structurally competitive, where the northern and 
southern companies are now respectively referred to as China Netcom and China 
Telecom, meaningful competition remains elusive). 
 567. See China Telecom Reports 2004 Profit, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 21, 2005, 
http://english.people.com.cn/200504/01/eng20050401_179018.html (adding that 
the number of Telecom’s broadband subscribers rose to 13.84 million and is 
expected to grow); Stephen D. Simpson, Is Broadband Working for China Netcom?, 
MOTLEY FOOL, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.fool.com/News/mft/2005/ 
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None of this is to say that the United States lags behind the world 
average in broadband connectivity, far from it.  While half or more of 
Americans and Scandinavians have Internet access, less than one 
percent of people in many African and Asian countries enjoy 
access.568  Outside of South Africa, in 2000 there was only one person 
with Internet access in Africa out of every five thousand people.569  As 
World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn acknowledged, 
“hundreds of millions of people living in Central Asia, Latin America 
[and] Africa [may] be cut off from the ideas changing the rest of the 
world . . . simply because of a lack of readily available cable or satellite 
technology.”570 
4. Municipal broadband represents a sound investment 
Critics of municipal broadband have cast such projects as 
financially disastrous drains on the public treasury.571  Opponents 
argue that municipal broadband has thus far required enormous per-
user subsidies, and its prospects are indefinite unprofitability.572  For 
example, studies released by a think tank financially supported by a 
variety of Baby Bells, cable companies, technology, and Internet 
companies concluded that existing municipal broadband projects are 
heavily dependent on tax dollars for subsidization.573  These critics 
                                                          
mft05091213.htm (noting that Netcom’s broadband subscriber growth was nearly 
85% in the first half after the Chinese government split China Telecom into two 
divisions). 
 568. United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Indicators Database, Internet Users 
Per 100 Population (Jan. 19, 2005), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_ 
results.asp?rowId=605. 
 569. See J.M. Spectar, Bridging the Global Digital Divide:  Frameworks For Access and the 
World Wireless Web, 26 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 57, 62 (2000) (describing that 
nearly 90% of the one million Internet users in Africa lived in South Africa, and 
among those who do not live in South Africa, the number of Internet users was very 
low compared with “one user per every thirty-eight people worldwide and one in five 
people in the West”). 
 570. James Wolfensohn, A Call to Action in a Global Economy (Apr. 13, 2000), 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/bankpres.htm. 
 571. See Adam D. Thierer, Risky Business:  Philadelphia’s Plan for Providing Wi-Fi 
Service, PROGRESS ON POINT 12.4, at 2, 14-16 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/pop12.4thiererwifi.pdf (describing indirect opportunity and long-term 
costs associated with municipal entry into telecom business, as well as risk of public 
bailout after municipalities lock-in to specific broadband technology in the face of 
technological change and market uncertainty). 
 572. See Thomas Lenard, Government Entry into the Telecom Business:  Are the Benefits 
Commensurate with the Costs?, PROGRESS ON POINT 11.3, at 2 (2004), 
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop11.3govtownership.pdf (claiming that 
subsidies range from $350 to over $1,000 per customer, excluding capital costs, 
causing “indefinite drain” on taxpayers). 
 573. See id. (declaring that municipally owned entrants into telecom business in 
Virginia, Pennsylvania and Oregon were unable to “cover costs without being 
subsidized,” thereby absorbing surpluses of other municipally owned utilities and 
restricting their ability to decrease taxes); Thomas Lenard, Wireless Philadelphia:  A 
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add that a better way to bridge the digital divide would be to 
subsidize computer purchases, rather than high-speed Internet 
access.574  By marketing broadband Internet access, cities could easily 
become stranded with obsolete networks and equipment, as 
innovation passes them by and their substantial investments are 
lost.575  Moreover, some critics also assert that broadband subsidies 
divert scarce public funds away from other important governmental 
functions.576 
The problem with many of these critiques is that they aim to assess 
the success or failure of municipal broadband projects in terms of 
profitability or “losses,” rather than savings to consumers, services 
delivered to residents, economic growth, or improvements in 
education, public safety, or delivery of health care.577  As the APPA has 
pointed out, public provision of essential services, such as electricity, 
generally saves consumers substantial amounts of money.578  Cities 
and counties have a long history of spending tax dollars on beneficial 
                                                          
Leap Into the Unknown, PROGRESS ON POINT 12.3, at 12 (2005), http://www. 
pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop12.3lenardwifi.pdf (adding that municipal telecom 
entrants have “generally not been successful in covering costs or returning the 
taxpayers’ investments,” as in Kutztown, Pennsylvania, where the mayor proclaimed 
that taxpayers were “subsidizing the system for too few paying customers”); Thierer, 
supra note 571, at 11-12 (stating that towns in Georgia and Iowa sustained losses on 
their broadband networks even after subsidies contributed over $20 million).  For 
information on funding of the Progress and Freedom Foundation, which employs 
Mr. Lenard, see Progress and Freedom Foundation, Supporters (2006), 
http://www.pff. org/about/supporters.html. 
 574. See Lenard, Wireless Philadelphia, supra note 573, at 13 (arguing that 
municipalities may spend a lot of money implementing broadband service and never 
achieve their social objectives due to drain on the budgets and the creation of an 
unattractive business environment). 
 575. See Executive Summary, in NMRC, supra note 28, at viii (noting that profits 
from municipal networks will likely be diverted to other city obligations instead of 
allocated for technology research and development to continually upgrade network). 
 576. See id.; see also Frank Rizzo, Philadelphia’s Big Dig, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 17, 
2005, http://news.com.com/Philadelphias+Big+Dig/2010-1071_3-5579848.html 
(arguing that Philadelphia’s municipal broadband project threatens to divert funds 
from a “shrinking budget needing to accommodate ever increasing social needs,” 
and that other state and local governments have lost tens of millions of dollars on 
telecommunications networks). 
 577. See Feld, supra note 527, at 1 (declaring that “municipal broadband plays a 
critical role in making the goal of universal deployment a reality” as it keeps rates low 
and quality of service high, increases investment in local communities, and is better 
able to meet community needs regarding health, education and welfare issues, 
unlike private companies which work to maximize profit); id. at 15 (stating that 
“profitability cannot become the sole yardstick for success” because, for example, 
hospitals that receive public subsidies are still considered successful if they provide 
health care for the poor). 
 578. See APPA, Community Broadband:  Separating Fact From Fiction, at 21 (2004), 
http://www.appanet.org/files/PDFs/BroadbandFactFiction.pdf (“During 2002 (the 
latest data available) the average electric rates paid by customers of investor-owned 
utilities were 13 percent above those paid by customers of public power systems.”). 
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local infrastructure improvements, which provide their residents with 
such modern amenities as electricity, natural gas, transportation, 
drinking water, sewage treatment, trash removal, and other services 
that private industry could also provide.579  Municipal entry into 
electricity was generally successful, with public utilities providing 
service more efficiently and at lower rates than private utilities.580 
By entering into the broadband market, municipalities are 
bestowing economic and non-economic benefits on citizens and 
businesses alike.  For example, municipal high-speed Internet service 
can cost about half of the $50 that many cable companies charge for 
comparable access.581  In fact, one municipal broadband and cable TV 
network alone saved local consumers over $30 million.582  Municipal 
broadband and Wi-Fi, among other virtues, can save cities tens of 
millions of dollars in telephone and Internet fees, and be critical 
components of a city’s strategy for disaster-preparedness, particularly 
in maintaining communications during post-disaster electrical and 
telecommunications blackouts.583  Although some municipal 
                                                          
 579. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, supra note 29, at § 8.3.2, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/COMMENT_DECISION/43597.htm (noting 
that the government has provided specific services, in part because they were 
deemed essential, and a number of local governments have classified high-speed 
Internet access as essential, thereby justifying investment in public broadband 
networks); W. Mark Crain & Asghar Zardkoohi, A Test of the Property-Rights Theory of the 
Firm:  Water Utilities in the United States, 21 J.L. & ECON. 395, 396-99, 405-06 (1978) 
(analyzing the differences between publicly and privately owned enterprises); Van 
Wart, Rahn, & Sanders, supra note 472, at 132, 143 n.1 (stating that “public 
enterprises began in basic infrastructure . . . in the late 1700s” and later shifted focus 
to include other services such as gas and electric utilities at the turn of the century, 
and eventually social welfare and economic development projects after WW II). 
 580. See Carlson, supra note 31, at 30 n.154, 31 n.159 (citing scholarly studies 
which assert that average rates for privately owned electric utilities were at least ten 
percent higher than for publicly owned utilities, with efficiency gains ranging from 
6.4% to 25.5%); Feld et al., supra note 527, at 15 n.57 (providing numerous citations 
to economic research on municipal and public electric and water utilities). 
 581. See APPA, supra note 578, at 22 (“In a 2002 random sampling of 12 public 
power utilities, the median price of high-speed, residential, Internet service (cable 
modem) was $29.45 with average offering of 2.2 megabits per second.”).  The price 
of cable modem access from a private cable company in 2002 was closer to $50.  See 
Behind the High-Speed Slowdown, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 17, 2002, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2002/tc20020917_2824.htm 
(reporting that the average price for cable modem service in June 2002 was $45.31 a 
month). 
 582. Alliance for Public Technology & The Benton Foundation, A Broadband 
World:  The Promise of Advanced Services (Feb. 2003), http://www.benton.org/ 
publibrary/ broadband/broadband-world.html. 
 583. See Richard Siklos, What We Have Here Is a Failure to Communicate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2005, Section 3 at 3 (Philadelphia’s chief information officer and architect 
of its Wi-Fi plan estimates that city will save up to $2 million each year on data 
charges); Clive Thompson, Talking in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, Section 6 at 
24-28 (“disaster-preparedness experts” are exploring ways to use Wi-Fi networks for 
backup communications during disasters like the collapse of the World Trade Center 
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broadband providers may fail to turn a profit, and careful analysis 
and planning is surely necessary to prevent unwise investments from 
being made, the fact that municipal broadband may not always be 
profitable is not a sufficient reason to ban it outright.  Like a school, 
university, library, or hospital, a city-supported broadband or Wi-Fi 
network can be a success despite rarely or never generating a positive 
cash flow.584 
Furthermore, the common criticism of municipal broadband as 
overly reliant on subsidies fails to account for the fact that the cable 
and DSL companies have received billions of dollars of subsidies in 
their own right.  Starting in the 1990s, the cable and DSL providers 
have won billions in federal, state, and local subsidies in exchange for 
promises of universal service that have not always been fulfilled.585  In 
Florida alone, the dominant telephone companies received over $80 
million in direct federal subsidies in 2004, and nearly $400 million 
over the five years leading up to 2004, yet “robust broadband service” 
still is unavailable in many small and rural Florida communities.586  
Thus, among the critics of municipal broadband are some of the 
most-subsidized private companies in the United States.587  Until it is 
established that private companies spend the proceeds of public 
subsidies more wisely than cities or counties, the fact that the latter 
may require subsidies to start up or continue broadband projects 
should not constitute a persuasive objection to their doing so. 
                                                          
or Hurricane Katrina, because unlike landline and mobile phone systems, Wi-Fi 
mesh does not have a single weak point); Broadband Beat:  A One-Item Holiday Wish 
List:  Broadband for All, ONLINE REPORTER, Dec. 17, 2005, at 7(2) (“free wireless 
broadband network in every city, town and village” could serve as “a universal 
communication system” for “first responders”). 
 584. See Feld et al., supra note 527, at 15 (noting that hospitals which receive 
public subsidies and convention centers which go over budget are still considered 
successful if they provide a service to the community). 
 585. See FMEA, supra note 3, at 17 (comparing Bell company promises to connect 
44 million homes to broadband and other advanced networks by 2000, with reality 
that only 500,000 households were in fact connected to such networks by 2000). 
 586. Id. at 12-13. 
 587. Id. at 13; Siklos,, supra note 583, Section 3, at 3 (noting that Comcast received 
$30 million subsidy to build its corporate headquarters).  The U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation recently authorized an 
additional $500 million in subsidies to “finance broadband deployment to unserved 
areas.”  U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Committee Approves Communications Reform Bill (June 28, 2006), http:// 
commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRele
ase_id=248635&Month=6&Year=2006.  The fund, it appears, will be made available 
to private as well as public “facilities-based providers of broadband service” so long as 
they satisfy applicable eligibility requirements.  Communications, Consumer’s 
Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. 
§ 252(c)(3)(A) (2006).  
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5. Federal preemption of impediments to municipal broadband should extend 
to state constitutional restrictions 
At least one eloquent supporter of municipal broadband projects 
has contended that while all state statutory limitations should be 
preempted, state constitutional limitations should not be, out of 
respect for state sovereignty.588  He argued that when state judges 
deny municipalities the authority to provide public services unless 
expressly permitted to do so by their state legislatures, section 253(a) 
of the 1996 Act is not offended in the way that it is by state legislation 
banning municipalities from entering telecommunications markets.589  
Finding federal preemption to operate in these Dillon’s Rule states 
would turn federalism on its head, he concluded.590 
The balance between federal antitrust and telecommunications 
policy on the one hand, and state sovereignty on the other, is better 
struck by preserving state regulatory authority over municipal 
broadband projects, rather than by refusing to apply federal 
preemption altogether.  From the standpoint of competition policy, 
there is no basis for distinguishing between state statutes outlawing 
municipal broadband and state judicial prohibitions of municipal 
broadband using Dillon’s Rule.591  Federal legislation preempting 
anticompetitive state laws outlawing municipal broadband also does 
not violate state sovereignty, because it merely establishes “federal 
standards regulating [a state’s] activity” in interstate commerce, 
namely operation of state utilities, rather than commandeering states 
to implement federal regulations of private conduct.592  For those 
                                                          
 588. See Carlson, supra note 31, at 53-55 (asserting that the 1996 Act compels the 
FCC to preempt state laws but not restrictions arising from legislative inaction in 
states that follow Dillon’s Rule because state sovereignty dictates the latter). 
 589. See id. at 55-56 (claiming that pursuant to section 253(a) of the 1996 Act, the 
FCC was mandated to preempt laws that restrict competition, however in Dillon’s 
Rule states there are no laws specifically restricting municipal entry into 
telecommunications market). 
 590. See id. at 55 (arguing that if the 1996 Act preempts Dillon’s Rule, it would 
improperly establish the federal government as a source of power for municipalities, 
thereby raising Tenth Amendment concerns by fundamentally changing the balance 
of power between state and federal governments). 
 591. Like state statutes outlawing municipal entry into broadband markets, 
restraints on such entry promulgated by state courts pursuant to Dillon’s Rule “have 
the effect of prohibiting any public provider from providing, to any person or any 
public or private entity, advanced communications capability or any service that 
utilizes the advanced communications capability provided by such provider.”  
Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 
2686, 109th Cong. § 502(c) (2006).  
 592. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2000) (holding that Congress 
did not exceed Commerce Clause power or violate Tenth Amendment by requiring 
states to respect the privacy of drivers registering with state instrumentalities, i.e. state 
motor vehicle departments, and not to sell drivers’ personal data to businesses); 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) (holding that Tenth Amendment was 
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inclined to implement federal telecommunications policy in a way 
that preserves state sovereignty as much as possible, a better solution 
would be to permit state regulation and management of municipal 
broadband in the public interest, but not the total suppression of 
municipal broadband.593  This is the balance that some federal courts 
tried to strike prior to the Supreme Court’s strained interpretation of 
section 253(a), and it will better serve the goal of universal access. 594 
CONCLUSION 
Making universal and affordable high-speed Internet access a 
reality in the United States will require bold steps to accelerate 
innovation and conquer local duopolies.  Cities and counties are 
currently leading the next wave in Internet infrastructure 
deployment:  the establishment of fast, cheap, ubiquitous Internet 
service on a wireless basis.595  In too many states, however, 
                                                          
not violated by federal law requiring states to treat their older employees equally and 
not discriminate against them); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 584, 589 (6th Cir. 
2005) (holding that Tenth Amendment was not violated by federal law requiring 
state prisons to provide inmates adhering to non-mainstream religions with “access to 
literature and ritual items and . . . a chaplain trained in their religions”); Nebraska v. 
EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 997-99 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that Tenth Amendment was not 
violated by federal law requiring states’ public drinking water systems to remove 
arsenic from water); City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 661, 663 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Tenth Amendment was violated 
by federal environmental regulations that “regulated [cities] in the same manner as 
other dischargers of pollutants.”); Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, 313 F.3d 
205, 214 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that Tenth Amendment was not violated by federal 
statute requiring state officials and health care providers to collect and report 
information about incompetent physicians to federal government, because fact that 
“‘a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes 
legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a 
commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.’”) (internal citation omitted) 
(quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)); City of Bristol v. 
Earley, 145 F. Supp. 2d 741, 750 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that Tenth Amendment 
was not violated by section 253(a) of 1996 Act because Commerce Clause is express 
grant of power to Congress over interstate commerce, including the 
telecommunications industry), appeal sub nom. Beales v. City of Bristol, Nos. 01-
1741(L) and 01-1800 (4th Cir.), vacated as moot, May 1, 2002.   
 593. See Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 
2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 502(d) (2006) (setting forth antidiscrimination 
safeguards requiring  public providers to subject themselves to regulations they 
imposed, or which are imposed by state or local laws, on similarly situated privately-
owned providers).   
 594. See, e.g., Missouri Municipal League v. FCC, 299 F.3d 949, 953-55 (8th Cir. 
2002) (holding that Congress may lawfully alter “a state’s authority to regulate its 
municipalities . . .”); City of Bristol, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (Congress intended to 
preempt state laws that “stifle competition” by erecting “barriers to [municipal] entry 
into the telecommunications field”). 
 595. See, e.g., Newsom Calls for “Revolution of Solutions,” supra note 10 (describing 
San Francisco’s plan to provide wireless Internet service to all citizens); Wireless 
Philadelphia Business Plan, supra note 11 (describing Philadelphia’s plan to provide 
wireless Internet service for $20 a month throughout the city); The Big Apple Goes 
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anticompetitive laws reinforce local cable and DSL duopolies and 
block municipalities from supporting broader high-speed Internet 
access.596 
Federal legislation is needed to overrule the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Missouri Municipal League, and to ensure that all laws 
banning municipal entry into Internet access are preempted as 
contrary to the overriding federal policies of uninhibited competition 
and universal provision of telecommunications services of equally 
high quality.  Fortunately, members of Congress have already 
proposed such legislation in the form of the Community Broadband 
Act of 2005, which is being folded into broader telecommunications 
reform legislation.597  To break down structural and economic 
barriers to broadband entry, and to overcome our nation’s gaping 
digital divide in access to high-speed Internet service, Congress 
should enact such a ban on anticompetitive state laws. 
The federal courts must also be more faithful to the compromises 
worked out in Congress between private industry and the public 
interest.  Cases like Trinko and Brand X represent surprising upsets to 
pro-competitive regulatory and antitrust policies Congress put in 
place in the 1996 Act.  In both Trinko and Brand X, the Supreme 
Court’s action unnecessarily reinforced barriers to competitive 
entry.598  Congress should act to lift these barriers by legislating an 
open and competitive environment for city-supported broadband and 
Wi-Fi networks.  Let us hope that any such legislation is not rendered 
moot by judicial decree. 
 
                                                          
Wireless, supra note 12 (describing New York’s plan to build a wireless network 
blanketing Manhattan). 
 596. See California Public Utilities Commission, supra note 29, at Appendix B 
(listing more than thirty states with limited municipal deployment of broadband 
services). 
 597. See supra notes 39, 376. 
 598. See Scheuermann, supra note 283, at 15 (arguing that the decision in Trinko is 
incompatible with the 1996 Act’s antitrust savings clause); Public Knowledge, Brand X 
Decision Chills Competition (June 29, 2005), at http://www.publicknowledge.org/ 
news/intheknow/newsletter.2005-06-29.0579387602 (arguing that “the result in the 
Brand X case will ensure less competition in the provision of broadband access”). 
